Home » Analyses and Opinions » Excerpts from “My West China, Your East Turkestan” — My View on the Kunming Incident

Excerpts from “My West China, Your East Turkestan” — My View on the Kunming Incident

By Wang Lixiong, published March 3, 2014

 

(On the evening of March 1, 2014, several knife-wielding men and at least one woman killed 33 and injured more than 140 in the train station in the southwestern city of Kunming. The Chinese authorities blame Uighur separatists for the terrorist attack. — Editor)

 

People asked how I look at the Kunming incident. I don’t feel I have much more to say. The issue lies not in the incident itself but beyond it, and it has been long in the making. I have said everything in my book My West China; Your East Turkestan (《我的西域; 你的东土》) published in 2007.  I offer the following excerpts from the book to serve as my answer:

What is “Xinjiang?” Its most straightforward meaning is “new territory.” But for the Uighurs, how could the land possibly be their “new territory” when it has been their home and their ancestors’ home for generations. It is only a new territory for the occupiers.

The Uighurs don’t like to hear the name “Xinjiang” because it is itself a proclamation of an empire’s expansion, the bragging of the colonists, and a testimony of the indigenous people’s humiliation and misfortune.

Even for China, the name “New Territory” is awkward. Everywhere and on every occasion, China claims that Xinjiang has belonged to China ever since ancient times, but why is it called the “new territory?” The government-employed scholars racked their brain, insisting that “new territory” is the “new” in the phrase “the new return of old territories” by Zuo Zongtang’s (左宗棠, best known as General Tsao who led the campaign to reclaim Xinjiang in 1875-1876).  This is far-fetched, because in that case, shouldn’t it be called the “old territory”?

I will never forget a scene once described by a foreign journalist in which, every evening, a seven-year-old Uighur boy unhoisted the Chinese flag, which the Chinese authorities required them to fly during the day, and trampled it underfoot. What hatred would make a child do that? Indeed, from children, one can measure most accurately the level of ethnic tension. If even children are taking part in it, then it is a united and unanimous hostility.

That’s why, in Palestinian scenes of violence, we always see children in the midst. I use the term “Palestinization” to describe the full mobilization of a people and the full extent of its hatred. To me, Xinjiang is Palestinizing. It has not boiled to the surface as much, but it has been fermenting in the heart of the indigenous peoples.

The indigenous peoples regarded Sheng Shicai (盛世才) , the Han (Chinese) war lord who ruled Xinjiang during the 1930s and 1940s, as an executioner, and they call Wang Lequan (王乐泉), the CCP secretary who carried out heavy-handed policies in Xinjiang, Wang Shicai. But when, in Urumqi, the Han taxi driver saw I was holding a copy of Sheng Shicai, the Lord of the Outer Frontiers, a book I had just bought from a bookstore, he immediately enthused about Sheng. “The policies at his time were truly good,” he exalted.

CCP’s policies in Xinjiang today have been escalating the ethnic tension. Continuing on that path, it will not take long to reach the point of no return where all opportunities for healthy interaction will be lost, and a vicious cycle pushes the two sides farther and farther apart. Once reaching that point of no return, Xinjiang will likely become the next Middle East or Chechnya.

Once, I asked a Uighur youth whether he wanted to make a pilgrimage to Mecca. He said he wanted badly, but he cannot go now because the Koran teaches him that, when your homeland is still under occupation, you cannot make pilgrimages to Mecca. He stopped short there, but the idea was clear. To fulfill his wish, he will fight to drive the Hans out of his homeland.

However, I am more shocked by Han intellectuals, including some elites at the top. On any normal day, they appear to be open-minded, reasonable, and supportive of reform, but as soon as we touches the topic of Xinjiang, the word “kill” streams out of their mouths with such facility. If genocide can keep Xinjiang under China’s sovereignty, I think it is possible that they will be able to stay composed and quiet if millions of Uighurs are killed.

If the oppression is political oppression, once the political system changes, the oppression will be lifted, and I suppose all ethnicities should still be able to live and work together to build a new society. But if the minorities believe that the oppression comes from the Han people, then political change will not solve the problem fundamentally. The only option will be independence.

This is a factor working against China’s political transition, because, instead of helping keep the minorities in China, political change will weaken the Chinese control, and the indigenous peoples will seek independence.

As an observer of the CCP’s power operation, I often see in my mind’s eye a scene you would see in Chinese acrobatics: one chair stacks on another, another and another, with the performer turning upside down one moment and swiveling around the next on top of them. Today, the CCP’s acrobatic skills have also reached such virtuoso levels, stacking chairs to an incredible height. However, the balance will not last forever, and the chairs cannot be stacked to an indefinite height. There will be a moment when all chairs will tumble down. The taller the chairs have been stacked, the harder they will collapse.

Over the CCP’s rule of more than half a century, the humanistic tradition has been cut off, education of humanities has been marginalized and has become insignificant. Even the new generation of bureaucrats, who are considered to have received a good education, are mere technocrats who have knowledge but no soul and who worship power and look down on the poor and the weak. They rely on nothing else but the power system and the art of power struggle; they are good at nothing but using such administrative power as a means of suppression. They churn out phrases like “step up,” “strike hard,” “punish severely” every time they talk. It seems to work for the moment, but it is drinking poison to quench the thirst.

In the absence of the humanistic spirit, the power group has no capacity to face deeper areas of culture, history, faith, and philosophy. Their solutions tend to be wretched and simplistic, calming down disruptive incidents like a fire engine darting out to distinguish a fire. But the ethnic problem is precisely a humanistic issue and the correct way of solving it is only attainable through a humanistic approach. Looking ahead, it is hard to expect the CCP to make any breakthroughs, because the revival of humanistic values cannot be done in a snap.

Throughout its history, Xinjiang was twice “East Turkestan” (once in 1933 and another time in 1944).  But China in the last century also saw various separatist rules, including the Communist Party’s “Soviet Republic,” resulting in China’s continuous division. In fact, the escalation of the Xinjiang problem almost coincided with Beijing’s “anti-separatism struggle” in Xinjiang. Therefore, we have reason to believe that, the Xinjiang issue to a large extent is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

[In 2000, the CCP issued Document No. 7 with regard to the Xinjiang issue. This is how it described what is at issue: “The principal danger to Xinjiang’s stability is the separatist force and illegal religious activities.” The syntax resembles Mao Zedong’s edict about Xinjiang [in 1962 when China and USSR turned from “brothers” to enemies]: “the principal danger in Xinjiang comes from the Soviet Union’s modern revisionism.” The difference is the focus has turned from international relations to ethnic relations. And this document has since become the CCP’s guidelines and policy foundation for carrying out hardline approaches in Xinjiang.

The crackdown has been strengthened, but terrorist activities have picked up. Why?  Is there a cause-and-effect correlation between the two?  It is possible that some terrorist groups and activities are the creations of the CCP’s “prophecies.” The CCP’s own creator Mao Zedong said long ago that “there is no such thing as hate without a reason,” but Beijing has not pause to consider the most important question:  What are the reasons and causes of ethnic hatred in Xinjiang?

When Document No. 7 insists that “the principal danger to Xinjiang’s stability is the separatist force and illegal religious activities,” it separates the Hans and the indigenous peoples living in Xinjiang into two groups, pitting them against each other, because both the “separatist force” and the “illegal religious activities” are aiming at the indigenous peoples.

Naturally, Beijing has been relying on the Hans living in Xinjiang to carry out its administration, and the indigenous peoples on the other hand have become groups on whom watchful eyes must be kept. Consequently, all the “prophecies” are being self-fulfilled: The Hans are vigilant toward the indigenous peoples, and the indigenous peoples eventually will be driven to the opposite side. A small number of terrorists are not a big problem; the biggest danger is when the indigenous peoples in Xinjiang as a whole turn against Beijing.

With the idea of stabilizing Xinjiang through economic development, the basic mistake is that the essence of the ethnic issue is not economic but political. To begin with, it is upside down to solve a political problem with economical solutions, and how do you expect to solve the ethnic problem when high-strung political suppression continues to ratchet up?

Beijing likes to flaunt how much money it has given Xinjiang, but the indigenous peoples are asking: How much oil have you siphoned away from Xinjiang? The Number One project in China’s “Grand Development of the West” is “the transportation of natural gas from the west to the east.” The Xinjiang residents have legitimate reasons to question whether the development of the west is in fact a plunder of the west. As long as the hostility exists and different ethnic groups distrust each other, all economic activities can be labeled as colonialism.

Hans are 40% of the Xinjiang population but they have controlled most of the power and the economic and intellectual resources in Xinjiang. They are positioned to grab more benefit than the indigenous peoples in any given new wealth distribution or new opportunities. Xinjiang’s economy depends on the interior of China. The use of Mandarin alone puts the indigenous peoples at a disadvantage. Today, if you are looking for a job in Xinjiang but don’t speak Mandarin, you will be dismissed right away. High-level positions are mostly held by the Hans.

Unemployment in Xinjiang is severe. Young people often can’t find a job. Han residents can go to the interior to work, but the indigenous people can only stay home. When I travelled in Xinjiang, I saw ethnic youth loitering together chatting or carousing. Scenes like that always troubled me because, what would the future hold if so many young people are idling, having no place to make better use of their energy, while hatred keeps growing?

A Uighur friend told me, “Look, 99% of diners in these little restaurants are Uighurs and 99% of them are paying from their own pockets. But 99% of the customers in big restaurants are Hans, and 99% of them are paying bills with public money!” The discontent of ethnic minorities first and foremost came from such visual and straightforward contrasts. Indeed, in expensive venues in Xinjiang, there were hardly any ethnic people. There, it felt just like China’s interior with Hans all around speaking Chinese.

As with any changing circumstances, there is a tipping point. Before reaching that point, there might be room for improvement. But once past the tipping point, the situation will be similar to the kind of ethnic war between the Palestinians and the Israelis that has no solution and no end in sight. I cannot estimate how far we are from that tipping point, but following the path the current regime is walking on, we are fast approaching it.

The CCP seems to believe that, with the grip on power, they can do anything they want without having to care about the feelings of the indigenous peoples. A typical example is that they sprinkled Wang Zhen (王震)’s ashes in the Heavenly Mountains. (Wang Zhen was one of the eight “lords” of the CCP and the first party secretary in Xinjiang.) For the indigenous peoples, all water comes from the sacred Heavenly Mountains (天山). The Muslims have particular concepts of being clean, not just tangibly but also intangibly. Ashes are not clean; on top of that, Wang Zhen was a heretic and a murderer, and to spread his ashes was to foul all of the water for Muslims.

Having ruled Xinjiang for decades, the Chinese government’s impertinence was such that, to satisfy Wang Zhen’s wish, the will of more than 10 million Muslims living in Xinjiang must be cast aside and the event must be broadcast loudly. Indeed, Xinjiang Muslims couldn’t do anything about it and still had to drink water. But you can imagine every time a Xinjiang Muslim drinks water, how he or she would be irritated by the idea of uncleanness, and how they would think that, if Xinjiang is independent, such a thing would never have happened.

The mosques are not allowed to run schools to teach the Koran. But how can you prohibit a religion from preaching its beliefs? When the students cannot study Koran in Xinjiang, they will have to go to Pakistan, Afghanistan … in the end some of them will be turned into Talibans and get Jihad indoctrination and terrorist training. Finally they will return to Xinjiang to engage in terrorism and fight for the freedom of spreading the Islam.

When people petition, protest, even provoke disturbances, it means they still harbor hopes for solutions. When they cease to say or do anything, it is not stability; it is despair. Deng Xiaping was right when he said, “the most terrifying thing is when the people are stone quiet.” Unfortunately none of his successors really understood him. Today the rulers are rather complacent about the general silence. Any expression of resistance by the Uighurs will be met with head-on blows.

Eliminating conflicts “at the germinating stage” isn’t a good way to deal with conflicts, because the nature of the conflict doesn’t manifest itself in that early stage, while many positive factors can also be eliminated. That’s not really eliminating the friction, but suppresses it or rubs it in deeper. It will pile up and there will be a day when it will be triggered unexpectedly: out of silence thunders crashes down.

If the percentage of Hans in Xinjiang are small, they would retreat to the interior as soon as there are signs of unrest. Conversely, if the Han immigrants outnumber the indigenous peoples with even more advantages than numbers, then the indigenous peoples would shun rashness. But now is a time when conflict is mostly likely because the Hans and the indigenous peoples are closely equally numbered.

Han is the second largest ethnic group in Xinjiang. A considerable portion of them have long put down roots in Xinjiang, and some have lived in Xinjiang for generations already. They don’t have anything in the interior, and they will defend Xinjiang as they would their homeland. This means that, when Hans in Xinjiang are faced with ethnic conflict, they are unlikely to exercise restraint. Instead, they would use the weapons, the fortunes, the technology and the leadership positions they have at their command to fight the indigenous peoples, with the help of the great China behind them.

When the Uighurs begin a Jihad against the Chinese rule, will other Muslims join their cause, such as the Caucasians, the Afghans, and rich Arabs? The separatists know very well that they can’t confront China by themselves, so they have always put their cause in the larger picture of the world. I have heard them talking about Xinjiang’s geopolitics, the world of Islam, and the international community, and I was surprised by their wide visions.

When the time comes, Xinjiang will simultaneously have organized unrest and random disruptions, prepared armed actions and improvised terror attacks. Overseas Uighurs will get involved, and international Muslims will also intervene. In a convergence like that, the conflict will inevitably escalate. It will not be easy for the Hans to put Xinjiang under control, but on the other hand, once hatred is being mobilized, it will see no end, and the killing will be imaginably frantic and ruthless.

In Xinjiang, an Uzbek professor told me that China is bound to slip into chaos in the future, and the day China democratizes will be the day when Xinjiang will be in a blood bath. Every time he thinks about it, he said, he is scared, and he must send his children abroad, away from Xinjiang.

 

 
王力雄Wang Lixiong (王力雄) is a Beijing-based Chinese writer best known for his political prophecy fiction, Yellow Peril, and for his writings on Tibet and China’s western region of Xinjiang. Wang is regarded as one of the most outspoken dissidents, democracy advocates in China. Between 1980 and 2007 when this book was finished, he made nine trips to Xinjiang and his travels brought him to every part of the region. While traveling in Xinjiang in 1999, he was briefly detained by the Chinese secret police for suspicion of collecting classified information. But his prison time in unexpected ways helped the writing of this book. Wikipedia (in English) has a list of Mr. Wang Lixiong’s works.

Read the complete book My West China; Your East Turkestan here (in Chinese).

 

Related:

Xinjiang or East Turkestan: Contending Historical Narratives and the Politics of Representation in China, by Michael Caster

 

(Translation by China Change)


36 Comments

  1. […] Lixiong, um conhecido activista pela democracia escreve no Chinachange.org sobre o que pode estar por detrás do ataque no fim-de-semana na estação de comboios da cidade […]

  2. Yaxue Cao says:

    My West China; Your East Turkestan

    Link to the complete book in Chinese

    http://m.friendfeed-media.com/e99a4ebe2fb4c1985c2a58775eb4422961aa5a2e

  3. What a nice article. I am really surprised how well the author knows the whole issue there in my home region. Thumbs up really, such a thorough and deep analysis! I am so glad at lease somebody out there knows whats going although he himself not a Uyghur. I thought only Uyghurs know how they feel

  4. […] reason. I strongly recommend taking ten minutes to read Chinachange.org’s translation of an opinion piece written by Wang Lixiong (王力雄), Beijing-based political dissident and writer of “My […]

  5. […] By Wang Lixiong, published March 3, 2014 (On the evening of March 1, 2014, several knife-wielding men and at least one woman killed 33 and injured more than 140 in the train station in the s… from China Studies at Leiden University http://chinachange.org/2014/03/03/excerpts-from-my-west-china-your-east-turkestan-my-view-on-the-kun… […]

  6. Vey good analysis of China’s imperialistic, megalomaniac policies & strategies to grab what does not belong to China.

  7. […] the recent knife attack and the greater debate about ethnic and religious repression in China, see Wang Lixiong’s reflections on the Kunming incident as informed by his observations in Xinjiang (translated by China Change), a Facebook post by […]

  8. […] a reason. I strongly recommend taking ten minutes to read Chinachange.org’s translation of an opinion piece written by Wang Lixiong (王力雄), Beijing-based political dissident and writer of “My West […]

  9. T says:

    In politics there is only the ruling class, their supporters and the disenfranchised. In a democracy the ruling class is supported by the majority of the population who falls into the 2nd group. Disenfranchised is managed at ~50% or so high or low. In a dictatorship the majority is disenfranchised.

    It doesn’t matter what the ancestry is, as long as in the present the majority of the population feels grossly disenfranchised by the current regime, the sentiment for revolution would grow as they seek to change their disenfranchised status after grievances followed by grievances. The only risk is in seeking their goal they may replace one extremely selfish ruling class by another extremely selfish ruling class and end up getting nowhere.

    The corollary of disenfranchisement is if the ruling class is extremely selfish it has a tendency to disenfranchise others, including its own supporters in the past. We see that in Joseph Stalin who ran a police state, and we see that in today’s Right Wing western rulers who seeks tax cut for the rich (minority by definition). They all have authoritarian tendencies, even in advanced Western democracies. They are not afraid to use propaganda to advocate for war (Iraq), fan nationalism (China) to support their own self interest, and crack down on dissent such as occupy wall street. When extremely selfish people become exploitative the general population suffer. The collective common such as defense suffer. And eventually the political institutions are neglected and falls. Only then will revolution take hold, and the cycle begins again.

  10. Tulga says:

    Thank you for your insightful article. I only wish many more Chinese intellectuals were like you.

    I am a Mongolian and feel sorry for the oppressed Inner Mongolians in China, in the same way as Uighurs, but still do hope the human wisdom will shine once again in China.

    Keep lighting the way!

    • 刘湘 says:

      mongol nazi, inner mongolia more richer than u country.
      and inner mongolia is fake word. it is 3 chinese province and formed by ccp in 1947
      one day we will repeal the fake word

  11. hussaina says:

    Nice article.

  12. LK says:

    There are too many dirty and bloody things done by the government and its officials. But ordinary Han Chinese are brain washed by the government and without knowing any of those dirty things done by them. Whatever its reasons behind, there is no justice to kill those 33 ordinary people. The people cannot repeat what bad things done by the government in sacrifice of lives of ordinary people.

    • 刘湘 says:

      do u think chinese are idiot?

      uyghur became more and more wahhabism .do u konw it?

      • T says:

        Most Chinese are ignorant about what it means to be democratic and that is by design. They simply haven’t been taught what they need to know. For instance a perfect example of undemocratic institution such as communist part would limit its membership to only a selected few because if it opens up membership to everyone it would become democratic. Yet most Chinese activist only advocates for rule of law, not open membership, so they are doomed to fail because they are essentially begging for a better system instead of making real fundamental demand for change, so their efforts are doomed to begin with due to lack of understanding. Chinese people are not idiot but are simply ignorant and less knowledgeable. Even Chinese who are western educated do not grasp the fundamentals of political economy to understand what they should be advocating if they want better representation.

  13. Dekyi says:

    Thank you so much for this very insightful and thought provoking article about the situation in Xinjiang.

  14. I’m really curious what dissident Chinese intellectuals like Mr. Wang could recommend. Is he okay with China being split apart? ‘Cause you can’t have an independent East Turkestan without an independent Tibet…and maybe even the loss of so-called Inner Mongolia to Mongolia!

    And if you’re going to have freedom of speech, religion, and all that nice democratic stuff — which is morally correct, to be sure — then that’s exactly what you’ll wind up with: ever more strident calls for independence and, of course, violence anyway eventually since independence can never come quickly enough for most nationalists.

    Unless people like Mr. Wang are willing to countenance such a development — the Chinese state being split apart in blood anyway (there almost certainly won’t be a Czech-Slovak divorce here) — what else could the Communist authorities do but try their acrobatic best juggling crisis after crisis?

    It would really be nice to see some specifics from honest Chinese like Mr. Wang.

    • Oğuz Türkü says:

      It is not yours to begin with. Why do you want to keep other nations under your banner and torture them when they dont want to?

  15. jackforeigner says:

    I’m really curious what dissident Chinese intellectuals like Mr. Wang could recommend. Is he okay with China being split apart? ‘Cause you can’t have an independent East Turkestan without an independent Tibet…and maybe even the loss of so-called Inner Mongolia to Mongolia!

    And if you’re going to have freedom of speech, religion, and all that nice democratic stuff — which is morally correct, to be sure — then that’s exactly what you’ll wind up with: ever more strident calls for independence and, of course, violence anyway eventually since independence can never come quickly enough for most nationalists.

    Unless people like Mr. Wang are willing to countenance such a development — the Chinese state being split apart in blood anyway (there almost certainly won’t be a Czech-Slovak divorce here) — what else could the Communist authorities do but try their acrobatic best juggling crisis after crisis?

    It would really be nice to see some specifics from honest Chinese like Mr. Wang.

  16. rudyhou says:

    it’s sad that such different believes in race and religion bring about a division within the people of the same city, all for political reasons. this is very much sound like a civil war about to happen.

  17. An independent Xinjiang could well set a precedent for an independent Tibet. (In one respect, the demographic situation would be easier for Tibet than Xinjiang since the number of permanent Han immigrants to Tibet is still low. In another, it would be more complex, since there are large Tibetan areas outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region.)

    I disagree that this would set a precedent for Inner Mongolia, if only because the Inner Mongolian population is overwhelmingly Han Chinese and has been so for at least the past century, possibly longer. One might as well imagine the Chinese northeast–the former Manchuria–becoming a Manchu nation-state.

    More importantly, this is why I don’t see China granting independence to Xinjiang any time soon. What nation-state wants to give up territory, especially if it fears that it might lead to further losses? Russia is not about to give up Chechnya, say, because it fears losing all of the North Caucasus to separatists, and perhaps beyond.

    • Indeed, so what’s the Chinese state to do? I’m really curious what folks like Mr. Wang propose specifically. The depth of hatred involved suggests a damned-if-you-do/damned-if-you-don’t reality that precludes any policy prescription save biding one’s time and keeping on keepin’ on…?

      Personally, I think there should be a high-level effort to invest in varsity and local sports — everyone look for the upcoming “Diamond in the Dunes” documentary, scheduled for broadcast on PBS in the US next year, about a Uyghur university baseball team captain struggling to hold his ethnically diverse team together for their big game against Tibetan students — to promote the “ethnic harmony” they so prize.

      • Terrence says:

        Tibetan exile Govt’s. longstanding view on solving Tibet’s problem is through dialogue, since 1979s HH Dalai lama has proposed middle way for political solution, this is based on current political situation but it does not mean Tibet concedes defeat to communist China. It was to find immediate solution based on compromise geo-political demands. Nonetheless China continues to rand Dalai lama as separatist, no matter how much compromise you show to Communist China it will never reflect upon their policies here won’t be any quid pro quo. China only knows how to subdue indigenous peoples and to colonize its peripheries…..

  18. Yaxue Cao says:

    The New York Times
    Chinese Officials Seek to Shift Attention From Rampage, MARCH 4, 2014

    with link to this essay

    http://chinachange.org/2014/03/03/excerpts-from-my-west-china-your-east-turkestan-my-view-on-the-kunming-incident/

  19. […] per la quale Osama Bin Laden non ha mai veramente menzionato gli uiguri o i Ceceni». Anche secondo Wang Lixiong, intellettuale di etnia Han sensibile alla causa uigura e tibetana, la componente religiosa nel […]

  20. […] In every society, it is the young males, especially unmarried ones without children, that pose the greatest social stability challenges of all.  It is only a matter of time before things hit critical mass, the point of no return, as dissident writer Wang Lixiong predicts. […]

  21. […] blog China Change, meanwhile, posted translated excerpts from Chinese writer Wang Lixiong‘s 2007 book My West China, Your East Turkestan. Wang’s […]

  22. […] Excerpts from “My West China, Your East Turkestan” — My View on the Kunming Incident, by Wang Lixiong […]

  23. […] There have been some reports that there was a “terrorist attack” in 廣東省(Guangdong Province) 廣州市 (Guangzhou City)‘s Metro. Where two men were spraying some sort of irritant into the air, causing spread and panic, where people ended up trampling over others: http://www.nownews.com/n/2014/03/04/1136443 In accordance with the “7 No’s” of not spreading rumors, CCTV had mentioned that this is merely a rumor. Not sure if they meant the incident didn’t happen at all, or whether or not it was just not a terrorist attack. UPDATE: March 4, 2014 A good piece on exactly how China’s presence in XinJiang is making it hard for locals: http://chinachange.org/2014/03/03/excerpts-from-my-west-china-your-east-turkestan-my-view-on-the-kun… […]

  24. nepacific says:

    This article conveys a number of home truths, but there is no chance that any Chinese government, “communist” or otherwise, will accept the independence of Xinjiang or Tibet. They are not only sources of raw materials that China proper lacks, but also buffers against dangers from India, Russia, and the central Asian countries. And they have been formally part of China for longer than the US has existed.

    The only way to make progress is for Chinese to better understand the non-Chinese people in the region, and to make more efforts to include them in government and in prosperity. Most Chinese think of Uighurs (and Tibetans) as “backward and dirty.” Getting rid of this prejudice is the first thing that has to be done, both by government policy and by more Uighur involvement in the rigors of Chinese life.

    But I don’t hold out much hope for avoiding violence, especially since I agree that China itself may have trouble dealing with its own centrifugal tendencies, if there is any serious economic downturn. I personally think everyone is better served by peace rather than violence, but the actual participants may feel differently. I do not discount the likelihood of CIA involvement in Xinjiang, either. In the furtherance of its own goals, the US (like other “great nations”) accepts a bit of violence and suffering…especially in other countries.

  25. manaut says:

    http://forum.uyghuramerican.org/forum/showthread.php?34876-mana-bu-bizning-halimiz&p=142807#post142807

    muhajirettiki qerindashlirmiz we teshkilatlirmiz arisda itipaqliq birlikning emelge ashalmasliqidiki sewep bizde dimukirattiye yoq. bir qsim kishler ozlirning gipini ras dep turiwalidu.kimning hoquqi chong bolsa shuning gipi gep boliwatidu.asasliqi ledirlirmizning sewyisi towen bolghach uyghur dewasigha toghra yitekchilik qilalmaywatidu. biz qabilyetlik rehberlirmizni qollishimiz, birqisim qabilyetsiz rehberlerni shallishimiz kerek.bu eng awal qilishqa tigishlik muhim ish.uyghur dewasigha rehberlik qilish uchun qorsaqta umach bulishi kerek. sherqi turkistan dewasini tereqqi qildurush uchun kuchluk sewiye telep qilinidu.sen sherqi turkistan dewasini ugunup bashlan’ghuchning diplomini alghan bolsang ottura mektepning balsgha deris birelmeysen. nowette dewa sepimizge kiriwalghan birqism munapiqlar teshkilatlirmizni jan baqidighan qoralgha aylanduriwaldi. bular gorohwazliq qilp,oghiri qaraqchilardek herket qilip yengidin bash koturup chiqqan teshkilatlarni urup yiqitiwatidu.dewani keynige sorewatidu. bundaq bulishidiki asasliq sewep ledirning teshikilatni yiteklep mangghidek sewiysning yoqlighida yaki bolmisa xitaygha bergen wede qesemlirni emelge ashurush uchun ishlewatqanlighida.sherqi turkistan sergerdan hokumiti,sherqi turkistan maarip hemkarliq jemiyiti qatarliq uyghur teshkilatlirning tek mewjut bulishi bir ijabi hadise idi.bu teshkilatlar ottursidiki mesillerni toghra hel qilalmighanliq yene del shu ledirning xataliqi. sen ozengni men uyghurning lediri deysen, likin arida buzghunchiliq qilisen.weten uchun jan pida qilshni xalaydighan heqiqi ot yurek inqilapchilar bilen heqiqi yusunda hemkarlishishni xalimaysen.sen zadi kim bilen hemkarlishishni xalaysen.sining haling shu tursa dewada qanchilik netije qolgha kelidu? uyghurning arzusi erkin hor yashash.hergizmu milyonir bulush emes.sen munapiq xitaydinmu zeherxende birdem qerindashlirmizni chetke qaqsang birdem xitay doslurung arqiliq qerindashlirmizni yoqitiwatisen.sen zadi qandaq ledir?

  26. […] fell within a year to the brutal warlord Sheng Shicai. The Chinese writer and activist Wang Lixiong mentions in his 2007 book My West China, Your East Turkestan that while some of Xinjiang’s Han residents […]

  27. ئالدامچىلىق says:

    ئالدامچىلىق

  28. […] disaster novel Yellow Peril (translated as China Tidal Wave), Sky Burial: The Faces of Tibet, and My West China, Your East Turkestan. In early July, they were put under house arrest for two days to prevent Woeser from meeting US […]

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