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Economics Professor Expelled for ‘Politically Harmful’ Expressions, Including Estimate of Staggering Cost to Maintain the Communist Party Apparatus
China Change, August 21, 2018
Yang Shaozheng (杨绍政), a couple of months shy of 49, was for 11 years a professor of good standing in the College of Economics at Guizhou University. He taught game theory and advanced microeconomics, focused his research on optimization theory and mechanism design theory, and managed numerous provincial- and state-funded research projects. On August 15, however, Guizhou University made a decision to expel him for “long-running publication and spreading online of politically mistaken speech, writing a large number of politically harmful articles, and creating a deleterious influence on campus and in society.” He was also guilty of “being unrepentant” and refusing to accept “educational help.”
Prior to this, last November, Yang was suspended from teaching and banned from advising graduate students. According to a personal statement he published online, Yang repeatedly approached the administration and the university’s Party Office to demand a formal statement of reasons for the sanctions. In each case he was fobbed off or refused. His written appeal to the university president was ignored.
Around the same time, Yang’s WeChat account and his blog were shut down, leaving him cut off from all public communication channels to express his views.
Last November, Yang submitted to New Tang Dynasty Television, a station affiliated with Falun Gong, a persecuted spiritual practice, a short article titled: “Can We Really Leave the Party Out of Our Economic Research?” (《我们经济研究中政党真的可以被忽略？》) The essay said: “Party personnel as well as the staff of some non-Party mass organizations are sustained by the taxes of the citizenry plus the state’s revenue. They are across the government, the military, mass organizations, state enterprises, educational and cultural institutions, and the organs responsible for Party Affairs. Their number exceeds 20 million; the cost to maintain them, including the loss of wealth caused by maintaining them, is estimated at 2 trillion yuan annually, with every Chinese carrying a burden of roughly 15,000 yuan each.”
Yang published the more detailed analysis, with the full title: “How the Estimate of All of Mainland China’s Government, Party, Mass Organization and State Enterprise Annual Costs Coming to 2 Trillion Was Calculated,” though it has since been deleted from his Sina blog.
In the article, he wrote that in two different economic systems — with all else being equal — one of them that had to “provide for that many regime officials would become increasingly impoverished. As long as nothing changes, the society that has to sustain the more government officials will ultimately collapse.”
Yang Shaozheng pointed out that despite the problem being so important for the future of the country, in China it is a forbidden area of enquiry and a blindspot in the public realm. Interestingly, in the article Yang described how several scholars pointedly avoided the topic at an academic conference he attended on political economy. During the tea break he brought up the question of Party expenditures to other scholars. Fudan University professor Zhang Jun (张军), gave no response; Zhejiang University professor Zhang Xukun (张旭坤) said he was worried that there may be State Security (国保) officers on site; Chongqing University professor Pu Yongjian (蒲勇健) said: “You understand what’s going on. If you’ve got the courage, go research it.”
In 2005, a researcher named Mu Zhengxin (穆正新) published an essay, which was widely disseminated, titled “The Chinese Communist Party is the Most Expensive Political Party” (《最昂贵的政党是中国共产党》). Mu calculated the expenditures on maintaining the Party apparatus, which he narrowly defined as Party organs and projects that have been set up just for the Communist Party and that are operated with funds from state revenue. The organs included in his calculations are: 1) The Party Committees, disciplinary committees, and consultative conferences at every level of government; 2) The specialized Party organs in schools and universities; 3) Organizations set up by the Communist Party, including the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the All-China Women’s Federation, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, as well as the Party’s youth organizations and numerous, countless other variants; 4) Party organs in police, military, and paramilitary systems, as well as courts and procuratorates; 5) The Party Affairs units inside state-owned enterprises; 6) The Party organs and expenditures for propaganda projects that go on inside Party mouthpiece media; 7) Overseas united front and propaganda work.
Mu Zhengxin’s calculations indicate that the Party’s annual expenditures on the above, just to sustain the Party, came to about 226 billion yuan. Ten years later, all signs indicate that such expenditures have, rather than decreasing, expanded enormously, possibly well beyond that dedicated to the educational system — and certainly far outstripping the budget dedicated to healthcare. Inquisitive readers are invited to examine the Chinese government’s budget for themselves.
Yang Shaozheng’s figures included not merely the costs of sustaining the Party apparatus, but also the loss associated with the constant drain of these costs (including the massive corruption that takes place).
As to Communist Party expenditures, in 2012 the Peking University professor of law He Weifang (贺卫方) wrote on Weibo: “The Party’s treasury cannot be confused with that of the country. Party cadres cannot derive their income from the national treasury, and instead should be supported by the Party’s own fees. Taxpayers pay their taxes to a secular national government, not a Holy Party.” (Professor He’s original post has likely been expunged entirely; the only online traces of it are in forwarded messages like this.) On March 27, 2016, He Weifang proposed on Weibo that national budgetary support be withdrawn from the Communist Youth League.
These demands are of course feeble without a transformation of the political system. The effect they do achieve, however, is to remind the public and the scholarly community to consider these issues. We look forward to Professor Yang Shaozheng and other Chinese or foreign political economists engage in detailed studies and calculations on this issue.
Prior to the Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Yang was twice called in for ‘chats’ by the Public Security Bureau in Guizhou Province. He told Radio Free Asia in an interview: “The first was on September 19. They said that during the 19th Party Congress I had to keep my mouth shut. I couldn’t speak, couldn’t write anything online, and couldn’t say anything political during class. I said to them at the time: what you’re doing here is illegal according to our national constitution. The second time they came to me was the very evening of the opening ceremony of the 19th Party Congress, at about 9:00 p.m. They first accused me of spreading rumors. I asked them where I was supposed to have spread rumors and demanded that they present the facts. They had no facts to present. In the end they told me explicitly that I had to shut up, and then asked whether I’d do so or not. I told them clearly that I wouldn’t be quiet. They froze my Weibo account. I told my students about what happened.”
Yang Shaozheng’s writings on websites inside China have been blocked or purged, and now only a few of his articles are available on some sites outside the country. In 2012 when Yang’s personal page “Statecraft for the People” (经世济民) on KDNET, a popular Chinese-language website, was deleted without prior notice, he wrote to the website administrator: “Today it was my website that was unconstitutionally disappeared; tomorrow I myself may be, unconstitutionally and without reason, also disappeared; and you, among many others, may also have their websites or books disappeared, or be disappeared yourselves.”
An overseas human rights activist told China Change that, over the weekend, Yang Shaozheng and his family were attempting to travel to Hong Kong when they were intercepted at the border. China Change has been unable to contact Yang so far.
Over the last few years, numerous university professors have been expelled, pulled from classes, sacked, or had their Party memberships rescinded, among other punishments, for their transgressions of thought and speech. A sampling of such cases over the last two years includes:
- Deng Xiangchao (邓相超), the vice dean of the School of Art at Shandong Jianzhu University, who was forced to retire in January 2017 after he forwarded a number of posts making fun of Mao Zedong on Mao’s birthday;
- Zhai Jiehong (翟桔红), associate professor in the law school at the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law in Wuhan, who in May 2018 had his Party membership cancelled and was suspended from teaching after criticizing the constitutional amendment (to remove the tenure limit on the head of state in China);
- You Shengdong (尤盛东), a professor of international trade at Xiamen University, who in June 2017 was sacked after being informed on by students for making statements in class that were “opposed to the socialist value outlook”;
- Li Mohai (李默海), an associate professor and director of the political department in the political-law school of Shandong Institute of Business and Technology, who was sacked in July 2017 for “publishing incorrect speech online”;
- Shi Jiepeng (史杰鹏), an associate professor of classical Chinese at Beijing Normal University who in August 2017 was expelled for “publishing incorrect views online over a long period of time,” “crossing the red line of ideology management, violating political discipline, and causing severe damage to the reputation of the university”;
- Xu Chuanqing (许传青), an associate professor at Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture who in September 2017 was subject to administrative punishment after being informed on by students in his Probability Theory class for “making inappropriate comparisons between Japanese and Chinese people and giving free reign to his personal dissatisfaction.”
Liu Shuqing (刘书庆) and Zhang Xuezhong (张雪忠), two university professor who are also human rights lawyers, were also deprived of their teaching qualifications. Liu Shuqing was disbarred from practicing law, and while Zhang Xuezhong has managed to keep his license, he’s been unable to practice due to the university’s concerted interference. Recently Zhang, a law professor, received a harsh warning from the police for publishing a proposal for drafting a new constitution by citizens that aimed to help create a modern political system in China.
In July, the Tsinghua University law professor Xu Zhangrun (许章润), in Japan as a visiting scholar, published a lengthy essay titled “Imminent Fears, Immediate Hopes” which carried out a thoroughgoing critique of — and expressing his deep concern about — Chinese political and social life. In writing the essay, he seemed to have made preparations for whatever would come to him, again showing that in China today, the freedom of expression of intellectuals is deeply imperiled.
In early August, Sun Wenguang (孙文广), a retired professor from Shandong University was set upon and dragged away by half a dozen police officers, who barged into his home while he was in the middle of an interview with Voice of America. The recording cut off live as he was hauled off. He was illegally detained for several days before being allowed to return home, and since then hasn’t been able to speak with journalists. A VOA journalist and news assistant who visited him previously were also temporarily detained.
In September 2017, Professor Yang Shaozheng, no place to publish, no blog to write, and unable to have a social media account inside China, came to Twitter. Few knew who he was. He posted screenshots of his writings and published them on his feed as though speaking to himself. His inaugural tweet reads, “The more I think, the more distressed I become. It’s hard to pursue the truth; it’s hard to speak the truth; and it’s hard to be a truthful person. Being able to freely express ourselves, without terror, is our dream.”
Xu Zhangrun’s China: ‘Licking Carbuncles and Sucking Abscesses’, China Change, August 1, 2018
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Testimony: American Universities Are Chess Pieces in China’s Grand Quest for Advanced Science and Technology
Yaxue Cao, founder and editor of ChinaChange.org
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee Hearing: Is Academic Freedom Threatened by China’s Influence on U.S. Universities?
June 25, 2015
(This is an abbreviation of the full testimony)
Dear members of the Subcommittee,
I’m pleased to have this opportunity to speak today about the Chinese government’s policies on joint higher education ventures, its mechanisms of controlling them, the Party’s presence in these ventures, and the regime’s severe suppression of academic freedom in Chinese universities.
China’s national policies on joint ventures in higher education
In 2003, China first issued the Regulation on Chinese-foreign Cooperative Education (《中华人民共和国中外合作办学条例 》) to set the rules for joint-venture higher education programs. Between 2004 and 2007, China issued several follow-up regulatory documents regarding the implementation of the initial regulation. In 2010, China promulgated the National Plan for Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development (2010 – 2020) (《国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要(2010-2020年)》) . The National Plan devotes a chapter (Chapter 16) to joint higher education, which gives a more detailed, and more visionary, description of its purpose and implementation. In 2014, the Ministry of Education issued a document reviewing the joint higher education ventures over the past three years, since the promulgation of the National Plan (《教育规划纲要实施三年来中外合作办学发展情况》).
The purpose of joint ventures in higher education is to bring the best international higher education resources to China. This includes: “bringing world-class experts and scholars to China to engage in teaching, research, and management; conducting joint research with first-rate foreign universities on advanced basic research and high technology, especially in the areas of science, technology, agriculture, and medicine; and introducing educational ideas, content, teaching methods, talent training models and management expertise.”
The Regulation encourages foreign education institutions to primarily use their intellectual property as their investment in the joint venture.
When admitted into WTO in 2001, China promised to open its education sector to foreign universities, and allow “foreign majority ownership.” But China has had no intention to deliver that promise. Meanwhile, it has sought to take advantage of the best education, research, and knowledge resources from foreign institutions.
The solution to these opposed goals is to set up a joint venture with the Chinese government being the controlling party.
The Regulation stipulates that the board of these joint ventures must have a Chinese majority, and the president must be a Chinese citizen. “Courses and imported textbooks in these joint-venture programs or universities must be submitted to government review and approval organs for record.” And “the joint-venture programs and universities must provide courses about the Chinese constitution, law, citizen morality, and the current state of the country, just as similar domestic institutions are required.”
The most insidious part of the control mechanism probably lies in the finance of these joint-venture universities. It is also the least transparent part. Financial dependence on the Chinese government, even if it is partial, puts foreign universities in a vulnerable position where they may feel the need to conform to China’s expectations, not only on the joint-venture campuses, but also on home campuses.
According to the Ministry of Education, the near 2,000 joint-venture programs in China focus on advanced manufacturing, modern agriculture, and modern service sectors. And China wants more talent in the fields of energy, mining, environmental protection, and finance. Of the near 2,000 programs, 37% are engineering, while literature, history, and law are less than 2% each.
Recent developments show that China’s quest for advanced knowledge and technology is coming to this country. Just a few days ago, newspapers reported the launch of a technology institution called the “Global Innovation Exchange Institute” in Seattle, a joint venture of China’s elite university Tsinghua University, the University of Washington, and Microsoft, that focuses on technology and design innovation in the areas of the Internet of things, intelligent cities, mobile healthcare, and clean energy. U.S. media reported that Microsoft was the investor, but in the Chinese press it was described as “an important step and a milestone of Tsinghua University’s international strategic deployment.”
Two other recent reports in Chinese newspapers indicate that China is seeking investment in the research triangle of in North Carolina. In an innovation forum at the University of Maryland, a Chinese official expressed the desire to build the first innovation incubation platform on the East Coast, with Chinese investment and research expertise from American universities.
Another component of China’s strategy is theft. Reports on this abound. For example in May, Penn State University disclosed that its engineering school had been invaded by Chinese hackers for more than two years. Penn State develops sensitive technology for the U.S. Navy.
China’s intentions in the world of higher education were made clear in two instances involving UC Berkeley. In November 2014, Peking University gave the President of UC Berkeley an honorary professorship, and expressed interest in “cooperation” on big data processing, a new and important computing technology with wide application. In February 2015, WSJ reported the forced closure of a labor center in Guangzhou jointly established by UC Berkeley, and Sun Yat-sen University, as part of the systematic suppression of rights activities and civil society.
The presence of the Communist Party in joint-venture programs
CCP presence in Chinese universities is thorough, from top leadership down to student cells. Reports in Chinese press confirm the CCP presence on joint venture campuses as well. From the Ministry of Education’s review in 2014, I quote: “Joint-venture universities have established Party committees so that there would be the Party’s work wherever the masses are, and there would be a Party organization wherever there are Party members, achieving the Party’s no-blind-spot coverage on a grassroots level. Some universities have also established overseas Party cells to ensure that the Party’s work remains synchronized with its work at home when students….study abroad.”
Academic freedom pummeled at Chinese universities
In China’s current political system there has never been academic freedom as understood by Americans, though the level of repression has fluctuated. Much has been written about the Chinese Communist Party’s Document No. 9, issued in the spring of 2013, which prohibits Chinese universities from teaching ideas about constitutional governance, universal values, free press, civil society, and the rule of law. This edict is shutting down what little academic freedom was enjoyed before. Articles, such as a recent piece in the Christian Science Monitor, have reported that professors were fired, or pressured to quit their jobs, for espousing liberal ideas and teaching them in the classroom; Party officials cut or constrained trips to academic conferences; student reading lists were vetted for ideological content. A media professor told the paper that, “There are topics I know that as soon as they are mentioned in my classes, I would be sacked immediately.”
For the record, I would like to quote a social media post of the well-known law professor He Weifang (贺卫方) at Peking University from last December. The post was later deleted by China’s Internet censors, but I was able to read a preserved copy and have confirmed its authenticity:
【Universities are as silent as the winter cicadas】 When lecturing, it is like walking on thin ice because there are surveillance cameras overhead. Gingerly we conduct research. We are not supposed to write papers on constitutional democracy; even if we do, there is no place to publish them. To take part in an international conference, we have to file a request with the authorities one year in advance, and the request would be denied if it is deemed even slightly sensitive (there are no transparent criteria for what is sensitive). Many on-campus academic lectures must be approved by the propaganda department of the university’s CCP Committee. It’s a mystery which faculty members are on the “black list.” They have been incessantly talking about making Chinese universities world-class universities. How do they do that?
Over the past three decades, China has benefited from an unprecedented transfer of knowledge and know-how from Western countries, much of it through joint ventures and through theft of intellectual properties. Many such relationships have soured in recent years, and the trend is likely to deepen. Now, the Chinese government is attempting to duplicate its successes in the business realm and apply them to the world of higher education. Its aim is to extract the knowledge and expertise from the world’s most prestigious and successful research institutions, all the while pursuing a political agenda that tramples on the very principles that set the human mind free and that are the basis of higher education as we know it.
I have no problem with free exchange of knowledge and technology. But I have a problem with freely providing knowledge and technology to the communist regime in China, which has no other effect than to strengthen it and its grip on power. I have a problem with our institutions of higher education looking the other way as terrible human rights violations take place in the country.
The US-China relationship for the last 30 years has operated on the premise that the US should engage with China, help her grow economically, and that economic development will lead to the Chinese Communist Party’s embracing human rights and democratic values. Instead, today we have a monstrous combination of state capitalism, the kleptocratic marriage of power and money, and broader and harsher suppression of the Chinese people’s legitimate demands for political and civil rights. Internationally, we are witnessing an increasingly aggressive China, a rising threat to the global peace and security, and a challenge to the existing world order.
One can argue about all the defects of the current order, but I assure you with absolute certainty that you do not want a global regime set up and dominated by the Chinese Communist Party.
The CCP has mastered the game of taking advantage of a free society like ours. It is sad to see how easily our universities can fall prey to the Party’s scheme. It is my wish that American universities are able to see the full picture, where they fit into it and what end they are serving when becoming a business partner with the Chinese government.
Innocent Abroad? Liberal Educators in Illiberal Societies, by Jim Sleeper. Ethics & International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, summer issue, 2015.
A 6,000-word assessment of American universities’ joint ventures with regimes in Singapore, China, the Emirates, and elsewhere, accompanied by an audio interview with the author.
New York University Shanghai: What Is the Deal? by Yaxue Cao, February 5, 2015.
Testimonies in the first of the series of hearings (more to come): Is Academic Freedom Threatened by China’s Influence on American Universities? December 4, 2014. Prof. Perry Link; Prof. Cushman; Prof. Xia Yeliang.
(According to the Subcommittee Chair, most of the university administrators called upon to testify have declined to do so; President Sexton of NYU was given 16 dates to choose from, but has evaded the hearing so far.)
By Hu Shaojiang, published: February 10, 2015
Bring back thought policing……
Yesterday [January 29], the Chinese Minister of Education Yuan Guiren (袁贵仁) called in a conference for the implementation of “The Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving Propaganda and Ideological Work in Higher Education under the New Circumstances,” a document recently issued by the General Office of the Communist Party of China and the State Council. Leaders of Education Bureaus in Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu as well as leaders of Peking University, Tsinghua University, Wuhan University, Shandong University, and Xiamen University attended the conference. Yuan Guiren’s speech is part of the Chinese government’s effort to re-ideologize Chinese higher education.
In China, there was a time when universities were little more than the ideological mouthpieces of the CCP, diminishing their original purpose to disseminate knowledge and foster personal growth. Following the Party’s ideological bankruptcy in the 1980s, independent thoughts flourished on college campuses. However, the party has always resented the loss of its absolute monopoly on ideology on campuses and has held deep-rooted hostility towards Western ideas popular among university students and professors. Since Xi came to power, the re-ideologization of Chinese higher education has become what they call a “new normal” in education.
The campaign to re-ideologize Chinese universities draws on three points. The first is to demonstrate support for the party’s leadership. Reporting this conference, the mouthpiece media claimed that Chinese university professors and students “wholeheartedly support the party’s leadership, fully trust the CCP with comrade Xi Jinping as its General Secretary, and confidently believe in socialism with Chinese characteristics and the great revival of the Chinese nation through the Chinese Dream.” This glorification of Xi Jinping is aimed at legitimizing support for the party leadership in university education.
Following practices from the Mao era, administrative organs of education announced that they will take concrete measures to spread ideologies espoused by Chinese political leaders. This is the so-called “Three Into-es” requirement: “rigorously introduce the words of the General Secretary Xi Jinping into our teaching materials, into classrooms and into minds.” In other words, education bureaus in China will spare no efforts to use public resources and classroom podiums to advocates Mr. Xi’s ideology.
I believe it won’t be difficult at all to adapt Xi Jinping’s words “into teaching materials” and “into classrooms;” the education bureaus and the university authorities will only need to impose an administrative order to force the implementation. However, it is a completely different question as to whether these intellectually vapid and logically absurd ideologies can be implanted “into the minds” of the students. The history of China, or elsewhere, has proved that forced political indoctrination of young people with words of political leaders rarely achieves the goal of the indoctrinators. Instead, it fosters detestation.
The second measure to re-ideologize universities is to tighten control over teaching through executive commands. This has been specifically spelled out as the Four Nevers: “Never allow textbooks that promote western values into our classrooms; never allow any remarks that attack, defame or discredit the party’s leadership or socialism to appear in college classrooms; never allow any kind of speech in violation of the Constitution or laws to spread in college classrooms; and never allow teachers to make complaints, vent grievances in classrooms that would affect the students.”
The purpose of the “Four Nevers” is to prevent college students to gain knowledge about the evolution of human societies, suppressing any thought or speech that shows the deficiency of ideologies promoted by Chinese leaders. This is rather similar to orders given by Chinese imperial courts to “depose the hundred schools of thoughts and promote only Confucianism.”
The truth becomes clearer the more an issue is debated; only a heated debate with different points of views can test the validity of an idea. Ideologies that cannot withstand the heat of argument and are in need of administrative protection are often shallow, absurd and vulnerable.
The third measure to re-ideologize higher education in China is to restore and strengthen thought policing on college campuses. When an orthodox ideology has to be implemented through administrative enforcement and when it is sustainable only by eradicating competing ideologies, this ideology is bound to contravene human nature in fundamental ways. Such lifeless ideas cannot gain popularity, cannot sustain for long, let alone thrive. In this battle with the state and its leaders on one side and the people and the humanity on the other, a system of thought policing is inevitable.
On university campuses in China, there are two groups of people who carry out the thought policing. One group is the university staff in charge of propaganda, consisting of Party cadres, Youth League cadres, and full-time student counselors. The other group are faculty who teach the thought education classes. They are teachers but they are also thought police. They are long on political orthodoxy and short on any convincing scholarship. Yuan Guiren, in his speech, voiced clear support for these people and vowed to increase their ranks. One can anticipate that these “thought police” will once again be monitoring professors and students alike on campuses.
Hu Shaojiang (胡少江) is a commentator for Radio Free Asia.
China Education Minister Demands Rejection of Western Values, Associated Press, January 29, 2015.
China Tells Schools to Suppress Western Ideas, With One Big Exception, the New York Times, February 10, 2015.
China Is Not A Normal Country, by Chang Ping, December 22, 2014.
(Translated by Diana Zhang)
By Yaxue Cao, published: February 5, 2015
A recent event prompted me to look into New York University Shanghai. I was rather surprised by what I found. This article pieces together my findings which include information available through the media as well as websites, in the spirit of “tossing out a brick hoping to attract a gem (抛砖引玉).” If it can help deepen inquiries and debate about the host of issues that can arise from setting up university campuses in China, as more American universities are set to do, it will have more than served its purpose.
“A Testing Field to Demonstrate Reform on International Cooperation in Chinese Higher Education”
NYU Shanghai is a joint venture between East China Normal University (ECNU) and New York University, “the first Sino-US joint venture university” according to NYU Shanghai’s website, whose first undergraduate class was inaugurated in the fall of 2013. According to the Chinese state media China News, the joint enterprise was approved by the Ministry of Education of China on January 17, 2011, and construction began on March 28 the same year in Lujiazui, the heart of Shanghai’s newly-developed Pudong District (上海浦东陆家嘴). A vice president of ECNU headed the team that oversaw the construction of and preparation for NYU Shanghai. Given that China’s universities, ECNU included, are owned and run by the government, it is fair to say that NYU Shanghai is a joint venture between NYU and the Chinese government.
The Chancellor of NYU Shanghai, Yu Lizhong (俞立中), “joined NYU Shanghai from ECNU, where he served as president from 2006 – 2012,” and the vice chancellor is Jeffrey Lehman, a former president of Cornell University. On the “Leadership” page of NYU Shanghai website, no information about its Board is listed; the only disclosure made is that Chancellor Yu Lizhong doubles as the Chairman of the Board of Directors.
Yu Lizhong told Beijing News that “in January, 2006, in search of a cooperation partner, NYU chose ECNU and launched the NYU Shanghai Center. In 2008, NYU president John Sexton asked whether NYU could move a step forward to establish a campus in Shanghai. We told him that it was impossible under the current circumstances, and that if he wanted to open a campus in China, it had to be a joint venture.”
China’s Regulations of Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running Academic Institutions (《中外合作办学条例》), effective since September 1, 2003, stipulates that “the president or the principal administrator of a Chinese-foreign cooperatively-run school shall be a person with the nationality of the People’s Republic of China, domiciles in the territory of China, loves the motherland, possesses moral integrity, and has work experience in the field of education and teaching as well as compatible professional expertise,” and “shall be subject to the examination and approval by the approving authorities.”
As a joint business, China has 51% share in NYU Shanghai and is the controlling party, and NYU has 49% share. Correspondingly, 51 percent of each entering class must be Chinese nationals, while the remaining 49 percent come from around the world, but mostly from the U. S.
This arrangement of ownership is similar to the model with which China has attracted foreign companies over the last three decades, gaining intellectual properties and learning know-how from its western partners. Now it looks like China is trying to reproduce this model in higher education.
A Chinese official’s description of the negotiations between NYU and its partner suggests that this arrangement was not what NYU first envisioned, but a result of yielding to a considerably different vision held by the Chinese side. The former deputy chief of Pudong District, who oversaw the district’s education affairs and took part in the entire process of building NYU Shanghai, said the two sides had gone through “difficult negotiations” about the size of the campus, the scale of the school, and the property rights of the university. “We faced a series of challenges during the project preparation process, and the negotiations were extraordinarily arduous. But we persevered, holding our ground and overcoming one difficulty after another to defend the interest of the Chinese side.”
That China in the end is the controlling party of NYU Shanghai should surprise no one, because NYU Shanghai was to be the vehicle to test its vision and achieve its goals. According to the same official, the Chinese Ministry of Education designated NYU Shanghai as the No. 1 pilot project in implementing China’s Outline of the National Plan for Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development (2010 – 2020) (more elaboration later). Moreover, the mayor of Shanghai instructed in October, 2010, that “introducing New York University is a landmark project to internationalize higher education in Shanghai. ….With the full support of the Ministry of Education, the synergy between all parties will accelerate the first-phase work and propel the signing the agreement as soon as possible.” On March 29, 2011, Liu Yandong (刘延东), a member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and a vice premier of the State Council who oversees education and culture affairs, told NYU president John Sexton and his delegation that she “encourages all parties involved in the preparation work to deepen their cooperation and make NYU Shanghai a testing field to demonstrate reform on international cooperation in Chinese higher education.”
This was also confirmed by a delegation of Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress during a campus visit on March 27, 2014. During a meeting that seemed to have been attended by Chinese administrators only, including the Chancellor, the Chairwoman of the municipal NPC iterated that “NYU Shanghai is a national education reform pilot project” and “the success of NYU Shanghai will help other universities…in their continued innovation and education reform.”
“NYU Shanghai is not a branch of NYU”
NYU Shanghai’s inaugural class admitted 295 students in the fall of 2013, 150 of whom were Chinese nationals and 145 were international students that are mostly from the United States, according to Tyra K. Liebmann, then Dean of Students, in an interview with a Chinese paper. Its apparently outdated FAQ page says “NYU Shanghai will be admitting 300 student for class of 2014, …and the enrollment scale for class of 2015 will remain the same.” But as of October 2014, NYU Shanghai campus has 750 students, including exchange students from other NYU campuses, according to a Chinese media report. NYU Shanghai says its “undergraduate student population will ultimately be in the range of 1,600 to 2,400.” All classes are taught in English.
NYU Shanghai acknowledges that “Ever since Cicero, the Roman statesman, coined the phrase ‘artes liberales,’ the liberal arts and sciences have been the touchstone of excellence in education for all individuals, regardless of their professional aspirations.” The question is, do “liberal arts” mean the same thing at NYU Shanghai as at NYU Manhattan, given CCP’s intense and persistent objection to freedom of thought and freedom of expression that are the very source of the liberal arts as we know it?
The humanities component of NYU Shanghai’s “liberal arts education” is packed into two compulsory courses: Social Fundations and Cultural Foundations. Each student takes two Global Perspectives on Society (GPS) courses and one China course. While I am curious how these GPS courses are designed and taught (little information is available on NYU Shanghai website), the China courses are geared toward a goal: “the crucial role that China plays in that global community will be emphasized throughout the curriculum.”
New York University Shanghai launches inaugural class; Not a reproduction of the American education model is the title of a Xinhua News Agency’s report on NYU Shanghai in September, 2013. Indeed, it is not. How much a role NYU plays to design and shape the curriculum at NYU Shanghai remains a question, but of one thing I am quite certain: NYU Shanghai’s curriculum will have to be approved, if not guided, by the Chinese government.
The Guangzhou-based South Metropolis Weekly (《南都周刊》) noted the difference between Chinese students and foreign students. Chinese students are required not only to take Gaokao, China’s national college entrance exams, but also fulfill the required military training, implemented after the Tiananmen Movement in 1989 to “rectify” incoming college students and install discipline in them. Chinese students at NYU Shanghai receive military training alongside undergraduate students at ECNU, the paper says.
What about the four “thought and political education” courses (思想政治教育) required of all college students in China? They are “Maoism and Theories of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” “Thoughts and Morality,” “Marxist Philosophy” (otherwise known as Marxist Materialist Dialectics), and “Modern Chinese History” (when I was in college in the 1980s, it was the History of Chinese Communist Party). Are Chinese students at NYU Shanghai required to take them? During a recent congressional hearing that probed whether China’s influence is infringing on academic freedom in American universities, Congressman Chris Smith asked the same question and did not know the answer.
If I have to take a guess, it would be “Yes” because, as Mr. Yu pointed out, as Chinese students at NYU Shanghai receive two separate degrees from NYU and ECNU, they must meet what is required of all Chinese college students. Furthermore, if they are not spared military training, why would they be spared the ideology courses? Just like the case with the military training, my guess is that they take these courses alongside ECNU students. However, whether on the NYU Shanghai website or in Chinese media, I have not found any mention of these courses. It seems to me that this simple yes or no question has been carefully tucked away.
Chancellor Yu Lizhong told Nanfang TV that, at NYU Shanghai, there are communist party members among faculty and students, and they participate in CCP activities at ECNU. Is there a CCP branch at NYU Shanghai? We don’t know. But according to the CCP bylaws, only three party members are needed to form a party branch. And I have come across articles about how the communist party should conduct its work in Sino-foreign universities (here and here).
If you are a foreign student at NYU Shanghai majoring in humanities, there are two majors to choose from: Global China Studies (required courses include “The Concept of China”, “Frontiers of China”), and Integrated Humanities. The first seems a thinly disguised version of the Party-state’s propagandist narrative about China, while the second one, only abstractly outlined, merits a closer look.
I should point out that China Studies have been popping up in Chinese universities in the last two years or so, mainly to attract foreign students as China sets to promote “Chinese culture” as a competing system of values against what the world recognizes as universal values, so as to gain the power to reshape the political discourse in the international arena. Ultimately, the goal is to redefine power, justice and freedom on the Party’s own terms. Leading the charge, Peking University launched The Yenching Academy in May, 2013, in the midst of strong student and faculty opposition, with the mission “to equip outstanding young scholars with a broad, interdisciplinary knowledge of China that reflects both Chinese and international perspectives, and to cultivate leaders who will advocate for global progress and cultural understanding.”
What are the incentives for American students to attend NYU Shanghai? I can easily imagine high school graduates being excited about getting a NYU degree in Shanghai, a vibrant city in a vibrant country. But the biggest incentive is probably money. Stephanie Ulan, from Queens, N.Y. was offered a deal worth $ $228,000: tuition, room, board and even reimbursement for her plane ticket to Shanghai, according to a NPR report in 2013. “The half a dozen others with whom NPR spoke said they got either huge discounts or free tuition.”
Ideally, one would want to take a look at the syllabi and textbooks, and talk to faculty and students. Since none of these materials are made public, as they routinely are in American universities, I settled for a crude, non-scientific experiment. I searched the NYU Shanghai website for the words “democracy” and “freedom” respectively. “Democracy” yielded two results that appeared in names of courses offered in study-abroad arrangements outside China, while “freedom” yielded three results, one in a bioscience paper, and two in descriptions of student life. “Human rights?” No. “Rule of law?” No. “Liberty?” No.
In 2013, NYU’s president was criticized by the university’s faculty for setting up the NYU Abu Dhabi campus and, among other things, straining faculty resources and diluting NYU degrees. But if you compare the vision of NYU AD and that of NYU Shanghai, the former at least states that it “is a residential research university and a branch of NYU New York, operated consistent with NYU New York’s academic quality and practices.” NYU Shanghai does not say anything like that in its mission statement, even though NYU President Sexton told the New York Times that “We’re comfortable that we will be able to offer an N.Y.U. education in Shanghai the way we offer it in Abu Dhabi or New York City.”
“NYU Shanghai is not a branch of NYU,” said Chancellor Yu Lizhong. “Instead, it is an exploration and demonstration how two sides complement each other with their respective strength to have a brand-new university.”
What Is the Deal?
Chancellor Yu Lizhong told the Beijing News that, in the initial stage when NYU Shanghai was constructed and set up, neither ECNU nor NYU invested any funds except for human resources and other intangible resources, while the Chinese government provided “a lot of support.” (ECNU is a state-run public institution, so any ECNU investment would be a government investment anyway.) In the same interview, Mr. Yu characterized NYU Shanghai as a new model of schools that are neither public nor private, because it receives “government support” for its founding as well as its future development and operation.
Mr. Yu said government support is one of the three sources of funding for NYU Shanghai, the other two being public fundraising and tuition. No specific number is publicly available as how much the Chinese government funds NYU Shanghai, I would venture a preliminary guess that tuition income is insignificant at most, since generous scholarships are provided to foreign students, and even if all Chinese students pay the full tuition of RMB 100,000 per school year, that total would still be rather modest.
Jeff Lehman, vice chancellor of NYU Shanghai and a former president of Cornell, told NPR when NYU Shanghai inaugurated its first class in the fall of 2013: “We’ve benefited from tremendous philanthropic support…. As we prove ourselves, I very much hope that kind of support will translate into the creation of a great endowment.”
Three months ago on October 30, 2014, a Shanghai local paper reported that NYU Shanghai’s Education Development Foundation has received USD12.5 million donation pledges “from various sectors of the society,” and “raised USD 25 million from NYU’s global fundraising platforms.” The fund, according to the report, “will mainly be used to support student financial aid, teaching and researching,” “hire top-notch visiting professors from around the world, and spend on some hardware construction per donors’ requests.”
Days later on November 4, 2014, NYU president John Sexton announced, in Shanghai, a $1 billion endowment for NYU Shanghai. “Three very significant people have formed a foundation for the benefit of NYU, which will have the purpose of raising money for financial aid,” he said. “These three donors, he claimed, will contribute $1 billion to NYU Shanghai over the course of five years.”
He went on to predict that the NYU Shanghai endowment would grow more rapidly than that of NYU in New York. “Because the NYU Shanghai ‘pilot’—as they call it—is seen as so important in the friendship between America and China,” Sexton said, “a lot of successful Chinese have stepped forward.” (nyulocal.com)
One of these “three very significant people,” according to the same Chinese report, is Liu Yungeng (刘云耕) who, until February 2013, was the head of Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress and, before that, Party Deputy Secretary of Shanghai, chairman of the Party’s Politics and Law Committee in Shanghai, and Party Secretary of municipal Public Security, as well as an alternate member of the 16th CCP Central Committee. Another is Teng Yilong (滕一龙), who until June 2013 was chairman of Shanghai Industrial Holdings Limited, a state-owned investment company. Before that, he held other senior government positions, including the head of Shanghai municipal Superior Court, and Party Secretary of China State Shipbuilding Corporation. The report quoted Chancellor Yu Lizhong as saying that these non-paid board members of the Foundation raised funds with their prestige.
For an American university, endowment from Chinese sources can be fraught with problems that western university administrators are often not fully aware of. To avoid scrutiny, the Chinese government may mask its money through philanthropy, and donors can be little more than representatives or middlemen of the Party. An endowment from Wen Ruchun, daughter of the then Premier Wen Jiabao, to Cambridge University in 2012, can serve as a warning.
The endowment, supposedly from a charity run by Ms. Wen, appointed a professor whose most recent book Is China Buying the World?, “accuses Western commentators of scaremongering over China’s rise and failing to make a ‘balanced presentation’ on China’s role in the world economy.” According to a more recent update on the story in the UK paper Telegraph, the arrival of money from one of China’s most powerful political families might have something to do with the abrupt departure of Professor Zhang Wei (张炜). Zhang, until 2011, had headed Cambridge’s Greater China Economics Research Institute, and was a high-ranking official in China’s Youth League system in the 1980s, and a peer of Li Keqiang (李克强). Unlike the vast majority of his peers, however, Zhang resigned following the June 4th massacre in protest and pursued a distinguished academic career overseas.
Privately I have heard about a couple of cases where Chinese donations to prestigious American universities, at least indirectly, changed the behavior of university administrators, and led to interference in academic events. While I am in no position to discuss these cases, others may be able to. There are ample grounds for concern about Chinese money corrupting the integrity and academic independence here in American universities.
Back to NYU Shanghai. One is bound to ask: What is NYU’s contribution in this joint-venture?
According to its website (faculty page in Chinese), NYU Shanghai has about 109 or so faculty members, and they are divided into 5 categories. Nineteen are “Senior Professors” who are mostly NYU professors and eight of them members of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Twenty-one are Affiliated Professors (or “联聘教授” – jointly-hired professors) who are also mostly NYU professors and most of whom are in Shanghai for only a semester to teach one course. Fifteen are “Middle-aged and Young Professors.” Seventeen are “Other Professors” who teach lab and other auxiliary courses. For the 2014-2015 school year, there are thirty-seven “Visiting Professors” from around the world to teach a variety of courses.
When asked how faculty are hired at NYU Shanghai, Chancellor Yu told the Beijing News that “we hire faculty through New York University, and our hiring standard is very clear: it has to be higher than the average level of NYU.” He said 40% of NYU Shanghai faculty would come from the NYU Manhattan campus, 40% will be top-notch professors hired from around the world, and 20% would be guest professors from ECNU or other Chinese universities.
NYU Shanghai offers 13 majors (biology, business & finance, chemistry, computer engineering, computer science, economics, electrical engineering, global China studies, integrated humanities, interactive media arts, mathematics, neural science, physics, and self-designed honors major) and has five research institutes currently: NYU-ECNU Institute of Mathematical Sciences, NYU-ECNU Center for Computational Chemistry, NYU-ECNU Institute of Brain and Cognitive Science, NYU-ECNU Institute for Social Development, and, the latest addition, Volatility Institute.
NYU Shanghai only posts job openings in the English version of its website where the school is described rather differently than in its Chinese version. While the Chinese version describes it more accurately as a joint-venture that aims to become a world-class research university, the English version states that “NYU Shanghai is a highly selective world-class research university and the first American university with independent legal registration in mainland China,” leaving you with the impression that NYU Shanghai is a branch of NYU.
It is important to note that setting up joint-venture universities in China, foreign universities can count their intellectual properties toward their contribution, even though it is unclear whether this is the case with NYU:
Article 10 of China’s Regulations of Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools (《中外合作办学条例》) stipulates:
A Chinese or foreign cooperator in running a school may contribute with funds, in kind or in forms of land-use right, intellectual property rights or other assets to establish the school.
Contribution of intellectual property rights by a Chinese or foreign cooperator in running a school shall not exceed one-third of its total contribution. However, for a foreign educational institution that comes to China for cooperation in running a school at the invitation of the education administrative department or the labor administrative department of the State Council or at the invitation of the people’s government of a province, an autonomous region or a municipality directly under the Central Government, its contribution in the form of intellectual property rights may exceed one-third of its total contribution.
Article 11 of Implementation Measures for the Regulation of Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools (《中外合作办学条例实施办法》) stipulates:
Where a Chinese or foreign cooperator uses intellectual property as its educational investment, it shall submit the pertinent materials of intellectual property, including a photocopy of the intellectual property certificate, valid status, practical value, basis for the price computation and the pricing agreement concluded between both parties, etc.
Summing up the deal, I am tempted to say that, in this joint-venture, it looks like the Chinese government/ECNU:
- Bankrolls NYU Shanghai;
- Grows a first-rate research university with NYU professors and professors/researchers hired in the name of NYU;
- Provides Chinese students who covet a US degree with a NYU degree while keeping the ideology program of the CCP intact;
- Indoctrinates a continuous stream of foreign students, mostly Americans, who benefit handsomely from government scholarships, with the “Chinese perspective;” and
- Possibly exerts influence on academic independence at NYU through real or pledged “endowment.”
In this joint-venture, it looks like NYU:
- Provides key faculty;
- Lends its brand and prestige to hire faculty from around the world and to attract students while ceding dominant control of the brand, in China, to the Communist government;
- Gets a share of the Chinese education market; and
- Solicits endowment; and builds what President Sexton describes as a “global network.”
I do not for a minute assume I have made a comprehensive assessment, given the scant information available. NYU professors want to know more. The Congress wants to know more. And the general public should know more. But that desire has been met with obstruction.
In September, 2013, the five elected officers of NYU-American Association of University Professors wrote a letter to NYU Board of Trustees to “record some grave concerns expressed by our members about the prospects for academic freedom in China and at the new campus.” Well-informed about ideological crusade and academic restrictions in China, which have gotten steadily and significant worse since 2013, the professors acknowledge that “it is difficult for us to imagine the campus can subsist as a bubble on an information landscape that is so severely constrained.”
The letter, which was entered into the Congressional record during the December 2014 hearing, pointed out that “the Shanghai initiative was conceived and shaped with minimal faculty consultation and with few faculty concerns about freedoms permitted to enter the discussions. Even now, we have not been given any formal evidence of the kind of agreement signed between our NYU Administration and the Chinese authorities (national, municipal or district).”
The professors worried about NYU’s name being sullied. “Accepting vast sums of money from foreign governments puts NYU and every scholar affiliated with the University in a morally compromising situation, and academic freedom is usually the first casualty.” [I can’t seem to find a link to the letter; I’m quoting from a hard copy I picked up at the hearing.]
During the Congressional hearing “Is Academic Freedom Threatened by China’s Influence on American Universities?”, Rep. Chris Smith expressed similar concerns about the moral cost of this transaction. He said “we have repeatedly invited NYU’s President and faculty to testify before this committee [the House Foreign Affairs Committee], without success. On five separate occasions, we gave NYU 15 dates to appear.”
Smith said “American colleges and universities should not be outsourcing academic control, faculty and student oversight, or curriculum to a foreign government.” He said he will be asking for a GAO study to review the agreements of both satellite campuses in China and of Confucius Institutes in the U. S.” “I will also ask the GAO to study whether U. S. satellite campuses in China operate differently from Chinese universities and whether there is a two-tier system in place, where Chinese students and faculty have more restrictions placed on their activities and research than U. S students and faculty. I will also ask whether Communist Party committees operate on campus, whether fundamental freedoms are protected for both Chinese and U. S. students and faculty.”
I must point out that, the concerns of NYU professors and Congressman Smith arise from the assumption that NYU Shanghai is a campus of NYU, when essentially it is not. So, in addition to the questions they have raised, another set of questions must be asked and probed in the interest of the well-being of American higher education, as more American universities are in the process of setting up “campuses” or programs in China and as Chinese endowments slip into campuses here in the U. S.
China’s Ten-Year Plan, the Hefei Statement, and China’s Quest for World-Class Universities
China promulgated Regulations of Chinese-Foreign Cooperation in Running Schools (《中外合作办学条例》) in 2003 to set rules for foreign education institutions seeking access to China, as China was bound by its promise of opening China’s education market when it was admitted into the WTO in 2001. According to Chinese Ministry of Education, over the last decade or so, about 1,780 programs or projects have been set up between Chinese universities and foreign universities, most of which are confined to particular majors and areas within the existing Chinese universities, such as this one and this one. The first joint-venture university with independent legal status is the University of Nottingham Ningbo (UNNC) and it was founded in 2004. Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University was the second;a joint venture between Xi’an Jiaotong University in China and the University of Liverpool UK that was launched in 2006 in Suzhou. NYU Shanghai seems to represent a model somewhat different from UNNC and XJTLU. Duke Kunshan University is a joint-venture of Duke University and Wuhan University “to create a world-class liberal arts and research university” that welcomed its inaugural class of students in the fall of 2014. Wenzhou-Kean University also went into operation in 2014.
China’s Outline of the National Plan for Medium and Long-Term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020) (《国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要 2010-2020年》), issued in July, 2010, devotes a chapter to “Expanding Education Openness” (Chapter 16) and the goals include:
- Strengthening international exchange and cooperation;
- Attracting more world-class experts and scholars to China to engage in teaching, researching and management, and introducing top-notch talent and academic teams from overseas according to plans;
- Strengthening cooperation with top universities around the world, establishing cooperative platforms for teaching and researching, and jointly advancing high-level research on basic sciences and high-tech;
- Improving the quality and level of achievement at Confucius Institutes;
- Increasing the number of Chinese government scholarships given to foreign students studying in China with emphasis on students from developing countries.
Three years into the issuance of this ten-year Outline, the Chinese Ministry of Education issued a briefing on the implementation of joint-venture higher education programs in 2013, making three mentions of NYU Shanghai. The core purpose of these joint-ventures, it states, is to “introduce quality education resources from overseas,” and the key areas for this effort to take place are science, engineering, agriculture, and medicine, especially engineering. 37% of the current joint programs are in the engineering fields (工科), and only 2% of them are in law, literature, and history.
Ideological indoctrination in schools like NYU Shanghai apparently is a big concern of the Chinese government, and the briefing makes a special evaluation of it. “Joint-venture institutions and programs have focused on cultivating a scientific world view and positive outlook and values,” says the Briefing. “They have engaged in thought and moral education as well as patriotic education based on the characteristics of students in these schools and programs, and have achieved remarkable results. Sino-foreign joint-venture universities, such as the University of Nottingham Ningbo, have insisted on establishing Communist Party committees so that there would be Party’s work wherever the mass is and there would be Party organization wherever there are party members, achieving the party’s no-blind-spot coverage on the grassroots level. Some universities have also established overseas party branches to ensure that the party’s work keeps synchronized steps with its work at home when students of these joint-venture institutions and programs study abroad.”
China’s drive to take advantage of the best and most advanced educational resources around the world seems multi-pronged. In October 2013, nine top Chinese research universities (Peking U., Tsinghua U, Fudan U, Ha’erbin Institute of Technology, Nanjing U., Shanghai Jiaotong U., U of Science and Technology of China, Xi’an Jiaotong U., and Zhejiang U.) signed the Hefei Statement with three world university leagues (Association of American Universities, the League of European Research Universities, and the Group of Eight in Australia), and, in early 2014, the Russell Group of 24 leading universities in UK also signed the Statement. The purpose of the statement is “to identify the key characteristics that make research universities effective; and to promote a policy environment which protects, nurtures and cultivates the values, standards and behaviors which underlie these characteristics and which facilitates their development if they do not already exist.”
In signing the Statement, AAU, LERU, G8 and the Russell Group might have intended to “promote the fundamental principles of world-class research universities across the world, and to influence the development of higher education and research policy,” as the head of the RG puts it. The question I want to ask is this: What really motivates the nine Chinese universities to sign the Statement, or more precisely, what motivates the Chinese government to sign such a document, given that no Chinese university has the autonomy to act on its own, and to do so without government planning and approval, at a time when the Communist Party in China has been banning the teaching, and indeed any mentioning, of values that are the very foundation of western universities, expelling or punishing free thinking scholars, reinforcing its ideological indoctrination, further tightening Internet censorship, and conducting complicated surveillance on faculty and students alike?
“[The signing of Hefei Statement] coincides with Chinese government’s desire to quickly elevate the standing of Chinese universities in the world,” Chu Zhaohui (储朝晖), a research fellow at the National Institute of Education Sciences in China, pointed out. “Support from government [for the signing of Hefei Statement] is merely a stance which does not change the long-standing managerial system of government running the universities, nor can it change the relationship between the Chinese government and universities from a legal perspective.”
Is China signing the Hefei Statement, or similar documents, to merely help further its exchanges with top universities around the world, without intending to commit to the principles of academic independence and freedom? This is a familiar game that China has played again and again to great success. For example, to gain entrance to the WTO, China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998 but has never ratified it. Activists have been tried and imprisoned for advocating its ratification. Even when China ratifies some human right covenants, it does not necessarily mean these obligations would be implemented in good faith.
The Hefei Statement deplores instrumentalist approaches to research universities, and the harms they do to the well-being of these institutions. But cynically, China’s varying approaches to working with the best universities in the world probably represent the worst kind of instrumentalist approaches one can possibly imagine, and the well-being of these universities should weigh heavily on our minds as many of them are jumping on the bandwagon to China, convinced that they must be there and be there fast.
Yaxue Cao (曹雅学) is the founder and editor of this website.
Duke Kunshan University delayed again, following communication and funding problems, The Chronicle, Duke University, February 8, 2013.
By Fengsuo Zhou, Yaxue Cao, published: November 4, 2014
We did not foresee writing this letter. We didn’t think it was necessary. All we need to do, we thought, is to present facts to the public, including the Wellesleyans. And we thought that truth is the only thing that matters, and that, before racism and McCarthyism become issues, the first order should be to find out what happened.
Let us introduce ourselves first. Fengsuo was a senior and physics major at Tsinghua University in Beijing in 1989. During the Tiananmen democracy movement, Fengsuo told the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on May 30, 2014, “I was responsible for setting up a student network that directed the protesters on Tiananmen Square, provided medical services to thousands of students on a hunger strike as hundreds and thousands more poured in from all corners of Beijing to rally in support. Through this network, ambulances were able to pass every 5 minutes through the crowds. Through this network [which included a radio station], many Chinese were able to express freely and publicly, for the first and only time in their life, their love for freedom and democracy and their hope for a better China” (watch hearing here). After the movement was suppressed with machine guns and tanks on June 4th, 1989, Fengsuo was No. 5 on the Chinese government’s most-wanted list of 21 student leaders. He was jailed for one year in Qincheng Prison in Beijing. He came to the United States in 1995, studied finance at Chicago University, and he is a financial analyst, father of two, living in California. Fengsuo was one of the tweeps who took part in google-searching “步起跃” (Professor Charles Bu) and exchanging thoughts on our findings on November 23, 2013.
Yaxue attended Peking University from 1980-1984. She came to the United States to pursue graduate study in English and American literature in 1991. She is a writer, translator, mother of two living in Washington, DC. In June, 2013, she launched ChinaChange.org, a website “devoted to news and commentary related to civil society, rule of law, and rights activities in China. It works with China’s democracy advocates to bring their voices into English and to help the rest of the world understand what people are thinking and doing to effect change in China.” Reports and translations on China Change have been cited or hyperlinked by the New York Times, Time magazine, the Guardian, the Telegraph, the Washington Post, the Economist, the New Republic magazine, the Atlantic (to name a few) and Congressional reports.
Last fall, Professor Charles Bu wrote three articles, as far as our search results show, in connection to the Xia Yeliang incident. On October 22, 2013, he published the first of the three in Chinese in Xinhua News under his Chinese name Bu Qiyue (步起跃). In it, he defended Peking University’s decision to fire Xia Yeliang as a pure professional decision that has nothing to do with Professor Xia being a dissident intellectual, and he chided his Wellesley colleagues for writing an open letter calling on the college to reconsider its partnership with PKU. “What makes them think they can point fingers at the internal affairs of a university on the other side of the planet?” (Wellesley has a full translation). Professor Bu wrote again on October 29, in the Wellesley News: Why the PKU partnership is good for Wellesley and, then again on November 3, in the Chronicle of Higher Education: Journalists Should Ask Peking U. Students About Yeliang Xia.
While Yaxue explained, clearly and meticulously, how her article Why Is a Math Professor at Wellesley So Hard Hitting against an Economics Professor Fired by Peking University in China came about in her Letter to the Editor on October 27, 2014, professor Bu has so far made no mention of his article on the Xinhua News website. Instead, Professor Bu hurled insults at Yaxue in his Letter to the Editor on October 30, accusing her of [making] false and defamatory statements, [feeding] a bogus story, and calling her a “complete joke.”
But to us, Prof. Bu’s Xinhua article is at the heart of the matter in terms of Professor Bu’s involvement, and the role he played, in the Xia Yeliang incident.
Professor Bu is entitled to his opinion about Xia, about his Wellesley colleagues, and about PKU’s decision. That’s not the problem. Yaxue’s report stated that in the very first paragraph.
Professor Bu might, or might not, have known his article was going to be used by all of CCP’s major “mouthpieces” in what appears to us, to other China watchers, and to veteran Chinese journalists Yaxue talked to, a state engineered, all-out smear campaign against Mr. Xia, but this much is certain: Whether Professor Bu was approached to write this article, or he wrote it voluntarily and submitted it to Xinhua (highly unlikely by our assessment), when he wrote it “in Boston on October 21, 2013,” he knew perfectly that:
- Xinhua is not an impartial and independent news organization, and as a CCP mouthpiece, it would never allow Mr. Xia to defend himself on Xinhua website;
- if Bu himself, or anyone else for that matter, happened to be a supporter of Mr. Xia, he or she would not be able to voice their support on Xinhua either;
- Professor Bu’s article could be published in Xinhua News precisely because it meets the need of official propaganda.
Let no one tell you that Xinhua News Agency is just like AP, Reuters, AFP or any other free and independent international wire service. China is an authoritarian state without press freedom where the Communist Party has a monopoly over the news organizations. According to Xinhua’s own description, “The work of the Xinhua News Agency has always been under the direct leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.” “The Xinhua News Agency performs the duties assigned by the Central Committee: to be the mouthpiece, the ears and eyes, the think tank, and the information confluence.” “Xinhua News Agency follows the requirement of the Central Committee, upholds correct political direction, and directs the public opinion.”
In China, reporters and newspaper commentators have been regularly expelled, jailed, or beaten for dissenting from the Party line or for cutting-edge investigative reports. It is increasingly difficult for foreign journalists to obtain visas. Those whose reporting is deemed “critical” are denied visas altogether.
We believe that professor Bu’s engagement with Xinhua over the Xia Yeliang incident was highly problematic. At the very least, it shows his poor judgment as an American academic about what is, and what it is not, appropriate to do. If Professor Bu really wants to defend his honor and integrity, he can begin by telling us how his article for Xinhua came about, instead of hurling mud at people in a hysterical, unsightly manner.
From our search, we concluded that Professor Bu has close ties to the Chinese government. We believe anyone who has found what we have found will come to the same conclusion. He had been, until at least May, 2014, and may still be, an “overseas commissioner” of the Federation of Overseas Chinese of Changzhou; he was received by the deputy director of the CCP’s department of United Front Work (see my report for further explanation of this party organ) in Changzhou; he and his family were guests at a banquet at Diaoyutai, China’s state guesthouse in Beijing. All of the above information was found on official websites of these government/Party entities. We welcome Professor Bu to explain his connections with the Chinese government and the CCP. He can begin by telling everyone what title and position an “overseas commissioner” is.
After Yaxue’s Letter to the Editor was posted on The Wellesley News, two reports, titled similarly “The Municipal Federation of Overseas Chinese Received [its] Overseas Commissioner Bu Qiyue,” one dated October 16, 2013, and the other May 26, 2014, were taken down from the official website of the Federation of Overseas Chinese of Changzhou. Professor Bu owes the Wellesleyans an explanation.
According to both reports, Professor Bu thanked the Federation for “taking care” of his aging father. Professor Bu probably can also explain what “taking care” entails. We believe there is an issue of conflict of interest here.
In his agitated state, Professor Bu had trouble keeping his narrative together. In his article I Am Not a Communist Spy, he alleged that Professor Cushman worked with us against him. “Mr. Cushman and so-called ‘freedom fighters’ resorted to a McCarthy-style witch hunt. They couldn’t find anything, so they went after my hometown connection (Changzhou, a city most Americans have never heard of) and wrote a bogus story about me. In particular, it fabricated a ‘Communist Commissioner’ position for me, which I don’t even qualify.” (Again, nowhere in our report did we describe Bu Qiyue as a “Communist Commissioner.”) When this accusation fell apart, a week later in his Letter to the Editor, Professor Bu made Yaxue the main villain who “mislead Professor Thomas Cushman,” damaging not only Professor Bu’s reputation, the reputation of Professor Cushman, but also the reputation of Wellesley College. We are very amused by this remarkable show of mental gymnastics.
We are aware of the controversy over Professor Xia, Professor Cushman, and Professor Bu on the Wellesley campus. We are aware of the ongoing student petition and the issues raised by 20+ faculty members in their Letter to the Editor on October 22. We want to remind Wellesleyans that Yaxue’s report, which sums up the findings about Professor Bu by a group of Chinese Twitter users, is a key part of the whole picture, and should be considered carefully. In answering Professor Bu’s accusation that Professor Cushman worked with us to produce this report, Yaxue wrote to The Wellesley News and explained how our report came about. In this letter, we ask Professor Bu a few key questions and lay out some larger issues.
Wellesleyans know better than we do that identity politics at the expense of truth is poison. It can be easily manipulated to silence critics. For the sake of academic freedom, we ask Wellesleyans to carefully examine the facts first before letting loose these -isms. Wellesley students and faculty should not rush to sign a petition or take a side without knowing and understanding the facts of the case. Of all people, Wellesleyans should not be intellectually lazy.
Finally, we would like to share our thoughts on Wellesley’s partnership with Peking University. Professor Charles Bu has spoken glowingly of Wellesley’s partnership with Peking University and how great it is for Wellesley. Professor Cushman does not oppose such engagement but gives warnings about the limits and price of such exchanges. A reexamination of American universities’ partnerships with Chinese counterparts seems to be underway on some campuses, and we look forward to reading more studies from our scholars. Here we want to tell Wellesleyans a few stories you will not learn from your partnership with PKU.
Xu Zhiyong (许志永) was a PKU law student who went on to found Gongmeng, or the Open Constitution Initiative, in 2003, pioneering China’s rights defense movement over the last ten years. When Gongmeng was shut down by the government in 2009, he went on to launch the New Citizens Movement with a band of rights lawyers, journalists, liberal intellectuals, and pro-democracy netizens. Across China in over 30 cities, citizens met regularly to discuss current affairs, engage in activism, and to press for changes in social and legal arenas. When the crackdown on the New Citizens Movement came last year, scores were arrested and tried, and Dr. Xu Zhiyong himself was sentenced earlier this year to four and half years in jail for “disturbing order in a public place.” His court statement, which was translated by ChinaChange.org into English, was called “the China Manifesto” by the Telegraph. His close friend Teng Biao, also a PKU alumnus, is currently at Harvard, and perhaps Wellesley can have him over to discuss a few things you will never be talking about in your partnership with PKU.
Cao Shunli (曹顺利) was another PKU alumnus whose story you will never learn from your partnership with PKU. In September, 2013, Cao Shunli was detained in the Exit & Entry area of the Beijing Capital International Airport where she was en route to Geneva to attend human rights training. Her “crime” was to demand participation in China’s domestic plans to advance human rights, and report the progress to the UN Human Rights Council in advance of its Universal Periodic Reviews. For her work, she had been put in labor camp, and finally in jail. When her health deteriorated in prison last fall and this spring, the Chinese authorities denied her treatment. She died in custody in March, 2014. When NGO representatives around the world held up Cao Shunli’s photo on the floor of the UN Human Rights Council to protest her death, the Chinese delegates “went beyond diplomatic protocol….to block the moment of silence for Cao Shunli.”
Do you know Who Lin Zhao (林昭) is? She was another PKU woman you should know. She was executed during the Cultural Revolution for criticizing Mao Zedong and the Communist Party’s rule. You will not hear her name in your partnership with PKU but you can watch this documentary about her.
The list is long and this is not the place to enumerate it. As this letter is being posted, a 34-year-old PKU alumnus name Shen Yongping (沈勇平) is being tried in Beijing on November 4th for making a documentary about China’s failed one-hundred-year pursuit of constitutional democracy.
Although we are not Wellesleyans, based on our understanding of the Chinese Communist Party and our close knowledge of the Party’s practices, we are sure your partnership is sanitized and bleached to prevent you from any meaningful discussion with your PKU partners about some of the most important and riveting issues regarding China and the world.
And worse, since the university authorities, not independent but also directed by the Communist Party, have control over what you would be exposed to, and your activities would be monitored carefully, you would be led to believe the China they package and present to you is the real China if you are not thinking vigorously and seek out for yourself.
With spite and clenched teeth, Professor Charles Bu spoke of “freedom fighters.” We don’t know if we deserve to be call freedom fighters, but we are convinced that freedom is worth fighting for.
Fengsuo Zhou, California.
Yaxue Cao, Washington, DC.
A timeline of the events from September 2013 to the present:
1) On September 3, 2013, 100+ Wellesley professors published a letter to Peking University regarding the possible dismissal of Professor Xia Yeiang;
2) On September 13, 2013, Professor Cushman published the article Conscience and Compromise: The Troubling Case of Yeliang Xia in the Chronicle of Higher Education;
3) On October 18, 2013, a Friday, Peking University formally announced the dismissal of Professor Xia Yeliang;
4) On October 22, 2013, Professor Charles Bu published in Xinhua News website the article In American Universities Faculties Also Have to Be Evaluated to Get Contract Renewal (Wellesley has a full translation);
5) On October 29, Prof. Bu published the article Why the PKU partnership is good for Wellesley in The Wellesley News;
6) On November 3, Prof. Bu published the article Journalists Should Ask Peking U. Students About Yeliang Xia in the Chronicle of Higher Education;
7) On November 25, 2013, Yaxue Cao posted Why Is a Math Professor at Wellesley So Hard Hitting against an Economics Professor Fired by Peking University in China on China Change website;
8) On February 27, 2014, Professor Cushman gave a presentation at Cato Institute: Chinese Intrusions into American Universities: Consequences for Freedom;
9) On Oct 5, 2014, New York Times published an article about Professor Cushman, Policing University Partnerships in Authoritarian Countries;
10) On October 22, 2014, Professor Bu published the article I am not a Communist spy in The Wellesley News;
11) On October 23, 2014, Professor Cushman published a rebuttal On Charles Bu’s Falsehoods in The Wellesley News;
12) On Oct 26, 2014, 20+ Wellesley faculty members voiced disapproval of Prof. Cushman in The Wellesley News;
13) On Oct 27, 2014, a faculty/student/alumni petition against Prof Cushman led by Sophia S. Chen, Class of 2013, was initiated. Unclear how many people have signed the petition;
14) On Oct 27, 2014, Yaxue Cao explained how her report from a year ago came about in a Letter to the Editor of The Wellesley News;
15) On Oct 30, 2014, Prof. Bu threatened to bring a lawsuit against Yaxue Cao in his Letter to the Editor of The Wellesley News;
16) On November 4, 2014, Fengsuo Zhou and Yaxue Cao posted Take a Considered Position through Disciplined Thinking – An Open Letter to Wellesley College on China Change website.
17) On November 6, 2014, Wellesley Student Tiffany Chan published the article Conflict between Professors Bu and Cushman Creates Unsafe Environment in The Wellesley News.
By Yaxue Cao, published: October 26, 2014
Almost a year ago, I posted a report titled “Why Is a Math Professor at Wellesley So Hard Hitting against an Economics Professor Fired by Peking University in China” on this website. This week, on October 22, the story entered a second season when the math professor in question – Professor Charles Bu – posted the article I Am Not a Communist Spy in The Wellesley News. On October 23, Thomas Cushman, Professor of Sociology and Director of Wellesley’s Freedom Project, posted in the same paper a rebuttal, On Charles Bu’s Falsehoods, in response to Professor Bu’s accusations against Cushman. I am also among the people accused by Professor Bu of participating in a “McCarthy-style witch hunt.” The following is my response, and it is also available in The Wellesley News.
Dear Professors, Administrators, and Students at Wellesley,
I am Yaxue Cao, founder and editor of ChinaChange.org and the author of Why Is a Math Professor at Wellesley So Hard Hitting against an Economics Professor Fired by Peking University in China. I’m here to explain how this article about Professor Charles Bu came about.
On November 23, 2013, Professor Xia Yeliang, who had not been active on Twitter for a long time, and who was probably still riled up about being fired by Peking University, which made news headlines a month earlier, dropped the following tweet: “Charles Bu, a math prof at Wellesley College, tends to be extremely active to accuse and smear me. What’s benefits behind?”
I met Professor Xia once at a friend’s dinner party in the summer of 2012 when I was vacationing in California, where we exchanged pleasantries. That was the extent of my acquaintance with Prof. Xia, but I am one of his 54.7k Twitter followers. And as the editor of ChinaChange.org, I took a keen interest in Prof. Xia’s case.
I myself actually didn’t catch this tweet of his (I follow 1,400+ people and don’t read every tweet on my Timeline). Other tweeps did and got curious, while Prof. Xia seemed to have disappeared again from Twitter after sending that tweet.
If you are an active Twitter user, you will know that Twitter is a virtual teahouse where people congregate, post information, talk, and, occasionally, yes, look into things. Without Prof. Xia’s knowledge, several of us became curious about who Charles Bu was and why a math professor from Wellesley was so involved in the incident of Professor Xia. We quickly found his Chinese name is Bu Qiyue (步起跃) and in a matter of hours, we discovered that (search “步起跃” and “Charles Bu” on Twitter and you will see all the tweets):
1. In the evening of October 22, 2013, in less than two hours, an article by Professor Bu Qiyue (Wellesley has a translation) was published by the state-owned Xinhua News Agency and then reposted by at least a dozen or so “mouthpiece” media outlets controlled by the Chinese government, such as the People’s Daily, People’s Daily Overseas, China News, the CCTV website, China Radio International, Global Times, China Daily, and more. It struck me, and everyone else who took an interest in the matter, as something extraordinary: the essay and its across-the-broad reposting in such a short time span had the appearance of a state-engineered and coordinated smear campaign.
2. Prof. Bu has very close ties with the Chinese government: According to a report (google webcache available if original link is broken) on the official website of “the Federation of Overseas Chinese of Changzhou,” he was an “overseas commissioner,” and was received on October 14, 2013, by the deputy director of the local Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department and the director of the Federation of Overseas Chinese of Changzhou. The Federation of Overseas Chinese, as my report pointed out, is a unit in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which is an arm of the Chinese government on both central and local levels. The official website of the Federation describes it as “a people’s organization under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party Changzhou Committee.”
In fact, as recently as May, 2014 (google webcache available if original link is broken), Professor Bu was still an “overseas commissioner” of the Federation of Overseas Chinese of Changzhou, and was again received by the Federation in that capacity.
Please note, nowhere in my report did I describe Professor Bu as a “communist commissioner,” and for a mathematician, such gross inaccuracy is deplorable.
3. A feature story (webpage freeze available if original link is broken) about Professor Bu on the official website of the Chinese Communist Party Changzhou Committee’s United Front Work Department mentioned that, among other things, Professor Bu and his family had once been received by a ministerial level Chinese official with a banquet at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, the place where Chinese government receives foreign leaders and dignitaries.
As a fellow Chinese who has also lived in the U. S. for over twenty years and whose journey to the U.S. was similar to that of Professor Bu, I want to offer readers some perspectives: for someone like Professor Bu, who apparently was the pride of his hometown Changzhou, it is not uncommon to be invited by local Chinese officials for a meeting or a dinner while visiting family in China. Once or twice I myself was approached as well. But to be retained as an “overseas commissioner” by local government, to be received by officials from the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, and to be invited to Diaoyutai in Beijing is anything but common.
Tweeps found more about Professor Bu on November 23, 2013, and one of them, who described himself as a mathematician too, even offered a professional evaluation of Prof. Bu.
I wrote the report and posted it on November 25, 2013. I summed up the collaboration of several tweeps (acknowledged at the end of my article). As far as I was concerned, I was interested in the fact that 1) Professor Bu’s article seemed to me (and to veteran Chinese journalists I talked to – read the comment section – after the article was posted) part of a concerted effort to discredit not only Professor Xia but his Wellesley colleagues as well, and 2) that Professor Bu had maintained close ties with the Chinese government.
Tweeps (I only know the identity of one of them) and I were not professional investigators on a mission. We were curious, we googled, and we found what we found on public sources available to everyone. While I documented our findings meticulously in my report, I made no accusation against Professor Bu. Instead, I closed my report with a very modest request for him: “…it is problematic to hold back such extraordinary ties from his Wellesley colleagues while criticizing their support for Mr. Xia [on Chinese state media], and Professor Bu owes his colleagues some perspective and balance.”
When Professor Bu wrote, “Mr. Cushman and so-called ‘freedom fighters’ resorted to a McCarthy-style witch hunt,” I suppose by “freedom fighters” he meant us: me and the tweeps. Let me just say that I didn’t know Professor Cushman at all; I had run into his name once when I did my research for the report, but I doubt the other tweeps knew anything about him. In any case, Professor Cushman, or Professor Xia for that matter, were completely irrelevant to our interest in Professor Bu and our subsequent research on him, and my report had nothing to do with either man. Neither man was aware of my report before it was posted.
I urge readers to search “步起跃” as well as “Charles Bu” on Twitter to find all the tweets (mostly in Chinese) tweeps tweeted on November 23, 2013, with their findings and thoughts, and you will have it all as I did. It’s as simple as that.
A Letter to the Newton (Massachusetts) Community, by Fengsuo Zhou and Yaxue Cao