China Change

Home » Posts tagged 'Wang Yang'

Tag Archives: Wang Yang

How Nine Wukan Villagers Were Illegally Tried and Sentenced in December, 2016

Zhuang Liehong, January 5, 2017

 

wukan_panoramic

Wukan in March, 2012. Photo: Zhuang Liehong


Ten days ago on December 26, 2016, the Haifeng Court in Guangdong sentenced nine villagers from Wukan to between two and ten years imprisonment, as a means of punishing them for participating in protests. My father Zhuang Songkun (庄松坤) was among them. Through this article I hope readers outside China will gain an understanding of these arrests and the circumstances of the trial, and that the situation in Wukan will receive greater international attention.

From 2009 villagers in Wukan engaged in collective petitions and protests against collusion between government officials and businessmen, who were expropriating collectively-owned village land for personal profit. After years of being ignored by the government, mass protests broke out at the end of 2011. I was one of the organizers of the protests, and was arrested and temporarily jailed in 2011. Another protest leader, Xue Jinbo (薛锦波), was tortured to death in prison. Given the enormous international attention the protests attracted at the time, the then-Guangdong Party Secretary, Wang Yang (汪洋), made a number of positive overtures. He affirmed that the demands of Wukan villagers were legitimate and lawful, and promised that they would be resolved. In 2012, under the international spotlight, an election was held in Wukan to democratically form the village committee.

But retaliation was swift. From 2013 to 2016 the authorities arrested and sentenced respectively Zhang Dejia (张德家) and three rights defense leaders (Hong Ruichao 洪锐潮, Yang Semao 杨色茂, and Lin Zulian 林祖銮). As one of the seven elected village committee members, I fled China to the United States on January 27, 2014, to escape persecution and apply for political asylum.

Large-scale demonstrations erupted again in Wukan last year in protest against the authorities’ persecution of the head of the Wukan village committee, Lin Zulian. From June 19 to September 12, a total of 85 days, around 4,000 villagers took to the street every day in protest marches.

At about 3 a.m. on September 13, a large number of armed police moved on the village, raiding houses and arresting two dozen or so villagers that the government considered to be the most high-profile, including my father, Zhuang Songkun.

 

wukan-%e5%90%88%e5%9b%be%e4%ba%8c

 

Come dawn, thousands of fully-armed People’s Armed Police locked down village street intersections, dividing the crowd and then crushing the protest. They fired countless rounds of rubber bullets, and volleyed canisters of tear gas and shock grenades into the unarmed villagers. Then they began surrounding and violently beating villagers, without regard to whether they were old, women, or children. Faced with this violent, armed suppression, villagers resorted to throwing rocks and bricks. Hundreds of villagers were injured during the conflict.

A few days later my mother received a “notice of criminal detention,” pertaining to my father. Twice my family sent cash and clothing to him, but they weren’t allowed to see him. Other detainees reported similar treatment. The nine have been detained in Haifeng County Detention Center (汕尾市海丰县看守所).

On December 14, a member of the village committee led government agents to my family home, telling my mother that my father would be tried between December 16 and 18, and that only two relatives could attend. My family had not yet received any notice that he was being indicted, neither was he, or any of the others, allowed to secure counsel.

On the morning of December 17 the government ferried the dozen-or-so family members of the nine defendants in a bus to the Haifeng County People’s Court for the trial. The entire day was spent with the judge reading aloud laws and statutes and enumerating the crimes of the nine villagers. Court sessions were frequently adjourned and then begun again.

All nine villagers pleaded not guilty, and the court said it would announce a verdict at a later date.

 

Wukan 合图一.png

 

On December 25, family members were told that court would be in session the following day.

On December 26 at 8:00 a.m., relatives of the defendants were once again bused to the Haifeng People’s Court. Arriving sometime after 9:00 a.m, they were brought into court around 10:00 a.m. As they were led inside, they were told to sit in the second and third rows, separated from each other by government personnel on each side. The first few rows were filled with government people.

Before the court session, a harsh voice could be heard from an anteroom bawling the names of the nine villagers. At 10:10 a.m. the villagers were separately escorted by two police into the court. My mother could catch only the faint outline of my father’s head, given how far back she was sitting. When she craned her neck to the side and leaned in to try see him more clearly, immediately one of the government staff sitting beside her stopped her with his hand and ordered her not to move or say a word.

None of the nine defendants were allowed to speak through the proceedings.

The judge then began reading out sentences (now available on the court’s website), and the entire session lasted less than 30 minutes:

The judgement of the court has determined that: the defendants Wei Yonghan (魏永汉), Hong Yongzhong (洪永忠), Yang Jinzhen (杨锦贞), and Wu Fang (吴芳), disturbed public order with severe circumstances, forcing the cessation of production and business operations, and causing great damage; the defendants Wei Yonghan and Hong Yongzhong were the leaders, the defendants Yang Jinzhen and Wu Fang were active participants, and their actions constitute the crime of gathering a crowd to disturb public order.

Defendants Wei Yonghan, Hong Yongzhong, Yang Jinzhen, Wu Fang, Cai Jialin (蔡加麟), Zhuang Songkun, Li Chulu (李楚卢) and Chen Suzhuan (陈素转) failed to submit their petitions to the relevant authorities according to the law and gathered an assembly, performing marches and protests, without permission; after the admonishment of relevant government authorities, they refused to comply with an order to disperse, dealing severe damage to social order. They are all directly responsible parties, and their conduct constitutes the crime of illegal assembly, marching, and demonstration.

Defendants Zhuang Songkun and Cai Jialin gathered a crowd to block traffic with severe circumstances, they were both leaders, and their conduct constitutes the crime of gathering a crowd to disturb traffic order.

Defendants Wei Yonghan and Li Chulu used violent means to prevent officers of the state to carry out their duties according to the law, actions which constitute the crime of endangering public affairs.

Defendant Zhang Bingchai (张炳钗) deliberately promulgated information online that he clearly knew was false, severely disturbing social order; his actions constitute the crime of deliberately disseminating false information.

Defendants Wei Yonghan and Li Chulu violently attacked police officers who were discharging their duties, committing the crime of endangering public affairs, which demands severe punishment.

Defendants Wei Yonghan, Hong Yongzhong, Yang Jinzhen, Wu Fang, Zhuang Songkun, Cai Jialin and Li Chulu have committed multiple crimes, and should, according to the law, be punished for them concurrently.

With consideration to the defendants’ crimes, the criminal circumstances, and the damaging repercussions, the court makes the following sentences:

Wei Yonghan: Ten years, six months;

Yang Jinzhen: Six years;

Hong Yongzhong: Six years, six months;

Wu Fang: Five years;

Zhuang Songkun: Three years;

Cai Jialin: Three years;

Li Chulu: Three years;

Chen Suzhuan: Three years;

Zhang Bingchai: Two years.

After the sentences were announced, the judge asked the nine villagers whether they accepted the decisions and whether they would appeal. All nine said they would appeal. Then they were taken out of the courtroom. Again, their names were heard being called out loudly in the anteroom, while their relatives in the audience were taken to the hallway where they were made to stand and wait. The police siren sounded and the nine villagers were taken away. A bus then took the relatives back to Wukan.

From my father’s arrest to his sentence, my family received nothing from the authorities except for a notice of his criminal detention. The situation for the other eight was the same.  

The Guangzhou-based human rights lawyer Sui Muqing (隋牧青) pointed out that the trial of the nine villagers violated procedural law in that: 1) based on relatives’ description of the courtroom scene, the trial was obviously not an open trial as it should have been; 2) it seems that none of the defendants had defense lawyers, and it was likely that the defendants were forcibly deprived of their rights to legal counsel.

wukan_%e9%99%88%e7%b4%a0%e8%bd%ac

Chen Suzhuan: “‘What takes place in our hometown is everyone’s business.’ Worker, born in 1982, elected member of the Village Committee with 3,604 votes on the second round of direct voting on March 4 [2012].”

“Illegal procedure means an unjust trial,” said lawyer Sui Muqing. “I believe that the local authorities abused their power in trying the nine Wukan villagers, and similar to trials of Lin Zulian, Hong Ruichao, and other Wukan villagers, this trial is also a retaliation against the people of Wukan.”  

In arresting and trying the villagers, the Chinese government once again demonstrated that it has no regard to the law when it comes to suppressing any form of dissent. It is unacceptable that such barbaric and fraudulent methods were used against the good people of Wukan. I will do everything I can to lead the relatives of the nine villagers to appeal the despicable sentences against them. We will do all we can to resist.  

Thirteen more Wukan villagers are currently held at the Lufeng Detention Center (汕尾市陆丰看守所) awaiting trial.  

Wukan nowadays is a ravaged place. The villagers have been facing more pressure on their livelihoods because they haven’t been able to recover their land lost to corruption. Since last September, Wukan’s streets and alleys have been patrolled by armed police day and night, and powerful floodlights have been set up around the entire village. Wukan villagers live in a big prison, and they need your attention and support.

 

 

I can be reached at kiddjoneke@gmail.com, or 1-(929) 500-1008

 


Related:

Special Report: Freedom fizzles out in China’s rebel town of Wukan, James Pomfret , Reuters, Feb. 2013.

For Over 36 Years, Grassroots Elections in China Have Made No Progress – An Interview With Hu Ping, China Change, November, 2016.

 


Translated from Chinese (《抗议对九名乌坎村民的非法审判》) by China Change.

 

 

 

Open Letter to the Chinese Government and the World Media About the Suppression of Wukan

Zhuang Liehong, November 23, 2016

“Wukan is a big prison now. Scores of villagers have been detained, including my father. Police patrol the streets and roads, and life is difficult.” – Wukan villager Zhuang Liehong

 

wukan-protest-zhuang-liehong

Zhang Liehong arrived early on November 23 to protest on behalf of his village. A U. S.-China trade delegation is here for talks led by Wang Yang (汪洋), who presided over the first Wukan crackdown in 2011.

 

Wukan, a fishing village in eastern Guangdong Province, occupies an area of about 5,765 acres and has a population of 13,000. Since 1993, corrupt officials have conspired with businessmen to secretly sell off the collectively-owned, arable village land, and pocket the proceeds.

This led to large-scale petitions and protests to defend villagers’ rights from 2009 to 2011. As they fought for their land and for democracy in their village, Wukan residents were faced with extreme hardship, and the local government did everything it could — including plots and conspiracies — to deny and block these demands. In 2011, the authorities launched a crackdown on the village, and a number of the key villagers involved in defending their rights, including myself, were arrested. Xue Jinbo (薛锦波) was treated particularly cruelly, and died in prison.

Under the gaze of international media, then-Party chief of Guangdong Province (and current Politburo member and vice premier), Wang Yang (汪洋), made a show of goodwill, sending Zhu Mingguo (朱明国), then-vice Party secretary of Guangdong, to the village to ease tensions, affirm that the villagers’ demands were legitimate, and promise that the demands would be met. Now, however, it appears that all this was simply the government buying time while the world was watching.

 

wukan-protest-stop-the-car

Zhang Liehong and fellow protesters stopped a vehicle of the Chinese delegation on Constitution Avenue. Chinese officials inside covered their faces with briefcases. Shamed?

 

In 2012, after Wukan formed its own democratically-elected village committee, the government used a range of methods to sow discord among villagers, erode the bonds of trust between them, lay traps for the most active village rights defense activists, and manipulate and control public opinion. Four years on, the government has put overwhelming emphasis on “stability maintenance” (meaning police and other security forces), and has not met any of the villagers’ demands for the return of the stolen land. Between 2012 and 2016, the authorities arrested one villager, (Zhang Dejia [张德家]), and sentenced three others — Hong Ruichao (洪锐潮), Yang Semao (杨色茂), and Lin Zuluan (林祖銮) — to prison.

In order to avoid the same fate, I fled to the United States on January 27, 2014, and applied for political asylum. For 85 days between June 19 and September 12, 2016, Wukan villagers organized daily protest marches through the streets, with about 4,000 participants every day.

On September 13, they were violently suppressed by thousands of riot police.

wukan-xuejinbo

Xue Jinbo (薛锦波), one of the leaders of Wukan uprising in 2011, died after two days in custody.

At about 3 a.m. on September 13, a battalion of armed police moved on the village, raiding houses and arresting 13 villagers that the government considered to be the most high-profile, including my father, Zhuang Songkun (庄松坤). Come dawn, thousands of fully-armed People’s Armed Police locked down village street intersections, dividing the crowd and then crushing the protest. They fired countless rounds of rubber bullets, and volleyed canisters of tear gas and shock grenades into the unarmed villagers. Then they began surrounding and violently beating villagers, without regard to whether they were old, women, or children. Faced with this violent, armed suppression, villagers resorted to throwing rocks and bricks. Hundreds of villagers were injured during the conflict, and reports indicate that an old woman died after being shot twice with rubber bullets. Nearly 100 villagers are believed to have been arrested.

Following the incident a large number of armed police, SWAT teams, and plainclothes officers installed themselves on practically every street corner in the village, even organizing patrols along the thoroughfares and back alleys. They severed internet access to block news about what happened from getting out, and stopped Hong Kong and international media from getting in. While all this was taking place, official media published gravely false reports about the suppression of the village. In the nearly three months since then, Wukan has become one big prison. Heavily armed riot police patrol the streets and alleys, members of the village Party committee act as spies, and the arbitrary arrest of villagers continues.

image1-4

“Wang Yang killed Xue Jinbo.”

There are multiple indications that the violent suppression of Wukan this time was carried out on the direct orders of the Guangdong provincial government. Reports say that the vice-secretary of Guangdong was commanding the suppression from the nearby city of Lufeng (陆丰市), and that the thousands of riot and SWAT police deployed had been mobilized from the Huizhou Military District (惠州军区). The only one authorized to bring this level of force to bear is the current Guangdong Party secretary, Hu Chunhua (胡春华), so I’m positive that the violent suppression of Wukan was ordered by him.

On September 19, activist Yao Cheng (姚诚), a friend, and I were on our way to the United Nations headquarters in New York City to protest, when we were accosted and harassed by over a dozen men in identical black suits and blue raincoats — apparently national security agents from Chinese premier Li Keqiang’s (李克强) security detail. After we all got into an argument, one of the men took an open letter I handed to him, addressed to the Chinese Consul General in New York. We proceeded to the designated area at the UN and held our protest as planned. The following morning, however, I was shocked to receive a telephone call from the Lufeng public security bureau, who had detained my father, and were forcing him to tell me to keep quiet. On the one hand I was so glad to be in America, yet also realized that my right to express myself freely here is still limited by the Chinese authorities, and my own personal safety is even put at risk.

image1-5

“Hold Hu Chunhua accountable.” The current Party secretary in Guangdong province, Hu presided over the brutal crackdown on Wukan in 2016.

Wukan is still fraught with tension and conflict: the villagers have had two thirds of their land stolen from them, and this already put their basic livelihood under enormous pressure. Now, the entire area has been turned into a jail. So many villagers have been badly injured and arrested, which is another severe blow. Many families don’t even have the money to pay for proper medical treatment, and now rely on relatives from nearby villages to send them rations just so they can survive.

For all these reasons, I make the following demands of the Chinese authorities:

I. Cease the suppression and detention of Wukan villagers;

II. Release Lin Zuluan, Hong Ruichao, Yang Semao, Wei Yonghan (魏永汉), Zhang Xiangkang (张向坑), Yang Jinzhen (杨锦贞), Yang Shaoji (杨少集), Liu Hanchai (刘汉钗), Hong Yongzhong (洪永忠), Zhuang Songkun, Lin Desheng (林德升) and all other Wukan villagers who sought to defend their legal rights to the village land, and release the body — or, if still alive, the person — of the 80-year-old grandmother who was shot twice at close range with rubber bullets and reportedly killed;

III. Arrange for the immediate medical care of the roughly 100 villagers who were severely injured by riot police, and who are now hiding in their homes attempting to recover;

IV. Return the stolen land to Wukan village;

V. Hold accountable the chief culprit that orchestrated the violent suppression of peaceful Wukan villagers on September 13: Guangdong Party Secretary Hu Chunhua.

Wukan villager Zhuang Liehong (庄烈宏)
Washington, D.C.
November 22, 2016


乌坎村民庄烈宏

 就乌坎镇压致汪洋和国际媒体的公开信

 

乌坎,是一个位于中国广东省东部的自然渔村,拥有土地面积约3.5万亩;人口1.3万。自1993年起,官商勾结暗中盗卖我乌坎村集体土地(耕地)资源,从而引发自2009年至2011年乌坎村集体上访和与当局政府的维权抗争。乌坎村人民在争取土地和民主途中所遇极其困难,政府以各种形式和阴谋阻止乌坎实现诉求。2011年政府对乌坎村进行镇压,包括我本人在内的几名维权首要村民被抓捕,薛锦波更在被捕后惨死狱中。在国际媒体的关注下,时任广东省委书记汪洋政府释出善意,特派时任省副书记朱明国进村平息民愤,承认乌坎村民的诉求是合法的,并承诺解决乌坎诉求。现在看来这只是政府面对国际舆论的一个暂时让步而已。

在2012年乌坎成立民选村委会后,政府利用各种手段,对牵头维权的村民布局陷阱,分化村民之间的信任关系,控制舆论自由等。4年以来当局以维稳为重,并未兑现乌坎村民的土地诉求。在2012年至2016年间,当局分别逮捕和判处一名村民(张德家)和三名维权领导人徒刑(洪锐潮、杨色茂和林祖銮)。我本人为了躲避迫害而于2014年1月27来到美国寻求政治庇护。2016年6月19日至9月12日共85天期间,村民自发每天在乌坎村道游行抗议,每天参与人数4千多人,直至9月13日乌坎村遭几千警力暴力镇压。

9月13日凌晨3点钟大批武装部队分别同时入屋抓捕13名政府认为在游行抗议中比较高调的村民,当中包括本人的父亲(庄松坤)。天亮后几千名全武装武警部队分别封锁村各个路口,并对我乌坎村人民进行切割式镇压,对村民展开无数次橡胶子弹枪射击、投放催泪弹和震撼弹,镇压中没有顾忌地对老人、村妇、孩童等实施围殴等暴力手段。面对全武装的军警镇压,手无寸铁的村民以路边砖块还击,事发中造成几百名村民身受重伤,拟似一名老太太身中两枪死亡。70多名村民在对峙中被捕。

事后,大批武警、特警和便衣警察在通往村里的每个路口、乃至村内的大街小巷布防和巡逻,同时切断网络,封锁现场消息流出,以及阻止香港和世界各地的境外记者进村采访。与此同时,国内官方媒体对乌坎镇压做了严重失实的报道。自九月以来的三个多月以来,乌坎村如同一个大监狱,村中大街小巷每天都有全副武装的武警分批巡逻,村党总支部人员充当间谍,当局对村民的任意抓捕行为仍在继续中。

各种迹象表明,此次对乌坎村的镇压是由广东省政府下令。据悉广东副省长坐镇陆丰市政府指挥,几千名镇压乌坎村的武警、特警由广东省惠州军区调遣,然而能行驶这等权利者唯有广东省现任省委书记(胡春华)。因此我肯定对此次乌坎暴力镇压是胡春华所为。

9月19日,我与姚诚先生以及一名好友前往纽约联合国总部前举标语抗议的途中,受到十几名身穿统一黑色西装和蓝色雨衣、貌似李克强跟从的国保人士的阻挠。在与他们一番争吵后,其中一人接过了我的一封《致中国驻纽约领事馆公开信》。 随后我们按计划前往纽约联合国总部前的示威区域举标语抗议。没想到第二天早上我即收到陆丰公安局人员打来电话,让在看守所中的父亲劝我封口。我庆幸自己来到了美国,然而虽然身在美国,但自由表达权利仍然受中国当局干扰,甚至感到人身安全受到威胁。

乌坎如今是一个千疮百孔的村庄。乌坎人民因无法追回近两万亩失地,本来已面临巨大的生存压力,如今更是活在一个大监狱中。许多村民受伤和被捕,导致经济严重受创,很多家庭无法给伤者提供正常治疗,甚至靠向外村亲戚借口粮维持生存。

诉求1:停止镇压、停止看守乌坎人民。

诉求2:释放林祖恋、洪锐潮、杨色茂、魏永汉、蔡加磷、张向坑、杨锦贞、杨少集、刘汉钗、洪永忠、庄松坤、林德升等所有参与土地维权的乌坎村民,归还对乌坎镇压中拟似受两枪近距离橡胶子弹射击至死的80岁老奶奶(钱秀香)的尸体,或释放其人。

诉求3:帮助治疗对乌坎镇压中100多名身受重伤的村民及其家庭度过难关。

诉求4:归还乌坎村被盗卖的土地。

诉求5:问责9月13日暴力镇压乌坎人民的刽子手——广东省委书记胡春华。

乌坎村民:庄烈宏

发于:华盛顿D.C.

2016年11月22日

Xi’s Empty Words Harm the Nation

(Tom is unable to post his piece at the moment. Yaxue substitutes.)

Xi Jinping created quite a stir with his recent trip to Guangdong province, which has been seen by many as a demonstration of his determination to continue with (economic) Reform and Opening up. On this trip he impressed many by proceeding in a much less flashy fashion than most expect from Chinese gov’t officials. While his recent promotion of waste-preventing guidelines and anti-corruption policies show a strong desire to limit these ills of the Party, there is little hope that these alone will make a difference.

Xi is right to focus on these issues early on in his leadership, as graft and abuse of power are widely seen as the biggest threats to the Party, but he fails to recognize that these are unavoidable consequences of the current political structure. As it stands in China, the flow of resources is still largely controlled by a massive bureaucratic system. This gives a large number of individuals power over very valuable, finite commodities; which provides them the opportunity to extract bribes and use their positions for their own personal benefit. Because these petty officials are only beholden to the Party, and not the people affected by their actions, there is little need for them to produce results that would help their communities (and the results they produce are generally in effort to further their own careers). Without massive reforms, corruption will continue to be major problem.

Furthermore, as we’ve seen time and again, China’s leaders are excellent at producing laws, edicts, speeches, and slogans; but are incapable of ensuring their enforcement. There is little reason to believe that Xi’s latest efforts will produce a different outcome than the dozens of similar speeches made during Hu Jintao’s time. The problem is that to date, anti-corruption efforts have relied heavily on gov’t investigators instead of public oversight. In reality, this is simply creating another opportunity for graft, as these investigators can use their power to extract bribes from other officials.

I believe that the current strategy of the Party is simply to present the appearance of a clean up. After all, if many people in China believe that the Communist Party of the 50’s and 60’s was incorruptible (even though officials feasted through Mao’s great famine), than it should be possible to convince them of this again while maintaining the “perks” of officialdom that produce the unquestioning loyalty that the Party requires of it servants.

Last week though an open letter to Xi Jinping outlined clear initiatives that could be taken if the Party was really serious about cleaning up corruption, instead of just giving the appearance of caring. Signed by 65 Chinese intellectuals, legal professionals, teachers, engineers, media professionals and people from other professions, the letter reads as follows:

Corruption is a very serious social problem in China, as general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Xi Jinping said on November 17, 2012, during a  study session of the Political Bureau, “The problem of corruption is becoming increasingly severe, and could ultimately bring down the Party and the country.” On November 19, 2012, the head of the CPC Commission for Discipline Inspection, Wang Qishan, gave a speech in the meeting of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Ministry of Supervision also stressing the importance of “steadfast opposition to corruption”.

But over the years, the anti-corruption slogans, campaign-style anti-corruption efforts have not been able to solve the increasingly serious problem of corruption. On July 11, 2010, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the CPC Central Organization Department, the Ministry of Supervision jointly issued “Rules Regarding Cadres Reporting Personal Matters” that stipulate that cadres at and above the division level (处级, lower-middle level officials) must report personal income, real estate holdings, and investments of his/her own, as well as that of the spouse and children living with them.” But the information has not been made public, and did not work toward eradicating corruption.

The fundamental way to solve the problem of corruption is transparency. In 1766, in order to limit the power of the king, the Swedish Parliament enacted “freedom of the press,” which gave the Swedish citizens the right to access information about the property of all officials. Over 240 years, the official property declaration system has proven to be an effective weapon in fighting corruption, and many of the countries in the world have emulated it, including China’s Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.

In the face of this grim situation, we demand that the official property publicity to be started from the top, not only because high-level officials display better ideological and political quality, their job performance stands out, and they also enjoy a relatively high degree of respect by the masses,” but more importantly, because senior officials wield enormous public resources, and hold the power to affect the well-being of China’s 1.3 billion citizens.

During the 18th Party Congress, Shanghai Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng said, as soon as the central authorities made the decision, he could easily make his information public, “because I do not have much property.” The same day, the Guangdong provincial party secretary Wang Yang said, answering questions about official property declarations, that Guangdong is implementing pilot official property declaration system, and will continue exploring it. During last year’s Two Meetings, the Xinjiang Autonomous Region Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian said that, if officials are to make public of their properties, he would be the first to do so. From these public statements, we see that the conditions are ripe for officials’ property holdings to be known to the public.

As prescribed in Article 41 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the right to put forward criticisms of, and suggestions for, anyone working in any state organ.” As citizens of the People’s Republic of China, we ask the 205 most senior officials of China, as listed below, set an example by publishing the income, real estate, investment and other holdings of their own, their spouses and their children’s to curb the corrupt behavior of officials from the source, and to build a better China.”

It seems as though Xi would benefit from the wisdom of his newly minted catch phrase, “empty talk harms the country,” as it stands, this trip to Guangdong is nothing more than another hollow gesture that is not substantially different than any of the anti-corruption measures that have come before. If he wants the country to benefit fully from the idea that “hard work prospers the nation,” his first step should be implementing a transparent system for reporting the wealth of officials.

You should be reading People’s Daily – The Party’s paper is the best tool for activists

English: Logo of the People's Daily 中文: 人民日报题字

People's Daily

I think to many observers of China, People’s Daily (PD) has little worth outside of restating the Party line. They pretend that it is a reconstruction of the Ministry of Truth from 1984, whose only purpose lies in creating “truth.” Some even go so far as to argue that reading and quoting such a paper does nothing but affirm the Party’s leadership. In fact, bloggers, activists, and dissidents should be reading the People’s Daily, and, as I’ll show, often the most damning evidence against the Party’s rule can be found within its pages.

Initially, I too was skeptical of the integrity of People’s Daily, but linked to it regularly, assuming that even the strongest proponents of China would find it difficult to argue with facts and figures from the Party mouth piece. After all, PD would have little interest in overstating China’s problems.

Overtime I started to realize that stories were usually innocent on their own, but when taken with the bigger picture often portrayed a hypocritical and unjust state. The strongest example of this comes from two stories that seem at first glance to be completely unrelated; a female teacher burning seven kindergartners with a hot iron, and a man smashing the windows of two Mercedes-Benz. However on closer reading, one sees the vastly different values placed on the children of the poor and the possessions of the rich; the woman was held by police for 10 days, while the man was sentenced for 20 months.

Intrigued by this discovery, I started combing the China Society page daily. The home page of the site interests me due to importance put on certain articles, but I have found the other sections reveal far fewer interesting stories. This is not to say that it is void of blatantly rosy accounts of China. The Politics section, is usually just pronouncements, where words like “urge” and “inspect” fill the headlines with little discussion of action (official reports appear here from time to time, which can be useful). Additionally, Foreign Affairs, rarely strays from the Party line, and replays the same few points ad nauseum (sovereignty, peaceful development, harmony…). At times though, the Foreign Affairs section fails to convey the Party line in a convincing fashion, like the infamous one sentence article, “No beating of foreign journalists by police: Chinese FM,” in response to an incident that took place during the Jasmine Protests.

Despite some sensational stories that argue otherwise, the Party doesn’t actually inspect every article prior to publication. PD however does know that their role is to support the Party. They offer the clearest view of what the Party line is, and therefore serve as a useful window to China. The benefit of this to activists is that it is not always clear how one should support the Party.

What many people are not aware of is that within the paper there is a great deal of latitude given to each author and each department. It is not uncommon for there to be contradictory headlines appearing within a day of each other. For example: “China to reduce rare earth export quotas” published Oct. 19, 2010 followed by “China denies reports of rare earth export quota cut” on Oct. 20, 2010. Both used quotes from the Ministry of Commerce and appeared prominently on the front page of the People’s Daily’s website. These contradictions show a clear lack of gov’t oversight, and that the editors are sometimes left guessing where the Party line is.

Surprisingly, People’s Daily actually gives activists the tools to easily track down related stories that expose the paper’s previous position.

This appeared with the article "China denies reports of rare earth export quota cut".

Unlike the Ministry of Truth in George Orwell’s distopia, the People’s Daily only produces new material, but doesn’t bother to delete the existing content. Even as Chinese censors scrub weibo of “sensitive words,” PD seems to be unaffected by these emergency efforts.

This doesn’t mean that there aren’t attempts to obscure the past. The search feature of the People’s Daily website does seem to employ keyword blocking.

A search for “Falun Gong” results in this:

While a Google search of People’s Daily reveals over 1,350 articles related to the same topic. One finds that even though you can no longer access this information through People’s Daily itself, all of the articles still exist in their original form, even the initial article stating the practice has been banned is easily found.

The People’s Daily also tries to maintain its relevance in society by reporting, often obliquely, on hot topics. Using the Google site search, I tested nearly 50 terms and found that People’s Daily seems at least to be discussing some of the most sensitive topics (Full results at end).

A Google site search is performed by searching: “X” site:http://english.peopledaily.com.cn I further limited the search using Google’s tools that narrow the search by date of publication.

The biggest gains in frequency are in line with which topics were most widely discussed in other major overseas newspapers. Unsurprisingly, “Weibo” went from just three mentions to 2,520 in 2011. Bo Xilai also experienced a massive jump in frequency from just seven mentions in 2010 to 253 mentions in 2011 as a result of his Red Songs campaign and political posturing. (Wang Yang of Guangdong, who was seen as Bo’s competitor, had 7 and 10 mentions respectively).

Other words that have become more common in the last year include: “Stability” gaining 344% to 5,820 mentions; “Pollution” went up 1,094% from 355 mentions to 4,240, which shows the greater debate of the topic in the last year; “Food Safety” increased 3,083% going from 104 mentions to 3,310; and “Gutter Oil,” which was not mentioned a single time in 2010, was discussed 1,410 times in 2011. Any China hand would agree that these increases reflect the changes in the conversations we hear on a daily basis with our Chinese friends. I would argue that it is the result of a greater openness in People’s Daily to report on issues without waiting for official permission (in addition to the more obvious propaganda pieces).

These shifts in reporting also reflect changes in gov’t campaigns. For example the period from January 1 – March 19, 2010 and 2011 only yielded 1 article related to Lei Feng; the same period in 2012 has resulted in 117. When you read People’s Daily everyday, you can start to intuit these shifts, but a Google site search allows you to quantify such changes.

Thanks to the administrators of the People’s Daily website, information is no longer a tool that only the Party can wield.

Sorted by Topic

Sorted by % change

Sorted by times mentioned in 2011

Important Notes: Google site search is not perfect. 3 page articles are counted as 3 separate mentions. While this skews data some, it is also representative of the importance attached to each topic. Recent photo pages also skew results, as an unrelated article may appear in the results due to the photo page being mentioned on the side bar. Data sets for Wukan and Muammar Gaddafi were strongly affected by this, which is why I placed an x in their columns for 2010. Additionally, mentions of “Democracy” may be pro-democracy or anti-democracy, but the value lies in the fact that it is increasingly being discussed.

Are the Two Meetings pointless? – Writing laws that won’t be enforced

Just in case you’ve been doing something else this week besides poring over China news, Monday marked the start of China’s annual Two Meetings (两会lianghui). Over 10 days, “representatives” (it is unclear who they actually represent) submit thousands of suggestions for new laws, listen to speeches from heads of various ministries, and approve virtually everything the Party sets in front of them.

For many Chinese netizens, it serves as a buffet of memes (internet jokes) at the expense of sleeping delegates and Mao’s grandson, as well as a source of outrage when it comes to expensive clothing and accessories.

At the end of the meetings, new laws will be presented and then promptly forgotten. As the WSJ put it:

…activists including artist Ai Weiwei, who was detained for 81 days last year without being charged, say Chinese police rarely observe legal procedure, and the new revisions include many loopholes that would still allow police to make people “disappear” in politically sensitive cases.

So if the laws aren’t actually enforced, aren’t these meetings pointless?

The reason China journalists, human rights advocates, financial analysts, and others have been glued to their screens this week isn’t because they think these new laws will actually be strictly enforced. Instead, this week is dedicated to reading tea leaves and trying to discern China’s future direction. This is especially important given that there will be a new group of leaders appointed this fall.

For example, Bo Xilai (the guy who loves red songs) and Wang Yang (called a reformer) have been the focus of at least a dozen articles, even though the next leader has already been decided (unofficially). Instead, these two men represent two factions within the Party, and the ascension of either one to a higher post could mean a general shift in that direction.

Unfortunately, Bo Xilai has been entangled in a political scandal, and is now unlikely to be promoted. I say “unfortunately” not because Bo deserves a promotion (my nationalist friend in Chengdu called him a “psycho” and the more reform minded friend called him “dangerous”), but his scandal means that we can no longer tell if he just lost favor or if his whole ideology has lost standing.

On the other hand, laws, like the one protecting human rights during detention, are China’s way of signaling to the rest of the world how it would like to be portrayed or less cynically, what it hopes to be. Law makers know this bill will result in headlines like, “China acts to give defendants greater rights,” and “China targets detention practices,” without actually limiting what state security agents can do, but many papers and activists will call it progress.

While I might seem skeptical, bare in mind the many cases of detention Yaxue has detailed on this blog were already in defiance of the current laws (“China is a country under rule of law” ironically was last year’s theme). Until people like Chen Guangcheng are free, there is little reason to expect that this law will be any better enforced.

Speeches, like Wen Jiabao’s promise that “Farmers’ land rights not to be violated by anyone,” serve two purposes. One, to give the appearance that the Party cares about Chinese farmers (which they need in order to maintain stability), and two, serves as a clear message to local gov’t’s that this issue is a priority. However, there is still little reason to think that this marks the end of land grabs. Police last year were ordered not to meddle in home demolitions, yet this is still a common source of tension.

Next week we’ll look closer at the tea leaves, and try to discern what kind of country China would like to be seen as.