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December 15, 2016
Yaxue Cao spoke with Chang Ping in Toronto on December 2, 2016.
YC: You used to be the director of the news department of the famed Southern Weekly and a columnist there, and you belong to a community of journalists who distinguished themselves in the 25 years of “market-oriented” media that coincided with the period of soaring economic development from early 1990s until recently. I’ve been wanting to hear your story, because I sensed that your trajectory as a journalist has also been the trajectory of China’s “market-oriented media.” So I’m very happy to see you. First of all, congratulations on receiving the CJFE International Press Freedom Award. They made a great choice.
Chang Ping: Thank you.
YC: I knew you were a 1989er, but I only learned yesterday, from watching the CJFE video, that you were detained for a month after the June 4th Massacre. Tell us a bit about your experience in 1989. Where were you?
Chang Ping: I was a sophomore at Sichuan University, majoring in Chinese Literature. In Chengdu, as in Beijing, college students took to the streets to protest, staged hunger strikes in the public square downtown, and held dialogues with the provincial government. I was involved in organizing some of these activities. After the crackdown, I was detained for a month and severely disciplined.
YC: How did you become a journalist?
Chang Ping: I wanted to be a novelist, and never thought much about journalism. I didn’t have a job after the June 4th protest, nor did I care for a career in the system. I stumbled on my first media job by accident: in Chengdu, a boss and I, just two of us, started a business intelligence magazine. That was 1991, the year before Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour. With scissors and glue, I cut out what I thought was useful business information and arranged it in categories such as policy, law, overseas information, etc. Back then it was still hot metal typesetting, and I had to go to the factory to set the characters with workers. In Chengdu region, small and medium businesses really needed that kind of information. Very soon we had a lot of subscribers. I had first-hand knowledge that, before Deng’s Southern Tour, the commercial impetus at the bottom half of society was already bubbling up. So for me, it wasn’t a surprise at all when, in 1992, the economy kickstarted after Deng’s tour. I also edited a book with the title “The Swelling Commercial Tides.”
After a while I quit the magazine and wrote short stories that were published in a journal called Young Writers. Some were recommended to the then-famous literary magazine Harvest. An editor asked me to revise my story, but I was so proud back then that I told him I wouldn’t change a word. At the same time I also compiled historical storybooks for young readers.
After 1992, the government began to push for market reforms. Some government-owned publications were outsourced. I leased a paper called Market Herald (《市场导报》), I was the deputy editor-in-chief, but the de facto editor-in-chief. But I loved reporting on everyday life, so I went out and wrote about, for example, Chengdu’s river channel improvement project, the living conditions of the blind, etc. The paper wasn’t making any money, so after two months it couldn’t go on. Right around that time, Chengdu Commercial Daily (《成都商报》) was founded by He Huazhang (何华章), and I joined as part of the earliest team, in charge of social reporting. Later I also edited the front page, and was one of the editorial managers.
Chengdu Commercial Daily pursued a vernacular style. Our reports, even some headlines, were written in everyday Sichuan dialect. When reporting the annual Two Sessions in Beijing, all newspapers had the same headlines as the People’s Daily, something like “The National People’s Congress Solemnly Opens in Beijing,” while our headline was simply, “NPC Held Meeting.” We were criticized for being not serious.
YC: Indeed, revolt often begins from aesthetics and taste.
Chang Ping: Chengdu Commercial Daily was an immediate success and made a lot of money. A year later, the municipal Party propaganda department took it into their hands as their own cultural achievement. Later, the paper formed a media group by consolidating with the Chengdu Evening News, which had been the leading paper of the city, a radio station, a TV station, and literary magazines, and was listed on China’s stock exchanges.
As Chengdu Commercial Daily became more and more mainstream, meaning more and more like the Party’s mouthpieces, my difference with other editors widened. I remember in early 1998 when the rock singer Cui Jian (崔健) issued “The Power of the Powerless,” I sent a reporter in Beijing to interview Cui and he talked about the difficulty of revolt. The propaganda department was very unhappy about it and chided me harshly. My commentaries were also criticized for “promoting a capitalist view of the press.”
Another event was the death of Deng Xiaoping in 1997. We had never experienced anything like that and didn’t know how to report it. But all Chinese held the wisdom that you can’t mess around with this, and you must do whatever People’s Daily does. You have to use the standard script issued by Xinhua News — but how do we design the page? We studied how papers reported Mao Zedong’s death, what font and what size of font were used for headlines. As the Party’s mouthpiece in Sichuan, the Sichuan Daily had no pressure; they simply waited for the phototypesetting of People’s Daily that was sent to all over the country — at that point it was phototypesetting printing. Our pressure came from the market. We wanted to publish early. So the editor-in-chief came up with an idea. He went to the printing factory and cheated out the phototypesetting of the People’s Daily. The next day, Chengdu Commercial Daily was the first paper in the city with the news. We were so happy about our cleverness!
About a week later, I saw a weekend paper from Guangzhou. On the left it was a large photo of Deng Xiaoping, on the right the headline was simply “Mr. Deng Passed Away.” The text below was also Xinhua’s standard announcement, the same as everyone else. I was rather shocked: what we thought was creative and smart was really nothing; we were just toadying.
I didn’t want to stay in Chengdu anymore. I met with Shen Hao (沈灏), the news director of Southern Weekly (《南方周末》), who was in Chengdu on business. He wanted me to join the rising Southern Weekly. So I did.
YC: Shen Hao was sentenced to four years in prison last year and paraded on CCTV giving “self-confessions.”
Chang Ping: He Huazhang has also been also detained. He was working at Sichuan People’s Publishing House in 1989. His career stalled because he joined the protests. He left the state system to found Chengdu Commercial Daily. The success of the paper catapulted him to hero status in China’s market reforms. He returned to government and became head of the municipal Party propaganda department and deputy mayor. He was taken into custody by the CCDI, the Party’s disciplinary committee, following the fall of Zhou Yongkang (周永康). He’s been in detention for a year or two already without trial. Many Party officials are in the same situation: no legal procedures are applied to them, and there’s no news reporting on them.
YC: Southern Weekly attracted a lot of young and idealistic reporters.
Chang Ping: At Southern Weekly, I reported on local government corruption, and environmental degradation. In 1998, there were floods across China. Jiang Zemin (江泽民) and Zhu Rongji (朱镕基) stood in the Yangtze River and reporting abounded. Southern Weekly made a plan to investigate the cause of the flood along the Yangtze River, beginning from the Tibetan plateau. Most of our series were observations: deforestation and soil erosion. I wrote similar things too, but I wasn’t satisfied. I wanted to look for stories. In Barkam (马尔康), northern Sichuan, I found a tree feller who had been honored for years as a model feller. He told me, “Now I feel the flood has something to do with me.” I wrote a report titled “The Last Model Feller,” because my sense was that there would be no more model fellers anymore, and it was a big success.
But soon Southern Weekly was “rectified.” Shen Hao was removed, and columnist Yan Lieshan (鄢烈山) and editor Cao Xihong (曹西弘) were censored.
YC: Why the rectification?
Chang Ping: Shen Hao organized a lot of reporting on the dark side of society — for example, publishing illustration of the varieties of torture police used to extract confessions. Yan Lieshan was an essayist well known for incisive criticism. Cao Xihong was the first to investigate the dark secrets of the railway and communication industries that the state monopolized.
After the rectification, I was appointed first the deputy director, and then the director, of the news department. I was responsible for news planning, page layout, and the deployment of reporters and editors. I also edited the front page, the Reporter’s Observations page, and the investigations page. Almost every weekend, I’d go out for stories, and I reported on judicial corruption, pollution, women’s rights, gay rights, and more.
At the time we tried to record changes in Chinese society using methods from anthropology and sociology. For example, we chose a village, a township, and a street in the heartland, the West, and the coast respectively — our plan was to revisit the same place at the end of every year for ten years to record its changes. I was forced to leave Southern Weekly three years later, but the editors and reporters continued and completed the plan. Ten years later, they published a book titled Here and There: A Report on the Transformation of Grassroots China (《这儿与那儿:中国转型期基层调查》).
YC: I’ll find that and take a look.
Chang Ping: I’ve always wanted to be an independent voice. At that time the majority of the journalists and commentators with dissenting views went about it by latching their own ideas onto those already in the air. For instance they’d take the “Three Represents” (三个代表) and try to explain the positive aspect of the theory, and then add in their own understanding: “Only by moving towards democracy, rule of law, and liberty will the will of the people be truly represented.” But I look at things differently. I am extremely sensitive to language. Words are not just a means of expression, they are the expression in and of itself. So if you even use “Three Represents” or similar slogans, you’re doing propaganda for it, no matter how much you try to smuggle in your own stuff. Also with Falun Gong — we were required to write about it as a political task, but we stubbornly resisted. We basically didn’t do any reports, whether good or bad. I got accused by some people of “rejecting the mainstream.”
In the spring of 2001 there was the case of Zhang Jun (张君), who for a while was a notorious triad boss. He robbed banks, killed cops, and had a record throughout Hubei, Hunan, and Chongqing, and of course had numerous mistresses. It had all the ingredients of a Hollywood movie. He was caught by Chongqing Public Security Bureau led by Wen Qiang (文强). In a photo, Wen had him on the ground, one foot on his face, and announced: “Zhang Jun is under my foot.” Wen Qiang, of course, was later executed by Bo Xilai (薄熙来) for protecting the mafia.
YC: And then Bo Xilai was himself jailed by Xi Jinping. In the Communist Party’s autocratic politics, anyone in the system can just be peeled off like a layer of cabbage — no one’s safe. Who’s to say that, in a few year’s time, Xi Jinping won’t be the one in jail?
Chang Ping: The capture of Zhang Jun was a big grand achievement for Chongqing public security — a chance for them to really bignote and back-slap themselves. They organized a lot of interviews, and a CCTV crew also went to interview Zhang Jun face-to-face in the detention center. I was mulling over how we should cover the case at Southern Weekly. Media around the country were running the story front page every day, and we were a weekly publication, so we were already a bit behind. I sent journalists to write a piece about how Zhang Jun grew up. It was titled: “Exploring the Zhang Jun Case: The Rise of a Brutal Syndicate” (《张君案检讨 – 一个极端暴力集团的成长》). It traced the story of how a simple village kid who left home to become a migrant worker in the end became the head of a triad group. It also scrutinized the operations of China’s criminal justice organs. As Zhang Jun himself put it, every time he entered prison, he came out worse. The article sent shockwaves through Hunan and Chongqing. Party bosses there wrote a letter to the Central Propaganda Department, saying Southern Weekly could even turn such a monumental achievement of law enforcement into a smear against socialism, against rural policies, and against the public security agencies.
In the autumn of 2001 Southern Weekly was “rectified” once again, after four articles we published were specifically called out and criticized. Editors and journalists were moved on and sacked. One of the four was the Zhang Jun investigation, and of the other three, one was about a cemetery for Red Guards who died in the Cultural Revolution, called “A Chongqing Cemetery Buries the Cultural Revolution’s Young Warriors” (《青春墓地埋葬重庆文革武斗》). Another was about a massive explosion in the city of Shijiazhuang, where the censors thought we’d just reported too many details. The last was a commentary about the situation in the Middle East, which made the key point that dictatorship is the source of turmoil in that region.
After those four articles were specifically named as problematic, I was removed, the editor-in-chief Jiang Yiping (江艺平) was transferred, and the deputy editor-in-chief was also transferred out. That was also the biggest turning point for Southern Weekly. I was transferred to be the deputy general manager of the circulation department — so I hadn’t actually been fired. They gave me a job title and salary, but no work.
YC: So it was just about two years after the previous “rectification.”
Chang Ping: Right. It was a time when independent voices won an unprecedented level of prestige for Southern Weekly, and it brought so much space for the imagination in freedom of speech and political reform in China. The paper also became a model that journalists and editors around China aspired to emulate. Many pro-reform scholars and lawyers were also very supportive. But it was all along also a target of repression.
YC: How many pages was the newspaper then?
Chang Ping: At the beginning it was 8, then we doubled, and then went to 24 pages. Sometimes we also added pages, and there were also experimental pages. On the professional side, Southern Weekly was really at the vanguard for trying new things, and it brought together so many people in the industry who had ideals, in particular many brilliant writers in the field. Our reports were very carefully done, and the writing was always well-crafted. Layout was exceptional, too — when I became the director of news, I put a lot of energy into photography and page design.
I left soon after I lost my editorial position. CCTV had just begun a new channel, 12, and I was invited to be the editor of a talk show. I did that for two months, so I gained some understanding of CCTV. But I simply couldn’t stand the culture there. I had to get out. In 2002, with friends from Chengdu and Guangzhou, we founded The Bund (《外滩画报》) in Shanghai. Shanghai is a city with extremely strict ideological controls — there’s a certain lifelessness about it. We hoped to inject some vitality into the place, but from the beginning we were put under strict monitoring and control. We hardly had space to operate. In 2003 I accepted an offer from the University of California, Berkeley, for a one year visiting scholarship. After I returned I went back to The Bund as deputy chief editor. In 2005 the propaganda department was unhappy with the job our official supervisor, the Shanghai Literature and Art Publishing House (上海文艺出版社), was doing keeping us in line, and they forced them to sell us to the Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group (文新集团). They didn’t want to buy, and we didn’t want to sell, but the deal went through regardless.
YC: It sounds similar to what happened recently with Yanhuang Chunqiu.
Chang Ping: Right. The Bund is still around, though it’s now turned into a fashion magazine. In 2005 I returned to Guangzhou and rejoined the Southern Group, running Southern Metropolis Weekly (《南都周刊》) as the deputy chief editor in charge of daily operations.
Southern Metropolis Weekly is a magazine of urbanized China — it focuses on civil society, the environment, women’s rights, and issues related to rights movements, ideas, culture, and so on. It’s relatively moderate in tone compared to Southern Weekly, but it’s still been hit with a lot of criticism by the authorities.
In the midst of all this, I also started writing a syndicated column, commenting on current affairs and culture. In April 2008 I published a commentary in the Chinese version of Financial Times titled: “Tibet: Nationalist Sentiment and the Truth” (《“西藏：真相与民族主义情绪”》). This was after the March 14 unrest in Tibet, where official media failed to carry any substantial reports, while social media and a number of websites let loose with a barrage of criticism against CNN, BBC, and other foreign media, accusing them of false reporting. In the piece, I wrote that if their concerns were really about news values, they shouldn’t be exclusively focused on exposing the misreporting of the Western press, but should also be calling into question the information found in the Chinese media, and the strict controls over the press in China. The latter deals far greater damage to the media environment than the former, the column argued. I also suggested that the narrow-minded Han nationalism common in China should be carefully examined. That article stirred up a tempest, and websites like China Online, KDnet, Utopia, and a few other Han nationalist sites pinned it on top of the page, and went into overdrive hyping it up. Just a single one of these forum posts got several hundred thousand hits, with tens of thousands of comments, most of them attacking me. Some people even threatened that they’d harm me and my family.
At the time too there was a Duke University student, Grace Wang (王千源), who during a campus demonstration was accused of supporting Tibetan independence. She was attacked by Chinese students at Duke, and her parents in China were attacked too. Her parents had to move into a hotel for their own safety, after attackers left feces at their door.
Beijing Evening News (《北京晚报》) took the rare step of publishing an article directly attacking me, called “Chang Ping Is a Rumormonger” (《造谣自由的南都长平》). The author, Mei Ninghua (梅宁华), writing under the pseudonym “Pen Spear” (文锋) was the president of Beijing Daily [the official mouthpiece of the Beijing municipal propaganda department]. His article caused an uproar. This dispute was the opening volley in a five year-long running debate about universal values, which Xi Jinping shut down in 2013.
Because of this I was again removed from my post, and prohibited from doing any work in the newsroom. They transferred me to the Southern Media Group’s research institute. But I kept writing columns for Southern Weekly and Southern Metropolis Daily (《南方都市报》). After six months those columns were also brought to a halt. They told me that if I agreed to stop writing, I might be able to keep my job. I refused, and kept publishing current affairs commentary in other outlets. At the end of 2010 the propaganda department demanded that the Southern Media Group completely cut off all association with me.
Newspapers, websites, and publishing houses around the country were from that point on prohibited from publishing or printing my articles or books, and websites were ordered to delete my previously-published articles and author information. At that point I had a large number of readers, and a lot of websites syndicated my blog, even real estate websites carried my column. It wasn’t me updating them. I saw myself disappearing from the internet before my own eyes — they weren’t only not publishing me, but erasing my existence. For a while, it was hard to even find my name online.
YC: It’s terrifying when you think about it. As long as they want to do it, they can make someone disappear. They can also make history, or reality, disappear. Even a journalist such as yourself can turn into such a nightmare for them, so much so that they want to expunge you completely.
When the wave of arrests in spring 2011 took place during the so-called Jasmine Revolution, what were you doing?
Chang Ping: I was a visiting scholar at Hong Kong Baptist University, and like a lot of mainlanders who came to Hong Kong to study, I went home on the weekends. Someone said to me at one point: You shouldn’t go back. Apart from writing my columns, I don’t do anything else — so should I follow this instruction and not go home? I didn’t want to be intimidated. It just so happened that right at that time I received an invitation to go to France for a forum. A number of others, including Yu Hua (余华), Zhan Jiang (展江), and Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), also participated. When I was in Paris, police in China came to my home to arrest me.
When I went back I remained in Hong Kong and helped found iSun Affairs (《阳光时务》.)
YC: iSun Affairs was a publication with serious ambition, and it brought together so many talented people, including yourself and Cheng Yizhong (程益中), who also worked for years in the Southern newspapers. iSun’s reporting on Wukan (乌坎), in particular, left a deep impression on me. You were chief editor at the time, but a lot of people may not realize that you were in Germany and had turned your schedule upside-down to work remotely. What happened there?
Chang Ping: I never expected it, but the Hong Kong government dragged out the approval of my work visa for two years (and in the end, rather than say that they had “rejected” it, they simply said that they “were no longer processing it.”) They came up with all sorts of reasons for investigating me, including an absurd attempt to establish whether or not I had taught illegally when I was a visiting scholar at Hong Kong Baptist University. As soon as they did this, it was clear that I couldn’t return to mainland China. With a PRC passport I could stay in Hong Kong for seven days at a time, so every weekend I flew to neighboring countries for “vacation,” including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Cambodia. After two months of that, Hong Kong immigration personnel told me that I couldn’t stay in Hong Kong like that — I would have to return to China or else the next time I arrived, there’d be trouble. So I never went back. After I received an invitation from the Heinrich Böll Foundation, I went from Cambodia to Germany.
Thanks to the support of my Hong Kong colleagues, I was able to stay on as the chief editor of iSun Affairs, working from Germany, for the next two years. But it also was extremely difficult, and the magazine was banned in China. In the end, we parted ways. I stayed in Germany and continued writing commentary for publications in Germany, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and continued to address the Chinese authorities’ repression.
YC: So in that case you haven’t been able to return to China since 2011. iSun Affairs had to shut down after a little over a year; one of the main investors, Chen Ping (陈平), was violently attacked in Hong Kong, Cheng Yizhong relocated to the United States, and you went to Germany. Later you wrote a column for Deutsche Welle and South China Morning Post, and got into an intense debate with another Deutsche Welle columnist, Frank Sieren, about the June 4 massacre. After SCMP was sold to Jack Ma, they immediately shut down your column. Earlier this year when the letters urging Xi Jinping to resign came out, your family in China was harassed.
Of course, the storied Southern Weekly is no more after the “Southern Weekly Incident” in January 2013. A great experiment has ended.
In 1999 “Southern Weekly” published a very famous New Year’s dedication, titled “There is a power that moves us to tears,” which said in part: “May the powerless be empowered, and may the dispirited continue forward.” This line inspired a generation of aspiring media figures. Now in 2016, press freedom in China has not only failed to progress, but has regressed dramatically. Please share some final thoughts for our interview today.
Chang Ping: Many years ago we were very optimistic. At that time I believed that every step made in the news field would promote progress in Chinese society, and that every word we wrote contained power — even if it could only be measured in milligrams. Looking back now, I often feel quite dejected. China is going backwards in so many areas. But I have never doubted the value of fighting for freedom of expression. Even if there’s no tomorrow, we still need justice today. It’s just as I put it in my acceptance speech for this award in Toronto: freedom of expression is not merely necessary for all other freedoms, but speech itself is freedom.
I made the following line the signature for my blog and social media accounts for many years: “If criticism is not free, praise is meaningless.” A friend and I translated it from the French: “Sans la liberté de blamer, il n’est point d’éloge flatteur.” It became popular and widely quoted in China, and made many people come to see how meaningless the Chinese government’s self-flattery is once it has gone around crushing all dissenting views. It makes us also see the value of critique, which was the goal of my being in the news and commentary field for so long. Now, I could disappear, but these ideas are already deeply rooted in the hearts and minds of the Chinese people.
Chang Ping (长平) lives in Germany. Follow him on Twitter @chang_ping
Yaxue Cao (曹雅学) edits this website. Follow her on Twitter @YaxueCao
China’s ‘Freedom’ Cage, by Chang Ping, 2015.
‘Speech Is Freedom Itself’ – Chang Ping’s Acceptance Speech for the CJFE 2016 International Press Freedom Award, December 1, 2016
The Virus of Censorship, by Cheng Yizhong, 2012.
By Chang Ping, published: January 18, 2015
Three months after friend and assistant Zhang Miao (張淼) was arrested, Angela Köckritz, Beijing correspondent for the German paper DIE ZEIT, wrote a detailed account to publicize the case and her own experience in the event. I admire Ms. Köckritz’s action. In similar cases, the Chinese government has used methods to impose silence on insiders, and in Zhang Miao’s case too, “her family asks that only a little be made public.” The authorities claim, explicitly or otherwise, that publicizing these cases would harm the detainees, and in a way, they are acknowledging that the Chinese judiciary can be swerved this way or that way at will depending on the public’s opinions. When families and insiders are forced to cooperate, the authorities are in fact likely commit more abuses in the absence of media and public attention.
Köckritz’s article is rife with information, including dark humor. For example, “From the beginning, it has said that Occupy Central is a ‘color revolution’ backed by foreign powers. Its argument would be more credible if it could produce a suspected spy. Maybe me?” But as a Chinese I find it hard to laugh, especially when officer Zhang, after learning that Zhang Miao didn’t have German passport and is still a Chinese citizen, said to Köckritz that “in any case Zhang Miao is a completely normal Chinese citizen. And we will treat her like we deal with Chinese citizens.” During a routine briefing of the Foreign Ministry last October, the spokesman Hong Lei, answering a question about Zhang Miao, also emphasized that “the person you mentioned is a Chinese citizen.”
If you understand why so many Chinese would do anything to secure a foreign passport for themselves and their families after they have made money or gained power, you would understand what it is like to be “treated as Chinese citizens.” Köckritz is lucky that she could still walk out of the police station after being accused of separatism and of organizing the Occupy Central protests – she cannot “enjoy” treatment reserved only for Chinese citizens.
If you are a Chinese citizen, you can be disappeared without even a plausible charge. In the aforementioned briefing, Foreign Ministry spokesman said Zhang Miao was detained for “allegedly provoking disturbances,” but Köckritz said in her article that she was at first told that Zhang Miao was “involved in a village squabble,” and then, she was told that Zhang Miao’s case is “about the security of the state, about its territorial integrity,” and “about inciting unrest.” The judiciary procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Law of PRC is supposed to regulate how police go about making charges. But the police told her that “the Criminal Procedure Law doesn’t apply.”
Ten years ago, Chinese news assistant Zhao Yan (赵岩) working for the Beijing Bureau of the New York Times was arrested on charges of leaking state secrets. Seven months later, the charges morphed into fraud. Then, shortly before Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States, the prosecutors dropped all charges against Zhao Yan. Two months later, the same prosecutorate indicted Zhao Yan again on fraud charges, and he was sentenced to three years in prison. Currently, both lawyer Pu Zhiqiang and scholar Guo Yushan were detained on one charge and then officially arrested on another. One may conclude that it is the Chinese government that is really committing fraud.
In my twenty years as a journalist in China, I have known many Chinese news assistants working for foreign media. Most of them were in fact journalists but since the Chinese government prohibits foreign media organizations to hire Chinese citizens as journalists, they could only work as assistants or researchers. Almost all of them have been interrogated by Chinese security police in the name of “chatting.” Some are forced to work for the security apparatus as informants, collecting intelligence and making routine reports. But most of them loathed it and were terrified. These circumstances are not only unfair to these Chinese media professionals, they are also a threat to freedom of press worldwide.
In China, over 200 people have been arrested for voicing support for the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, and Zhang Miao is one of them. This itself is absurd persecution against expressions. The police’s interrogation of Köckritz shows that, working for Die Zeit can be another charge against Zhang Miao in addition to supporting the Umbrella Movement. She can be investigated for, or charged with, colluding with foreign forces to separate the country, and divulging state secrets. German media and government have the responsibility to call for her freedom, and doing so is also fighting for its own press freedom.
This is the reality we must face: on the one hand, international opinion and governmental negotiation are still the forces, even the only forces, to constrain Chinese government’s wanton behaviors; on the other hand, the Chinese government cares less and less about these forces, and they even turn around to leverage against them. More foreigners are receiving the “treatment of Chinese citizens,” and in 2013, for example, Chinese-American Charles Xue was humiliated on the national TV after being detained for visiting a prostitute.
More and more foreign journalists in China have to learn to self-censor when reporting political topics, or they could be forced out of China just like Ms. Köckritz was. Reading her reports, I can see that she is a journalist who has in-depth understanding of Chinese politics and society. Forcing out such a foreign journalist, Chinese security police have once again scored big points.
Chang Ping (长平) is a veteran Chinese journalist and commentator of current affairs. He lives in Germany now.
(Translated by China Change)
By Song Zhibiao, published: July 13, 2014
At the beginning of last year, a friend proposed that we conduct a volunteer project — we do a sustained exposure and critique of the false reports and fraudulent op-eds coming out of the Global Times (Chinese version). I can imagine that this would be an onerous task requiring updates almost every day. In the end, the proposal was shelved and became a joke between friends. After all, it’s no fun cleaning up filth every day.
Before, the Global times was something that was never discussed in my small circle of friends, and now, although we don’t talk about it that much, it has gradually become a topic that, like a piece of gum, cannot be easily shaken off. This in itself is proof of a kind of invasion. On social media such as Weibo, it is being discussed more and more, just like people used to talk about the southern newspapers, such as the Southern Weekend and other papers from the same lineage¹.
The Global Times has invaded circles of public discussion as an “alien object,” and the watershed event of this was the Southern Weekend New Year Editorial incident at the beginning of 2013. At the time, the authorities made the editorial in the Global Times the “standard opinion” of the Southern Weekend incident, forcing all newspapers across China to reprint it. Scattered resistance occurred in this process, and the futility of this resistance highlights the aggressiveness of the Global Times. Ever since, it has become this uncomfortable presence.
Even though it is laughed at as a joke, I have noticed that the Global Times is mentioned in more and more of my friends’ articles. This is like embedding a commercial for the Global Times in the text of a column. In the liberal-leaning discussion of media transformation, it will be picked out as an example to explain how the system is so barbaric, indicative how much deeper it has intruded and how ubiquitous it has become.
On just about all of China’s hot stories, the Global Times is not afraid to display its crude opinions: Chen Guangcheng, the Southern Weekend incident, Pu Zhiqiang, Hong Kong’s “Occupy Central,” Taiwan’s Sunflower Student Movement – the list is long. It never uses complicated arguments and does not care about logic, and some of its sentences don’t even make grammatical sense. Its points are easy to pick apart, but this in no way implies that it is easy to defeat.
The reason that the Global Times is difficult to defeat is not that it is truthful, but rather that it shows such contempt for the truth. The Global Times is hard to insult because it knows no shame. By tearing down the standards of what is right, it sets itself “free.” In short, the Global Times is always “victorious” not because it is correct, but because it does not apply the principles everyone else respects.
Many friends have made ample revelations on the Global Times’ publishing policies, editorial standpoints, and writing style, but it is impossible to rely only on these to defeat it. In the domain of China’s current public opinion, the organizations that have principles have been gradually cleared out, and they do not have the ability to contend against the Global Times. At the same time, the political environment has now become extremely crude and ugly. Where jackals and wolfs thrive, no pure voices are to be heard.
Furthermore, the Global Times’ vulgar articles and rude opinions go hand in hand with certain characteristics of the kind of education Chinese nationals have received. It is but the manifestation of the thinking pattern propagated by the Party for dozens of years and a fact not to be disputed. Other minds and thinking have been removed as soon as they emerged, and, having done so for decades, what we have is the invincible Global Times.
Those who criticize and expose the Global Time’s way of thinking are the “other minds” I am talking about. There was a time when these “other minds” triumphed over half a China. But after several rounds of expulsions, they have now retreated and become further marginalized in the market of ideas. The Global Times has become more and more “mainstream” as more and more of these “other minds” were eradicated.
It is difficult to defeat the Global Times relying on arguments and refutation alone. In a corrupted and dumbed-down public sphere, it has obtained a super ability to reproduce: The more one talks about it, the more it spreads. Discussion meant to expose its deception will not stop it; instead, it will be stimulated and spread via whatever carries it.
Generally speaking, the rise of the Global Times reflects the collapse of China and the increasingly nasty political trend. The values the Global Times represents is not of great importance, nor is it to be feared, but is that of a snobbish opportunist disguised in the role of a government hack. It will continue to cause confusion for some time, but the force that can overpower it eventually is hidden in the very contamination it spreads.
The evil is not overcome but overtaken. The most practical way to deal with it is to not talk about it. After writing this column, I will not mention it again. It’s like a virus thriving in a particular political eco-system, if we cannot stop it, we must then quarantine it. If we cannot quarantine the crowd, we can at least quarantine ourselves. That way, we will not become its carriers and unintended promulgators.
¹ The southern newspapers refer to media publications of the Southern Media Group in Guangzhou. These papers and magazines, including the Southern Weekend, are known for their liberal-leaning content and were a magnet for China’s best journalists in late 1990s and much of the 2000s. Several waves of Party-ordered purges have since driven out their best names, such as Chang Ping, Xiao Shu, and the author himself.
Song Zhibiao (宋志标) was a commentator with the Southern Metropolis Daily in Guangzhou and well received for his commentaries on current affairs in China until May 2011. He was suspended that month for his article commemorating the third anniversary of the Wenchuan earthquake. Now he describes himself as a media watcher.
Say What? By Donald Clarke, the China Law Prof blog
(Translated by Jack and Tom)
By Mo Zhixu
Mo Zhixu (莫之许), pen name of Zhao Hui (赵晖), is a Beijing-based Chinese dissident intellectual and a frequent contributor of Chinese-language publications known for his incisive views of Chinese politics and opposition. He is the co-author of “China at the Tipping Point? Authoritarianism and Contestation” in the January issue of Journal of Democracy. With permission, we edited his piece, originally published in iSunAffair Weekend on Thursday, to reflect later developments. A more detailed account of the event itself can be found in this Foreign Policy article by Annie Zhang that I translated. –Yaxue
The predicament of Party-owned but commercialized media outlets in China
China does not have private media. Most of China’s media groups are subordinates of CCP Committees on different levels. The Party’s newspapers often look ugly, and their content unappealing, if not repulsive, without any market potential. They have always depended on forced subscriptions and state treasury subsidies for subsistence. As China “reformed,” the Party’s media organizations established and published subsidiary media outlets that answered the market demand and, at the same time, infused blood back into their parent papers. The system has embraced such a model, because it not only alleviates the financial burden of the state in supporting large media organizations, it also ensures that these organizations would benefit from the rapid economic growth without the Party losing control over mass communication.
In a very real sense, commercialized media outlets (CMO) in China, such as the Southern Weekend, are mere money trees of the Party-controlled news organizations.
Indeed, the Party has kept the leash on CMOs tight due to the singular significance of the press in any given society. Generally, leadership positions of these CMOs are appointed by parent newspapers as gatekeepers. On top of that, the Party’s propaganda department makes direct intervention regarding the content, as well as personnel matters, through phone calls, post-publication reviews, and other forms of supervision.
However, market-based operation has its own laws. Even though they are structurally still part of the system, journalists at CMO s have grown to have their own value judgment and interest placement, as they immerse in the market and become financially independent. It is inevitable that they should grow increasingly at odds with the management from the Party’s propaganda organs.
The propaganda department’s invasive grip over the publication hurts the market interest of these CMOs, and offends the professional dignity of journalists at CMOs. Resentment runs deep and wide, but it has been largely suppressed for fear of the Party’s wrath, because after all, a CMO owes its very existence to the Party and can be shut down anytime.
Rebellion at the Southern Weekend
The Southern Weekend is one of the earliest CMOs in China, thanks to its geographic advantage in Guangdong, frontline of China’s “reform and open-up.” Peaking around the turn of century, and widely regarded as a harbinger of freedom and reform, it has been cherished by both liberals outside the system and reformists inside the system. As a result, it has gained huge commercial success over the years (according to SW’s official website, it currently enjoys a distribution of over 1.7 million copies, prints in 19 cities, and grows at 15% annually).
The Southern Weekend has a clear liberal leaning that can be summed up as: Recognition of the importance of a market economy, globalization and rule of law; warmth toward individual rights, universal values, and political reform. There is nothing extraordinary about such a stand, it should be said, and it does not even exceed the Party’s official narrative, let alone step over red boundaries. There was a time when this narrative was promoted by the Party itself to respond to the demands of new social classes so that the system may extend its life by attuning itself to societal changes.
For example, as China develops rapidly, the emergent social groups are making more demands on rights and interest. The combination of market, globalization and information revolution has given these new groups a certain level of resources and means to challenge the existing system. This is manifested in more and more rights defending and struggles against injustices, also in stronger and stronger online voices for change.
For its continuous advocacy for change, the Southern Media Group—to which SW is a part—has come to be seen as a force alien to the stability-maintenance efforts of the system and must be re-shuffled and suppressed. And the Southern Weekend no doubt is a prime target, not to mention that, over the years, former Southern Weekend journalists have become the most sought-after journalists, and they have brought certain mindset to new media outlets and online media platforms across China.
In “The Virus of Censorship” published in New Statesman last fall, former editor-in-chief of the Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报, a sister publication of Southern Weekend) Mr. Cheng Yizhong (程益中) wrote that censorship tightening and personnel reshuffling have gone on for several years already, climaxing in parachuting Yang Jian(杨健), deputy propaganda chief of Guangdong province, to be the Party secretary of the Southern Media Group prior to the Party’s 18th Congress. Apart from top leadership appointments, censorship measures that have been implemented include appointing censors to be members of editorial committees, planting followers and informers among journalists, pre-publication topic selection and content review, and etc. Since last spring when Tuo Zhen (庹震) was appointed the Party’s propaganda chief in Guangdong in the spring of 2012, the pre-publication censorship at the Southern Weekend has worsened significantly.
During last week’s row, the SW revealed that, in 2012 alone, at least 1,034 of their stories were either killed, cancelled or rewritten by orders from the propaganda department. For a weekly that publishes average 40-50 stories per issue, it means that half of its stories suffer the ax of censorship. The anger that must have been building up over time finally erupted around the New Year of 2013.
Future is elsewhere
Over the past week or so, the editors and journalists demanded for Tuo Zhen’s resignation and an investigation of the “truth” behind the procedural breach regarding its New Year’s special edition and New Year’s message. They issued open letters; they organized a signature campaign; and they even threatened a strike. Public support for them stormed on to Weibo.
By Tuesday and Wednesday though, there were signs that an internal split had occurred, conservatives among them had gained the upper hands, and the idea of a strike had faded away quietly. By Thursday it was over as the latest issue came out without giving any explanation about what deals had been made.
This means only one thing: the Propaganda Department has won, and the Southern Weekend’s revolt has failed. Without any rights or independence to speak of, the Southern Weekend will surely face a purge. Frankly, from the moment that agreement was reached (whatever it was), the fate of the liberal weekly was sealed.
As a matter of fact, the structural quandary of CMOs decides that journalists at these organizations are extremely unlikely to take unified, collective actions against censorship. A CMO is a hybrid whose upper body is the rigid system and lower body the fluid market. Within the same newspaper, you have the publisher, the editor-in-chief, and the editorial committee parachuted in by the party on the one hand, and you also have what is called “migrant workers” in journalism on the other. The former could hardly be expected to rise against the system because they are part of the system and their interests are rooted in it. If some of them do as in this week’s event, they easily concede. As for the migrant journalists, while there are fewer strings holding them back, they would not want to make sacrifices for something that they don’t have a sense of belonging.
There is a winner though in the Southern Weekend episode, and that’s the hundreds of ordinary citizens from all walks of life who took their actions to the street. Furthermore, the street protesters made appeals different from that of the SW journalists who, throughout the event, stated consistently in their string of open letters the desire to voice and solve their discontent within the confinement of the system, even using expressions such as “fully respect the Party’s control over the media.” For the first time over the last 24 years, we saw banners and slogans calling for “freedom of expression,” “constitutional democracy,” “lift ban on freedom of the press,” “abolish censorship” and more. For several days it was like a joyful festival outside the Southern Media Group compound, and those young and beautiful faces have impressed me deeply and given me hope.
All too soon, the first major event in 2013 was over. My sense is that those action takers need to project their voices in more places and elsewhere in order to realize their goals. As Mr. Liu Xiaobo said it before, a free China will only be born from people outside the system.
I assume you are a China watcher and already know the Southern Weekend (also translated as the Southern Weekly) incident that’s been raging on for the last couple of days. If you are not, you’ll find out here. Either way, I want to place the incident in the larger picture.
China doesn’t have an independent press – we all know that. The Southern Weekend is a part of the Southern Media Group (南方报业传媒集团), a Guangdong provincial-level state-owned media enterprise. Like any state-owned enterprises, whether they manufacture sewage pipes or produce newspapers, its top leader is the Party secretary (党委书记) and, in NMG’s case, the position is concurrently held by the Deputy Chief of the Propaganda Department of Guangdong province. The Group operates like a corporation, but its important positions are appointed by the Propaganda Department, and the members of its editorial boards, according to what has been revealed, are all censors. On top of that, the Propaganda Department issues written/oral directives about what and how news should, or should not, be reported down to the smallest detail. In this, all media groups and newspapers in China are about the same.
That said, the NMG papers, the Southern Weekend in particular, have been known for their liberal bent, as much as it’s been possible under the muzzle of censorship. A magnet for China’s best journalists, it has enjoyed a reputation for being refreshing, diverse and daring, and, for that, a large and loyal readership across the country.
Over the years, however, the papers have gone through several significant “purges” where editors and journalists were fired for their reports that were considered to have stepped over boundaries. Cheng Yizhong (程益中), former editor-in-chief of Nanfang Metropolis Daily, was falsely charged with embezzlement (the charges were dropped later) but he was really punished for the paper’s aggressive reporting on SARS and the Sun Zhigang case (孙志刚案). Chang Ping (长平), former news director of the Southern Weekend, was forced out in 2011 after being fired twice before for his reports and commentaries. These are only two examples. Many others also lost their jobs such as Xiao Shu (笑蜀), Li Wenkai (李文凯).
With the “purges”, the papers have declined. In an article published in the New Statesman last October, Cheng Yizhong detailed how censorship had been tightened in the paper and how informants had been planted to monitor journalists and editors. In an interview with Radio Netherlands Worldwide on Monday, Chang Ping said that, over the last five years, media outlets in Guangdong had been regressing steadily. He said, although Wang Yang (汪洋) has been widely perceived as a reformist and entertained rhetoric of “thought liberation” when he first arrived in Guangdong, censorship during his tenure has gotten worse. Indeed, many loyal readers of NMG papers will readily tell you that “it’s not like it used to be” these days.
According to a statement by the Southern Weekend editors, in 2012 alone, 1,034 of their stories were censored one way or the other.
1,034! You can just imagine the frustration and humiliation fermenting over there day in and day out.
The Southern Weekend incident that has been raging started from a Weibo post complaining about a procedural breach by the Propaganda Department: The paper has a long tradition of publishing a New Year’s greeting letter, and this year’s letter was entitled “China’s Dream, the Dream of Constitutionalism.” Approved by censors (everything the paper publishes has to be approved by censors) and signed off by editors, it was ready to be printed. But without the knowledge of the editors, officials at the Propaganda Department rewrote it, retitled it as “Chasing the Dream”, and put it in print (read a rundown of the chain of events here and a more detailed account here).
Over the last few days, Weibo was ablaze with condemnation of the Party’s control of media and support for the Southern Weekend. Several statements and petitions by the journalists themselves, by interns, by prominent intellectuals, by the public have been circulated.
Now, what I want to point out in this post is this: Whatever the journalists at the Southern Weekend may want at the bottom of their hearts, they have NOT been appealing for freedom of the press, or the lift of censorship. They are merely protesting the procedural breach and demanding the resignation of Tuo Zhen (庹震), the Party’s propaganda chief in Guangdong.
They have their prohibitions obviously: this is their livelihood and they are not ready, or not in a position, to give it up.
Besides, the journalist body there is not monolithic: Among them, there are supporters of the Propaganda Department and censorship, or people who have been planted by the department.
However, most of their supporters online and offline are taking the opportunity to appeal for significantly more: freedom of the press and other fundamental demands.
So, essentially, these are two separate campaigns. What will the SW journalists and editors do next? Will they escalate or retreat? How will happen to the public outcry? As I write, protesters from the general public are gathering outside the entrance of the NMG compound with signs such as this:
All in all, the New Year’s greetings from China are surprising and fascinating. Stay tuned.