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A Comprehensive Bibliography of Liu Xiaobo’s Writings

Hermann Aubié, September 5, 2017

 

Liu Xiaobo_biblio

 

 

During the eight and a half years that Liu Xiaobo spent in Jinzhou prison, only intermittent attention to both his fate and Liu Xia’s detention kept him from becoming gradually invisible, despite being the world’s only imprisoned Peace Nobel laureate. Now that Liu Xiaobo has passed away of liver cancer on July 13, 2017, there is an even greater danger that what he expressed and stood for will be either poorly remembered or completely forgotten.

In the absence of a comprehensive bibliography of his writings, I compiled this list of Liu Xiaobo’s texts that were found on various Chinese websites, magazines, journals and books that had mostly been published in Hong Kong and Taiwan, as part of my dissertation that provides the first comprehensive academic study in English of Liu Xiaobo’s human rights struggle from a socio-historical perspective. In addition to several interviews with foreign media, Liu published eleven books and about one thousand articles covering an impressive range of topics. After translating all the titles of his texts into English, I added brief annotations and footnotes about the general topic of each text when the titles did not provide any obvious indication on their own.

Because only a few translations of Liu Xiaobo’s writings are available in English (in total less than 1% of all his writings), the discussion of Liu Xiaobo’s struggle for human rights in Western media and academia has often been limited to a small set of quotes that are not representative of what he stood for as a whole. As a result, there is still a gap of understanding between Chinese and foreign writings on Liu Xiaobo. Hopefully, this bibliography will inspire future researchers to look deeper into his work to improve the public knowledge and understanding of what Liu Xiaobo gave his life for.

A note on the hyperlinks: All the text that is hyperlinked in blue was originally linking up to the text of his articles or translations, but many of them might have changed since then. If the URL is no longer functional, a simple Google search will turn up valid substitutes.

 

A Comprehensive Bibliography of Liu Xiaobo’s Writings (Chinese and English)

 

 

Hermann AubieAbout the author:

Hermann Aubié is a lecturer in sociology and policy at Aston University in Birmingham, England; he completed his PhD at the Centre for East Asian Studies of the University of Turku (Finland) in 2016 with a dissertation titled “Liu Xiaobo’s Struggle for Human rights: A Contextual Analysis from a Historical Perspective” which is forthcoming as a book.

After doing his BA and MA at the University of Western Brittany in France and the University of Glasgow, he spent five years working in China as a teacher, researcher and consultant for the EU-China Civil Society Dialogue.

His research focuses on contemporary politics, human rights, and civil society transformations in China and East Asia, with particular attention on how citizens use the law and media to promote socio-political change, and to redress injustice for individuals/groups who are persecuted and discriminated against.

 


Related:

From Brittany, in Memory of Liu Xiaobo’s Spirit and Voice of Conscience, Hermann Aubié, August 9, 2017

Liu Xiaobo: The Founder of China’s Political Opposition Movements, Wu Qiang, June 30, 2017.

The Path Forward in the Wake of Liu Xiaobo’s Passing, Yaxue Cao, July 16, 2017.

As Liu Xiaobo Dies in Isolation, It’s Time to Abandon ‘Quiet Diplomacy’, Chang Ping, July 18, 2017.

 

 

 

 

 

Open Letter: A Call for Investigation Into HNA Group’s Activities in the US and Likely Corrupt Ties With Top Communist Party Leaders

China Human Rights Accountability Center, August 15, 2017

 

We are writing this open letter to express our deepest concerns about the highly suspicious activities of the HNA Group (HNA) in the United States, including the lack of transparency of its ownership, the unclear nature of its plan for charity work, and allegations of large-scale corruption. Based on the mandate of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, other relevant laws, and in the service of public interest, we strongly urge Congress and relevant administrative agencies to investigate and uncover the true nature of the HNA Group, its asset sources, and intended uses in the United States.

Headquartered in the capital city of Hainan Province, an island off mainland China between the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin, HNA Group started in 1992 as a state-owned enterprise doing business primarily in airlines and tourism. It was re-incorporated around 2000 and began expanding its assets rapidly and mysteriously.

In the last decade alone, the HNA Group transformed itself into the largest acquirer of foreign assets in the U.S. and one of the largest worldwide. The HNA Group is heavily funded by Chinese state-owned bank loans, which have enabled it to leverage into completely unrelated business sectors. With acquisitions, its rank in the Fortune Global 500 list climbed from No. 464 in 2015 to 170 in 2017, and is projected to reach the top 100 in 2018. It is reported that HNA Group’s current total assets exceed $150 billion.

HNA’s ultimate target is to be top 10 in the world, according to its CEO Adam Tan. HNA’s sprawling portfolio now includes Ingram Micro, Avalon, Deutsche Bank, and Hilton Worldwide, to name a few. Its transactions and activities involve former White House Communication Director Anthony Scaramucci and other high profile luminaries including George Soros, David Cameron, and Nicolas Sarkozy. However, HNA remains behind a heavy veil, despite its incomprehensible success. It failed to make any clarifications when various journalists repeatedly raised questions about its ownership structure or how it made its fortune.

We are writing this letter out of concern over what appears to be one of the most generous donations to a U.S. foundation in the history of philanthropy, and its potential connections to unprecedented massive corruption.

On January 31,2017, New York Times first reported that HNA’s largest single shareholder was Guan Jun (贯君), a mysterious man in his 30s who is alleged to be tied to China’s anti-corruption czar  Wang Qishan. In June, the Financial Times also reported that Guan Jun purchased 29 percent of the company last year from Hong Kong-based businessman Bharat Bhise.  Neither HNA nor Bhise revealed how the stake changed hands up to this transaction.

Only after the Chinese and foreign media began to focus on HNA’s ownership did the company finally release an open letter on July 24 to its employees, associates, and consumers; but even then, it did not list Guan Jun as the largest shareholder. When probed about the disappearance of Guan Jun’s share by a reporter from China Business Network, HNA said Guan is a “private investor” who owned some of the company’s shares, which has now been donated to the Cihang Foundation in New York.

This was confirmed by another Financial Times interview with HNA’s chief executive Adam Tan, who told the British newspaper that a Chinese citizen had donated $18 billion of the ownership of HNA—29 percent of the shares of the HNA Group of China—to a private foundation based in New York: the Hainan Cihang Charity Foundation, the company’s charitable arm in the United States. According to HNA, 53 percent of the company is owned by Cihang foundations, including a 22.8 percent stake held by a sister charity in China. The foundation registered with the New York Department of State on December 7, 2016, and it is currently applying for federal tax-exempt status with the Internal Revenue Service. The foundation says it will support a number of efforts, including anti-poverty work. Suspiciously, its three initial directors are all top executives of HNA, as reported by Wall Street Journal.

To put the size of the donation into context, a single donation of $18 billion will make the New York Cihang second only to the Bill Gates Foundation, the largest private foundation in the world. Cihang foundations — the New York Cihang and Hainan Cihang — now hold tens of billions in total assets.

What was not explained, however, was how the donor Guan Jun, a man in his 30s, acquired such a large share of one of China’s biggest companies in the first place. According to Hong Kong corporate filings, Guan Jun’s registered residential address is a simple apartment in what New York Times reporters found was a dingy, trash-laden building in Beijing, while his business address was registered in the “Oriental Aphrodite Beauty Spa”, a street-side salon in a residential neighborhood in western Beijing. Both proved to be very dubious; Guan does not appear to be the owner or resident of those locations. When asked some of these questions by the Financial Times in a telephone call, his answer was “It is inconvenient to answer any of your questions.” This has been his only comment on the record.

In the interview with the Financial Times, Tan made the surprising admission that Guan, and another shareholder, Bharat Bhise, had never really owned the shares, “but had just held the stake for us.” This claim is inconsistent with the HNA spokesperson’s statement. It remains to be examined how these shares were obtained from HNA, a former state-owned enterprise that had undergone government-managed privatization. HNA’s true relationship with Guan Jun also remains unsettled — HNA claims he does not work for the company, but according to media reports, he serves as co-chairman with the son of HNA’s Chairman Chen Feng in a peer-to-peer financing platform owned by HNA.

Doubts about the company’s unclear ownership structure and claims of corruption allegations have recently caused Bank of America to decide not to do any business with the Chinese conglomerate. Meanwhile, the European Central Bank is reportedly investigating HNA’s nearly 10% stake in Deutsche Bank. On top of this, the New York Attorney General pointed out that the group had not registered in the state as a charity, as required by law, and asked it to do so within 20 days or explain why it has not done so.

Although Chinese citizens were prohibited from asking questions about HNA and its business and political affiliations, there is little doubt that this conglomerate needed close ties with senior leaders of the Chinese Communist Party to achieve such spectacular growth.  There is no other possible explanation for how HNA could obtain a seemingly unlimited line of credit from all major state-owned financial institutions in China. Most Chinese people are prohibited from knowing the nature of the HNA transactions. Those who are aware of the hidden fact are outraged by such an abnormal transfer of assets — possibly a grand embezzlement of public wealth — but they are too afraid to protest or speak up because they fear the potential backlash from the individuals who genuinely control the HNA assets, who are likely connected to the very top of the communist regime.

For Congress and the administration, HNA’s unprecedented, massive corruption and dubious transfer of large assets to a U.S.-based “charity” should sound an alarm: Cihang foundations control over 53% of HNA, making Cihang a shell holding company of HNA, one of the top companies in the world, not a charity.

We suspect that HNA’s largest shareholder Guan Jun may have acquired his 29.5% share ownership by siphoning public assets through government manipulated privatizations, because public records provide no evidence that he purchased these shares fairly.

Consistent with Guan Jun’s murky identity, only very high level political privileges can explain why HNA was able to grow at a parabolic rate, fueled by bank lending and easy access to hard currency, despite China’s tight capital controls. In addition to alleged connections of Guan Jun with Wang Qishan, HNA’s chairman of the board, Chen Feng was a former PLA officer, worked under Wang Qishan for a project of the now defunct China Agriculture Trust Investment Co., and has “been a delegate to three national congresses of the Chinese Communist Party since 2002, spanning the presidencies of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping”, as reported by Nikkei. HNA’s business took off when Wang Qishan became Hainan’s Party chief in 2002. In Chen Feng’s most recent public appearance, he accompanied Xi Jinping on Xi’s state visit to the U.K in 2015, where he was received by then-Prime Minister David Cameron on the same stage with Xi.

HNA bypassed scrutiny while acting as a state sovereign investment company. On the other hand, given the opacity of the ownership and its special connections, we are concerned that it could very well be controlled by individuals and families connected with the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), operating through a shadowy Guan Jun. Cihang will provide a shelter for CCP leaders’ families to retain their wealth, which they could only have obtained through corruption. Cihang may thus become a beachhead for the CCP to influence the U.S. government and public.

If this is the case, such an entity would be liable for examination per the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, passed in December 2016 (NDAA 2017, section 1261-1265) as the law aims at sanctioning officials or their senior associates who have committed “expropriation of private or public assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption to foreign jurisdictions.”

Therefore, we ask the U.S. Congress and the administration to support the following:

  1. Conduct an independent investigation into all transactions and assets held by HNA and its U.S. -based business affiliates in connection with alleged corruption by CCP leaders;
  1. Conduct an independent investigation of the source of funding for HNA and Cihang’s U.S. operations in connection with alleged corruption by CCP leaders;
  1. Hold an open hearing through the U.S. Congress regarding the above investigations;
  1. Suspend approval of HNA’s application for the tax-exempt status until the completion of the above investigations;
  1. Suspend approval of all HNA’s business mergers and acquisitions in the United States until the completion of the above investigations;
  1. Audit HNA’s U.S.-based companies, NY Cihang Foundation, and Guan Jun’s donation and suspend their operations in the U.S. until the completion of the above investigations.

 

Contact: Fengsuo Zhou, Email: zhou@h-china.org

 

China Human Rights Accountability Center was formed in January 2017 by a group of mostly U. S.-based Chinese activists to promote and assist the implementation of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.  

 

Paul Mooney, Shanshan Zou, Sandra Fu contributed to this letter.

 


Media coverage:  

Financial Times: HNA chief shrugs off regulatory and ownership concerns

https://www.ft.com/content/d9bc0760-70d0-11e7-aca6-c6bd07df1a3c

Financial Times: Who owns HNA, China’s most aggressive dealmaker?

https://www.ft.com/content/8acfe40e-410b-11e7-9d56-25f963e998b2

Financial Times: ECB probes HNA and Qatar Stakes in Deutsche Bank

https://www.ft.com/content/1e9ca0e2-6ba9-11e7-b9c7-15af748b60d0

New York Times: Behind an $18 Billion Donation to a New York Charity, a Shadowy Chinese Conglomerate

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/business/hna-group-billion-donation-new-york-charity.html

New York Times: HNA dealing with Scaramucci, first report of Guan Jun

https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/us/anthony-scaramucci-business-white-house.html

Regulatory filing of AID in Hong Kong, a HNA shell lists Guan Jun as shareholder

http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/GEM/2016/0330/GLN20160330275.pdf

Wall Street Journal: HNA has deepened the uncertainties around the New York foundation that is its biggest shareholder by changing its reason for not registering yet with the state.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/hnas-new-york-charity-wont-take-outside-money-for-now-1501893615

Bloomberg: Bank of America Halts Deals With HNA Amid Debt Concerns

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-19/bank-of-america-said-to-halt-deals-with-hna-amid-debt-concerns

Wall Street Journal: HNA’s Biggest Shareholder Doesn’t Really Exist Yet

https://www.wsj.com/articles/hnas-biggest-shareholder-doesnt-really-exist-yet-1501159085

Bloomberg: Don’t fly in the dark, HNA

https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2017-06-06/chinese-cash-magnet-hna-must-clear-the-murk-to-reach-its-goals

Bloomberg: HNA’s NYC Charity Owner Told by A.G. to Register With State

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-27/hna-s-nyc-nonprofit-owner-told-by-state-to-register-as-charity

HKEJ: The ties that bind: HNA’s Chen Feng and his rise to power

http://www.ejinsight.com/20170522-the-ties-that-bind-hna-s-chen-feng-and-his-rise-to-power/

Fortune: You’ve Never Heard of HNA Group. Here’s Why You Will

http://fortune.com/2017/07/24/fortune-global-500-hna-group-china/l

Nikkei: Questions mount over HNA’s financial engineering

https://asia.nikkei.com/Features/Company-in-focus/Questions-mount-over-HNA-s-financial-engineering

Why HNA is on a buying binge?

https://www.xcnnews.com/rd/159722.html

Hainan Cihang registration at New York Department of State:

https://appext20.dos.ny.gov/corp_public/CORPSEARCH.ENTITY_INFORMATION?p_token=05E802F662B75268CF28BB101283266F719FCDDE5829066C371B474E3012B58C9173744907E7B39478A94A75F692D9BC&p_nameid=DAB0EBE0256869E8&p_corpid=94B8FB0CF3559FCA&p_captcha=12422&p_captcha_check=80F162C216CC3291&p_entity_name=%63%69%68%61%6E%67&p_name_type=%25&p_search_type=%43%4F%4E%54%41%49%4E%53&p_srch_results_page=0

Cihang’s tax filing, 2016

http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990pf_pdf_archive/820/820700090/820700090_201612_990PF.pdf

Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act

https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/284

 

 

 

 

Foreword to ‘The Martial Law Troops of June Fourth’

Wu Renhua, May 29, 2017

 

Wu Renhua (吳仁華) is a unique scholar. For over 20 years he has been immersed in the primary source materials about what Chinese authorities call “the June 4th incident,” and what is known around the world as the Tiananmen Square Massacre. His academic training of nearly a decade was in ancient Chinese historiography — a set of research methodologies that he never expected he would apply to unraveling the genesis, execution, and aftermath of the bloody slaughter of unarmed students and Beijing residents in 1989. Wu was a junior faculty member of the China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing at the time of the protests, in which he was also a participant. He was one of the last to leave Tiananmen Square in the early morning of June 4; on his way back to his college residence he witnessed tanks crushing students in Liubukou (六部口). In February 1990 he swam four hours through the Zhujiang River Estuary from Zhuhai to Macau, then made his way to Hong Kong and finally the United States. He edited Press Freedom Herald  (《新闻自由导报》), a pro-democracy magazine, for 15 years. He lives in Los Angeles, California.

China Change has undertaken a translation, performed by Matthew Robertson, of the first chapter of The Martial Law Troops of June Fourth  (《六四事件中的戒严部队》), one of Wu Renhua’s three books on the 1989 movement. The other two books are: The Bloody Clearing of Tiananmen Square: The Inside Story (《天安门血腥清场内幕》, 2007) and The Full Record of the Tiananmen Movement (《六四事件全程实录》, 2014).

The Martial Law Troops of June Fourth was first published in 2009 in Chinese, and a revised edition was published in 2016. It has not yet appeared in English. It is an exhaustive, meticulous account of the decision-making process behind the command to impose martial law in Beijing and, later, open fire on the students; the command and control structure of the military; the manner in which commands were communicated through the ranks; the marshalling of military forces and their composition; the routes they took to Tiananmen; the countermeasures established by the military to guard against a coup; the clearing of the square; the reasons for the savagery of the troops; the rewards later given to officers and soldiers, and more. The bulk of the book is dedicated to minute analysis of the force composition of each of the group armies mobilized for the massacre, the routes they took, the orders they received, and in some cases the specific actions of specific units, and even individual officers and soldiers.

The foreword to the book and the section headings of the first chapter are presented for readers below as the 28th anniversary of the massacre approaches. — The Editors

 

June 4 martial law troops

 

Foreword

 

The foremost question in any study of the 1989 Beijing massacre is the mobilization of a fully-armed military force for the slaughter of peaceful students and protesters. When discussing the “truth” of the June 4 incident, the most important truth to be discussed is this. As a participant in the protests, a witness to the killings, and a scholar with a background in Chinese historical research, I’ve worked for years to gather documentary materials about the June 4 incident, and to explore the truth of the massacre that took place. My previous book, The Bloody Clearing of Tiananmen Square: The Inside Story, was a careful documentation of the entire process by which the square, and surrounding area, was cleared. The current volume is an examination of the PLA units that were ordered into Beijing to impose martial law. It is therefore testimony to another side of the truth of the June 4 massacre.

This book was conceived in March, 1990, soon after I had escaped the mainland by swimming across the bay to Zhuhai and then to Hong Kong. I’m indebted to the veteran journalist Ching Cheong (程翔) who gave me the book One Day Of Martial Law (《戒嚴一日》)  that provided a preliminary explanation of the June 4 martial law troop deployments. The detailed arrangements for the mass use of lethal force by Party leader Deng Xiaoping and his key supporter and senior military leader Yang Shangkun (楊尚昆) shocked me deeply. At the same time, there was much left to clarify: the order to open fire, the unit designators (番號) of the martial law troops, the number of troops involved, and more. So I made a vow: I would cast a vast net to collect material, begin a detailed study, and write a volume specifically dedicated to the martial law troops of June 4. This would also be a recording of the decision-makers and executors of the June 4 massacre, ensuring that all their names were listed in history’s hall of shame.

FullSizeRenderTo this day, the June 4 massacre remains an area of enquiry forbidden by the Chinese Communist Party. This made writing a book about the subject particularly challenging. The first problem is a grave lack of data, and the absence of officially-produced reliable materials. The second issue relates to the Chinese military itself, and in particular the difficulty in finding information on the units involved in the imposition of martial law. Chinese communist historiography has always regarded military affairs as a state secret. Every PLA unit has a numerical unit designator, and every organizational unit in, for instance, the 38th Army Group (陸軍第38集團軍), has a code name at the regimental level or above. All public references to the unit use this code name. The most well-known is Central Guard Unit (中央警衛團), which goes by the code “8341.” Thus, even the unit designators are secret and not allowed to be used — code names are used instead. On top of this is the extreme political sensitivity of the June 4 massacre, which has been blotted out of official Communist Party literature. This extends to propaganda about the successes of “suppressing the counterrevolutionary riot,” and the material regarding awards given to “Guardians of the Republic” — not only are the unit designators absent, but even the code names for the units are elided, making it almost impossible to determine from the official materials which soldiers and officers were in which units.

To my great fortune, I specialized in classical historical and documentary research at Peking University, undergoing seven years of professional training in bibliographical studies, bibliology, historiography, and textual criticism, first obtaining a Bachelor’s degree and then a Master’s. Furthermore, prior to entering university I was an enlisted soldier in the PLA at a border defense garrison, and thus have a certain foundational knowledge about the Chinese military and its organization. With this background, and after many years of assiduous effort, the secrets hidden in materials about the June 4 martial law troops were slowly revealed, and I was able to verify each and every one of the unit designation numbers, which provided the foundation for this volume. On the basis of this — having cracked the code and discovered the unit designators — related materials fell into place and were able to act as mutual-supporting verification for official documents that had previously been a mystery. Thus, formerly worthless propaganda material celebrating the “suppression of the counterrevolutionary riot” assumed immediate value, and the position of the PLA’s Command Center for Clearing the Square (解放軍戒嚴部隊清場指揮部), as well as the forward deployments of military units, became clear.

Writing this book was a grueling process — but since it involved the constant unraveling of surprises in the primary sources, and the solving of riddle after riddle, it was also a process full of delight and surprise. I regularly commented to my friends, half in jest, half in earnest, that I never thought that I would find myself, exiled in the United States, separated by so many years from my study of classical documentary research and textual criticism, able to put to full use the things I studied at university. Perhaps in all this the hand of providence is at work.

To this day, this is the first work to clarify the unit designators of the martial law troops of June 4, along with the number of soldiers. This includes the 24th Army Group, 27th Army Group, 28th Army Group, 38th Army Group, 63rd Army Group, and 65th Army Group under the Beijing Military District; the 39th Army Group, 40th Army Group, and 64th Army Group under the command of the Shenyang Military District; the 20th Army Group, 26th Army Group, 54th Army Group, and 67th Army Group under the Jinan Military District; the 12th Army Group under the Nanjing Military District; the 15th Airborne Corps under the direct command of the Central Military Commission; the 14th Division Artillery under the Beijing Military District; the 1st and 3rd Security Divisions of the Beijing Garrison Command; the 1st Tank Division of the Tianjin Garrison; and the Beijing Municipal People’s Armed Police Corps. In total, this comprised over 200,000 troops.

吴仁华于洛杉矶

Wu Renhua. Photo by Yaxue Cao.

The current volume devotes one chapter to enumerating these units and describing, blow-by-blow, their actions — from when they received orders to enter Beijing until they received the command to clear Tiananmen Square, including the routes and methods by which they entered the capital, the manner in which they cleared Tiananmen, and so on.

Another chapter is dedicated to a discussion of the order to open fire, as well as other questions about the June 4 massacre that are of widespread interest. This chapter is broken into 14 parts, and includes discussion of: the origin and decision-making process behind declaring martial law in Beijing, the deployments of the martial law troops in Beijing, the military unit designators and number of troops involved, the measures to ward against an internal coup d’état or mutiny in the military, the routes by which PLA troops entered Beijing, the specific orders given in the clearing of Tiananmen Square, the goals and itinerary of the martial law troops, the specifics of the orders to open fire, the circumstances surrounding the clearance of Tiananmen Square, the helplessness of unarmed students in confronting a highly armed opponent, the list of names of officers and soldiers awarded and promoted for their involvement, the deaths of paramilitary and military troops, the reason the martial law troops were so savage in their killing, and the wild retribution visited upon protesters by martial law troops after the incident.

The current volume provides what is to date the most complete list of military officials who were promoted due to their roles in the June 4 massacre, including a partial list of the officers and soldiers involved in the incident. This includes their military unit designators, positions, and ranks — a list of over 2,000 names. These individuals may not all be personally responsible for the June 4 massacre, but they are at the very least eyewitnesses, and they have a responsibility and a duty to testify as to what they did and witnessed all those years ago.

Given China’s current political circumstances, the only way that the full truth of the June 4 incident will be told is through the joint effort and work of scholars and insiders. Obviously, the largest and most important group of insiders knowledgeable about the crackdown are the soldiers and military officials involved. Unfortunately, however, to this day there are only two soldiers involved in the massacre who have emerged to speak about their experiences. The first is First Lieutenant Li Xiaoming (李曉明), a radar station master in the 116th anti-aircraft artillery division, 39th Army Group, who resides in Melbourne, Australia. Li spoke about his experiences at a press conference in New York City on May 30, 2002. The other is Zhang Shijun (張世軍), a soldier in the 162nd infantry division, 54th Army Group, who lives at Number 35, Lane 2, Shanguonan Road, Tengzhou City, Shandong Province; he wrote about his experience in an open letter to then-Chinese leader Hu Jintao on March 6, 2009. In the early  hours of March 30 he was arrested and detained for over 10 days.

I look forward to any material and research leads that readers may be able to provide about the martial law troops of June 4, so that this text may be further revised, supplemented, and updated.

 

Wu Renhua
May 2016

 

Section I | Martial Law in Beijing: Origins and Decisionmaking

Section II | Martial Law Military Deployments

Section III | The Number of Martial Law Troops and Their Designators

Section IV | Precautions Against Coups and Mutinies

Section V | The Units that Entered Beijing and the Routes They Took

Section VI | The Order to Clear the Square

Section VII | The Martial Law Troops Advance Toward Their Objectives

Section VIII | The Order to Open Fire

Section IX | The Clearing of Tiananmen Square

Section X | A War Against an Unarmed Enemy

Section XI | Deaths of Soldiers and Armed Police

Section XII | The Reason for the Martial Law Troops’ Savage Killing

Section XIII | The Soldiers’ Mad Revenge

Section XIV | Promotions for Services Rendered

 

 


Related:

The Historian of the Tiananmen Movement and the June Fourth Massacre –  An Interview With Wu Renhua (Part One of Two), June 3, 2016.

The Historian of the Tiananmen Movement and the June Fourth Massacre – An Interview With Wu Renhua (Part Two of Two), June 4, 2016.

 

 

 

 

One Belt, One Road, Total Corruption

Chang Ping, May 18, 2017

“Corruption is not just the result of money being misused, but the lack of a fair and transparent mechanism itself.”

 

OBOR_gold bridge

 

God said: “Let there be light,” and then there was light. Xi Jinping said: “A ‘Project of the Century’ must be undertaken,” and then there was “One Belt, One Road.” At the just-completed summit in Beijing, Xi Jinping announced that China will invest hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars in 60 countries to lead in the construction of bridges, railways, ports and energy projects. This venture is known as “One Belt, One Road,” and involves more than 60 percent of the world’s population. It’s projected to transform the global political and economic order, and can be said to be the largest overseas investment project undertaken by a single country in history.

Where does such an unprecedented, magnificent, and spectacular plan come from? How many Chinese were aware of it in advance? Was it critically evaluated? And what was the outcome of the evaluation? Other than Xi Jinping, there is probably no one who can answer these questions. And no one knows if he himself has carefully thought about it. People can at least learn about almighty God by reading the Bible. But the “One Belt, One Road” plan of renewing the world only consists of a few pages of empty speeches and some conference documents. According to Chinese media descriptions, the whole world is heralding the birth of a new savior.

‘One Belt, One Road’: Don’t Ask Me Where I Came From

It’s been 500 years since Martin Luther’s Protestant Reformation, but in China a corrupt “church” still monopolizes everything. Rational Europeans cast a suspicious eye. German Chancellor Angela Merkel did not attend the forum and “join in the festivities,” and the German Minister for Economics and Energy, Brigitte Zypries, who attended the event, criticized the unclear source of capital in China’s acquisition of German companies. Minister Zypries should also see that the lack of clarity does not just apply to the origin of part of the capital, but the whole “One Belt, One Road” project.

Joerg Wuttke, President of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, said in a recent interview: “I hope China is actually embracing the world and opening up to foreign trade instead of just reaching out.” Risk analyst Andrew Gilholm said: “I don’t think many people are buying the spin that this is all in the name of free trade and global prosperity.” Siegfried O. Wolf, Director of Research at South Asia Democratic Forum in Brussels, was even more candid: “At present there is a lack of an effective platform for ‘One Bridge, One Road’ cooperation between Europe and China. If China is reluctant to build this bridge, and is unwilling to move toward multilateral mechanisms and disregards the values of the European Union based on good governance, rule of law, human rights, and democracy, then European skepticism of ‘One Belt, One Road’ will continue.”

Countries outside Europe aren’t irrational either. U.S. President Donald Trump, a businessman, has adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward China’s Creation Project, and only sent National Security Council Asia Director Matthew Pottinger to attend the meeting. Australia rejected China’s invitation. India boycotted the summit, saying that the “One Belt, One Road” project ignored “core concerns about sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Many of the leaders attending the summit are autocrats who don’t care about the questionable origin of China’s funding, and know the Chinese government doesn’t care how the investment is actually used once it’s given.

Buy One, Give Two Away: Corruption and the Deterioration of Human Rights

Many Chinese believe that Xi Jinping is leading a fight against corruption. What is corruption? Corruption is not just the result of money being misused, but the lack of a fair and transparent mechanism itself. In this sense, the lack of democratic supervision of “One Belt, One Road” is a mechanism for corruption. As with all large projects in China, there is no restriction on power, and this inevitably results in the criminal activities of corruption, rent-seeking, giving and taking bribes and money laundering.

While the Chinese media was obediently singing the praises of “One Belt, One Road” and its benefit to all mankind, a Chinese netizen posted the comment: “Some people lamented that overnight we’ve returned to the Song Dynasty [translator’s note: Song is a homonym for “give away” in Mandarin]. Others asked: the Southern Song Dynasty or the Northern Song Dynasty? Answer: No, it’s not ‘Southern Song Dynasty or Northern Song Dynasty,’ it’s the ‘Eastern Song [Give-Away] Dynasty’ and ‘Western Song [Give-Away] Dynasty!” Without public oversight, an unelected leader can take hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars in taxpayers’ money and give it to authoritarian states. The only thing that taxpayers can do is sneer at and mock it. Can a sane person believe that this is a good thing?

In the process of cooking up “One Belt, One Road,” China’s human rights situation has significantly deteriorated and threatens the whole world. Can all these—the kidnapping of Hong Kong booksellers, the coerced confessions of journalists, NGO workers, dissidents, and activists on China Central Television (CCTV), the disappearance of a Taiwanese human rights worker, and the cruel torture suffered by a large number of Chinese human rights lawyers—make you believe that such a government, which is expanding its economic and political clout through the “One Belt, One Road” program, will bring a New Gospel to mankind?

 

长平_DWChang Ping is a Chinese media veteran and current events commentator now living in political exile in Germany.

 

 

 

 

 

This is a Deutsche Welle column. Translated by China Change.  

 

Also by Chang Ping:

China’s ‘Freedom’ Cage, by Chang Ping, 2015.

We’d Be Satisfied With Any Government!, October, 2015.

Chinese Students Studying Abroad a New Focus of CCP’s “United Front Work” , June, 2015.

Tiananmen Massacre not a “Passing Lapse” of the Chinese Government, July, 2014.

 

An interview with Chang Ping:

The Fate of Press Freedom in China’s Era of ‘Reform and Opening up’:  An Interview With Chang Ping, December 15, 2016

 

 

Another Chinese Propaganda Video Ties Mainland Rights Defense Activism, Protests in Hong Kong, and the Syrian War Into One Anti-U.S. Narrative

December 18, 2016

A verified account belonging to the Ministry of Public Security issued this video on December 15 with the hashtag #警惕颜色革命 (“Beware of color revolutions”) and #是谁最想扳倒中国 (“Who wants to take China down the most”).  Two similar videos issued in August can be seen here and here.  – The Editors

 

 

[Syrian swimmer] Yusra Mardini, fleeing war-ravaged Syria. The boat had a problem, she and her sister pushed it to rescue the refugees packed in it.

[Mardini’s voice]: “It’s hard to believe, but as an Olympic swimmer, I almost died in the water.”

In Rio, she was a member of the Refugee Olympic Team made up of athletes who have lost their homes because of “color revolutions.” Her presence at the Olympics was an indictment of the brutality of war.

Several years ago, she and her compatriots celebrated passionately the beautiful new world brought by the “Arab Spring.”

But behind the flowers and colorful flags are nothing but ruins, turmoil, terror, and despair.

The homes that once were are gone forever.

 

“Color revolutions” have successfully turned many countries to war zones and strife, and the sharp claws of the Devil have also reached China!

In 1953, former U.S. Secretary of State John Dulles said that a strategy of peaceful evolution must bet on the young people.  

In 2000, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright emphasized that, with the internet, America has ways of dealing with China.

In 2011, a former U.S. ambassador to China argued during a presidential debate for the famous “Take-China-Down Theory”:

“We should be reaching out to our allies and constituencies within China. They’re called the young people, they’re called the ‘internet generation.’ There are 500 million internet users in China. And 80 million bloggers. And they are bringing about change, the likes of which is gonna take China down.”   

By sending carriers to South China Seas, and by deploying THAAD in South Korea, the U.S. is using multiple approaches to try to contain China.

[Clip of Hong Kong police and protesters.]

[Photo: citizens protesting the shooting of Xu Chunhe (徐纯合) in Heilongjiang in May 2015]

[Photo: Lawyer Wang Yu in court defending Falun Gong practitioners in April, 2015.]

[Photo: Lawyer Wang Quanzhang’s wife Li Wenzu outside a courthouse in Tianjin.]

[Clip: Hong Kong protest scene]

[Photo: citizens protesting in Weifang, Shandong, during Xu Yonghe trial in June 2015.]  

Joshua Wong, Secretary General of Demosisto in Hong Kong, “Now I’m asking all of you to come with us and we are going to charge into the Civic Square.”  

 

anti-us-video-3

A screenshot of the video.

Are these real expression of the people, or the instigation of foreign forces? The facts and the truth are alarming!

[CCTV announcer:]  Tianjin Municipal Second People’s Intermediary Court held a trial of Zhou Shifeng for “subverting state power.” Zhou Shifeng was convicted of the crime of subverting state power, and sentenced to seven years in prison and deprivation of political rights for five years.

August, 2016. Zhou Shifeng, director of Beijing Fengrui Law Firm: “[I] plead guilty. I repent. I accept punishment, and will never appeal.”

[CCTV host]  Strengthening the so-called labor movement and publicizing sensitive cases are the hallmarks of the “topple the wall movement” that Zhou Shifeng and Hu Shigen have been implementing.

 

Hype up mass incidents and use social conflicts as breakthroughs, as the fuse for launching a “color revolution.”

Zhai Yanmin, trouble-making organizer of “petitioners”:  “None of the sensitive cases I participated in publicizing has anything to do with me. It’s publicity for the sake of publicity.”

Criminal suspect Gou Hongguo: “Wherever there was a high profile incident, they’d certainly organize people to protest on site.”

 

Utilize foreign NGOs to train “proxies” to lay the social foundation for a “color revolution”

Illegal religious activist Hu Shigen: “[They recruit young people with potential in the mainland, and train them to be future leaders.”

Fengrui Law Firm’s Wang Yu resolutely refused the first “International Human Rights Award” by the U.S.

[Wang Yu’s voice:]  The content of their training includes smears against the Chinese government. My attitude toward this award is to not acknowledge it, not recognize it, and not accept it. To me, this award is their attempt to use me to attack the Chinese government. I’m a Chinese, and I only accept the leadership of the Chinese government.”

 

Embassies in China are frontline directors that integrate forces to implement “street politics.”

In 2011, U.S. ambassador to China Jon Huntsman “accidentally showed up at the Jasmine Revolution gathering site

Netizen: This is the U.S. ambassador.

Netizen: Do you know that these people are here for the Jasmine Revolution?

Netizen: You are pretending you don’t know, aren’t you?

In February 2016, foreign diplomats again appeared outside Tianjin Municipal Second People’s Intermediary Court.

And Director of Feirui Law Firm Zhou Shifeng has been “good friends” with them.

[Photo: Zhou Shifeng with Swedish ambassador Lars Fredén.]

[Photo: Zhou Shifeng with a member of the Geneva Bar Association*]

[Photo: Zhou Shifeng with an Associated Press journalist.]

 

Utilizing Internet and other media to negate Chinese history and culture and lay the ideological foundation for a “color revolution”

Comprehensively slandering Chinese history [screenshot of a Taiwanese website questioning the existence of the Yuan Dynasty]

Destroying role models [photo of article questioning the truth of communist martyr Lei Feng]

Defiling the image of leaders [photo of the Causeway Bay bookstore]

Questioning the trustworthiness of the government [screenshot of a 2013 article pointing out failures of the government housing information database]

Doomsaying China [screenshot of BBC article about likelihood of a Chinese economic crisis]  

 

Using Hong Kong as a base for a “color revolution”

In 2011, Jimmy Lai was exposed to be the biggest donor to the opposition. The Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption launched an investigation into $40 million in dark political money.

[Voice of Alex Tsui,** former deputy director of operations of ICAC] “It’s obvious that Jimmy Lai plays a very important role in the ‘black money whirlpool.’

[Voice of Benny Tai] “Occupy Central now begins”

It turns out that Occupy Central did not start from the “Trio” and the students, but from Jimmy Lai who, as early as 2012, already secretly sought advice from Shih Ming-teh [Taiwan early opposition leader].

[Recording, voice of Jimmy Lai] “As long as we are willing to go to jail.”

[Voice of Shih Ming-teh] “Right, you will succeed the moment you are jailed.”

[Voice of Jimmy Lai] “Together we go to prison.”

[Voice of Shih] “This flower, when it blossoms, will be Hong Kong’s flower of freedom, and it could very well also be China’s flower of freedom.”

Jimmy Lai’s “friendship circle” was exposed by the media, and the behind-the-scenes black hand is the U.S.

His “assistant” Mark Simon is the chairman of the Hong Kong branch of the Republican Party. He used to be an intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy, and his father was a senior agent in the CIA.

[Photo of Raymond Burghardt, Chairman of American Institute in Taiwan, at the Occupy Central site]

[Multiple photos Paul Wolfowitz, former deputy Secretary of Defense]

Towards the end of Occupy Central, the localists gained support, and once peaceful Hong Kong is no more.

Man wearing a black T-shirt with text on his back: “Hong Kong has always been a base for subversion.”

[Clips of Hong Konger clashing with police] “I’m a Hong Konger!” “I’m not a Chinese!”

[Voice of Hong Kong resident Mr. Lee:] “We want to live in peace. We want to have peaceful and happy life. When you don’t have food and have no job, you’ll know, because we have experienced that.”

 

We once experienced the chaos of war and the torment of poverty

The happiness of today is due to the ceaseless efforts and sacrifices of generations

A stable society with good public safety

A sense of security is like water and the air — we’ve long been accustomed to it

Indeed, happiness is not inevitable, because the shadow of war has never been far away

Social progress is never a smooth road

Peace and stability are the most important guarantees to fulfilling our dream of revitalization

Thoroughly expelling from China all “color revolutions” will be a long and arduous battle

It requires the vigilance and resistance of every one of us

Don’t believe lies. Don’t be gullible. Understand history, be resolute in your belief.

The new Great Wall will be forged through the thoughts and actions of all of us

‘If there’s a war, the veterans will answer the call and re-enlist’ is not merely the promise of every veteran soldier

It is the pledge made to the fatherland by every Chinese person

If there’s a war, the veterans will answer the call and re-enlist

In resisting “color revolutions,” everyone must do their part

 

*A delegation of Geneva Bar Association visits Beijing Bar Association in November, 2014. It’s striking how such a photo can be used against a Chinese lawyer.

**Alex Tsui was sacked in 1994 for questionable associations with a man under ICAC investigation.

 


Related:

After Four Detainees of the ‘709 Incident’ Are Indicted, Chinese State Media Name Foreign News Organizations, a US Congressman, & Three Embassies in Beijing as ‘Foreign Anti-China Forces’, China Change, July 15, 2016.

To American Bar Association With Regard to ABA Human Rights Award to Wang Yu, August 2016

The Vilification of Lawyer Wang Yu and Violence By Other Means, July 2015

 

 

China’s Most ‘Radical’ Political Prisoner Dies in Jail

China Change, November 30, 2016

 

image2-2Peng Ming (彭明), one of a handful of Chinese political prisoners serving a life sentence, died in Xianning prison, Hubei Province, on November 29, according to his relatives in China. The head of the prison told Peng’s brother in Wuhan, the provincial capital, that Peng Ming suddenly fell down while watching TV, and died in hospital after being rushed in for emergency treatment. No autopsy or forensic report has yet been performed.

But China Change learned today from a close family friend that Peng Ming’s sister believes he was murdered; a public statement from the family is forthcoming.  

To many who have been tracking human rights in China over the years, the name of the 62-year-old political prisoner may not be a familiar, or have become obscure with the passage of time. But the news of his death is reverberating in the dissident community inside and outside China. Indeed, many expressed doubt over the official version of events, particularly given the fact that Peng’s older brother visited him as recently as November 24, Thanksgiving Day, and reported that he appeared to be in good health. Peng had also recently written encouraging letters to his children in the United States; his daughter Lisa Peng (彭佳音) is a junior at Harvard University majoring in political science.

The brother, according to friends, has since been placed under house arrest to prevent him from speaking about Peng’s death.   

Unlike most dissidents, Peng Ming first enjoyed a successful career until his run-in with the authorities. His achievements, impressive for his age, were mostly forged in the 1990s, a time of opportunity and imagination in China. He was editor-in-chief of “Friends of Entrepreneurs” magazine, CEO of a company under the Ministry of Aerospace Industry known as the Aerospace General Electric Group (航太航空通用电气集团), chairman of Beijing Urban Construction Group (北京城建集团), and director of China Institute for Development and Economic Strategy (中国发展经济战略研究所). The series of appointments represents the paragon of a successful businessman plugged directly into the official system.

pengming_%e7%ac%ac%e5%9b%9b%e5%ba%a7%e8%b1%90%e7%a2%91

“The Fourth Landmark,” still available online. 

Peng was also the author “The Fourth Landmark” (《第四座丰碑》), sponsored by the Ford Foundation and published in Taiwan in 1999. It argues that, succeeding Sun Yat-sen’s “Three People’s Principles” revolution, Mao Zedong’s communist revolution, and Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open-up, China needs a fourth revolution for the 21st century.

In June, 1998, Peng Ming founded “China Development Union” (中国发展联合会) with Chinese dissidents to promote a path to development through environmentalism and constitutionalism. The organization boasted over 10,000 members and made a splash at the time. According to a TED talk by Lisa Peng in 2014, it was “a think-tank established to address the censored topics of human rights, free speech and democracy.” Merely a few months later, in October 1998, the Chinese government declared the organization illegal and sentenced Peng Ming to 18 months in a labor camp.

Upon his release, Peng was surveilled and threatened with more jail time. The family decided to flee China by escaping to Vietnam, then Thailand. They eventually arrived in the United States in August 2001 as UN refugees.

Based in the Bay Area in California, Peng Ming continued his activism. In early 2003, he established the “China Federal Interim Committee” (中国联邦临时委员会) and an “interim government.” Its mission was to unite anti-communist forces overseas, end one-party rule in China in three to five years using any means, and then establish a Chinese federation. This is what he called “The Democracy Project”(民主工程).

According to Peng Ming’s own defense, he entered Myanmar from Thailand on May 22, 2004, with a travel document issued by the U.S. government to asylees. Once there he was kidnapped by Chinese agents and soldiers of the Burmese communist People’s Army. On May 28, he was taken back to China and on July 23 formally arrested under orders of the Wuhan People’s Procuratorate. On February 23, 2005, he was indicted.

pengming_lisa-peng-on-capitol-hill

Lisa Peng during a Congressional hearing in 2013.

It was widely believed that Peng Ming’s plan was to establish an armed resistance base in the border area of Myanmar and China.

On October 12, 2005, the Wuhan Second Intermediate People’s Court sentenced Peng to life imprisonment, and a lifetime deprivation of political rights, for “the crime of organizing and leading a terrorist organization.” The indictment states that beginning in 2001 Peng published articles online, as well as wrote the book “The Democracy Project,” which called for the violent overthrow of the Chinese regime. The court also declared that Peng was guilty of kidnapping and the possession of counterfeit currency (the evidence on which these charges are based is unclear).

Peng Ming’s story is redolent of that of another overseas Chinese dissident, Wang Bingzhang (王炳章), who was kidnapped from Vietnam in 2002 and is currently serving a life sentence in Shaoguan Prison, Guangdong. Years of campaigning by relatives and human rights organizations have failed to secure his release.

 

Sources:

http://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/china_dissident-20051014.html
http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/pengmin-20051018.html
http://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/china_dissident-20051014.html
http://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/138898-20040618.html

 

pengming_%e6%b0%91%e4%b8%bb%e5%b7%a5%e7%a8%8b1China Change offers below a translation of the table of contents of Peng’s book “The Democracy Project” (《民主工程》) in order to provide readers with a deeper understanding of the man and his uncanny insights, which ring even truer today than when they were written 15 years ago. The book is meant to be a practical handbook, providing specific advice for the set of institutions that would replace the Chinese Communist Party, as well as the means of a prospective opposition movement to do so. Readers are advised that the presentation of Peng’s ideas does not represent an endorsement of them by China Change. — The Editors

The Democracy Project

By Peng Ming

One of the Greatest Global Projects of Social Change in the Early Years of the 21st Century

Establishing a Provisional Federal Government

Replacing the Chinese Communist Dictatorship

Publisher: China Federal Government Development Committee Publishing House

Table of Contents

 Chapter One: The Chinese Communist Dictatorship Must be Ended as Soon as Possible

Part One: The need to improve human rights in China

  1. The CCP will continue depriving citizens of political rights, crush to the greatest extent possible the space for activism, and eliminate dissident forces in their nascent stages
  2. Ethnic minority protests in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia will be pitilessly and comprehensively crushed
  3. The broad population of middle- and low-income earners will have their basic livelihoods increasingly threatened

Part Two: The need to prevent a large-scale economic and social crisis

  1. China’s economic bloat
  2. A bloated economy is beneficial to the consolidation of regime power
  3. China’s economic maladies
  4. An economic crisis is unavoidable
  5. The international impact of an economic crisis

Part Three: The need to avoid the outbreak of war across the Taiwan Strait

  1. The flames of nationalistic sentiment fanned by the Communist Party among the public, intellectual elite, and military will force the CCP into military confrontation with Taiwan
  2. Provoking a war to divert attention from domestic crises
  3. Jiang Zemin, whether for self-aggrandizement, a show of achievement, or to extend his power, may set off a war with Taiwan
  4. Taiwan’s own conflicted attitudes and behavior may lead to the CCP using military force
  5. The ambiguity of U.S. policy may lead the CCP to take desperate risks

Part Four: The need for long-term security and stability in the Asia-Pacific

  1. A conflict in the South China Sea is unavoidable
  2. Provocations in the Senkaku Islands have already begun
  3. Territorial disputes with India will arise once again
  4. The CCP will proliferate nuclear weapon and guided missile technology to Pakistan, weakening India’s military position and imperiling security in South Asia
  5. The CCP will secretly hinder the unification of North and South Korea, and encourage the North to be militaristic and belligerent

Chapter Two: The Failure of ‘Peaceful Evolution’ and the Uncertainty Ahead

Part One: The West’s strategy of peaceful evolution worked in the Soviet bloc of Eastern Europe, but has failed in China

  1. Differences in people
  2. Differences in culture
  3. Differences in national character
  4. Differences in level of development
  5. Differences in how much effort the West has put into peaceful evolution
  6. Differences in counter-measures

Part Two: The failure of U.S. administrations to change China’s regime through engagement

  1. The result of implementing a policy of regime change through engagement
  2. Why regime change through engagement failed
  3. The consequences of continuing the policy
  4. The choice for America’s China policy in the future: “a high-pressure push for change”

Part Three: A repeat of Taiwan’s peaceful transition can’t take place in China

  1. Differences in basic ideology
  2. Differences in international circumstances
  3. Differences in internal repression
  4. Differences in historical baggage
  5. Differences in levels of development
  6. Differences in blood debts against the people
  7. Differences in vested interest groups

Part Four: Without external pressure, the process of CCP self-reform will be an extremely drawn-out process

  1. Under certain conditions, dictatorships can survive long term
  2. Regimes without popular support can also survive long term
  3. The CCP is an organism with the ability to learn, adapt, self-correct, and extricate itself from crises
  4. The Party has a strict set of regressive mechanisms that weed out high-capability individuals and great leaders from gaining entry to elite politics

Chapter Three: The ‘Gray Path’ to Realizing Democracy in China

Part One: The first path: red

  1. The basic ideology: ‘red’ [revolutionary] culture
  2. Political appeals
  3. The means of operation
  4. Leader type
  5. Those relied upon
  6. International support
  7. Analyzing the evidence
  8. Basic judgments

Part Two: The second path: blue

  1. The basic ideology: blue [democratic] culture
  2. Political appeals
  3. The means of operation
  4. Leader type
  5. Those relied upon
  6. International support
  7. Analyzing the evidence
  8. Basic judgments

Part Three: The third path: green

  1. The basic ideology: green [ecological] culture
  2. Political appeals
  3. The means of operation
  4. Leader type
  5. Those relied upon
  6. International support
  7. Analyzing the evidence
  8. Basic judgements

Part Four: The gray path and the way out

  1. The gray path = red methods + a blue leader + green ideology

Chapter Four: The Design of the Democratic Project and the Establishment of a Provisional Government

Part One: Establishing a provisional government is a precondition and guarantee for realization of the democratic project

  1. Establishing a provisional government is necessary for mobilizing the public
    1. If you want the public involved, they must first recognize and believe in you
    2. If you want the public involved, it needs to benefit them in some way
    3. If you want the public involved, you’ve got to give them a deep and unshakeable hope for the future
    4. If you want the public involved, their risks need to be lowered to the minimum
  2. Establishing a provisional government is essential for integrating all the anti-CCP forces
  3. Establishing a provisional government is necessary for securing international support
  4. Establishing a provisional government is needed to give the CCP a shock
  5. Establishing a provisional government is needed to invigorate the overseas democracy movement.

Part Two: The structure of the provisional government

  1. A Chinese Federation
  2. The Federation of China
    1. Composition and distinctions
    2. Jurisdiction and relationships
  3. The federal government
    1. The presidency
    2. The Cabinet
    3. The legislature
    4. The courts
    5. The military
  4. The federal Cabinet
    1. Operational norms
    2. Permanent structures and functions

Part Three: Getting the democracy project started

  1. Preparing to establish the provisional government
  2. Starting operations: Grasp the central theme, lay a sound foundation, prepare for a comprehensive campaign
    1. Raise a war chest
    2. Set up a headquarters and regional bases
    3. Recruit and train personnel
    4. Set up lines of communication and an intelligence network
    5. Establish an underground governing network
    6. Prepare the ability to strike
  3. Map out the plan for a general offensive
    1. Find and take aim at targets
    2. Designate four primary battle tactics
    3. Deploy measures for toppling the system

Chapter Five: Roll Out the Democracy Project, Gain Power in Three Years

Part One: Launch a surprise attack, shaking the foundations of CCP rule

  1. Use all four battle tactics — publish Nos. 1-4 of the “Announcement to All Chinese People”
  2. Use the momentum to retake the country, comprehensively wresting power by the CCP
    1. Publish “Announcement to All Chinese People” No. 5
    2. The CCP’s collapse
    3. A round-table conference and the unification of the interim government
  3. Restore order and prepare for political reform

Part Two: Carry out the plan for political reform

  1. Promulgate the Constitution, formally establishing the federation
  2. Establish the legislature and hold a legislative election
  3. Directly-elect the president and form a Cabinet
  4. Select members for the Supreme Court
  5. Establish governments in every province
  6. The new Cabinet puts forward the “project to revitalize the federation,” at which point the democracy project is basically complete, and the project for rebuilding the country has begun

Part Three: Implement the project to revitalize the federation — four major programs

  1. Adjust security and defense needs
  2. Establish a comprehensive social security system and plan for regulating the population
    1. Three basic subsistence guarantees for unemployment, retirement, and healthcare
    2. Nine years of free elementary education
    3. Population regulations: control the quantity, optimize the quality
  3. A plan to invigorate the economy and regain territorial integrity
    1. Emergency reform measures: currency, finance and taxation, foreign trade, and state-owned enterprises
    2. Medium to long-range plans: One measure, two projects, three main goals
  4. A plan to re-establish faith and virtue
    1. Restore [freedom of] belief
    2. Awaken the conscience of the people
    3. Rebuild morality — draw up a “China’s Classics of Virtue”
    4. Strengthen the role of grassroots autonomy and family and clan ties

 

(For photos of the Table of Content in original Chinese, check out here.)